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INTRODUCTION
Article II of the United States Constitution mandates: "No person except a
natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President."'
The Twelfth Amendment establishes identical prerequisites for the Vice
1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. The remainder of the qualifications clause provides:
"[N]either shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age
of thirty five Years, and been fourteen years a Resident within the United States." Id.
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Presidency, 2 and the current federal succession statute permits only individuals
"eligible to the office of President under the Constitution"3 to act as President
in the event that both the President and Vice President are unable to fulfill the
obligations of office. 4 While the language of this portion of Article II may
appear clear on its face, few constitutional provisions are actually so opaque.
Who is a "natural born Citizen"? 5 Does the category encompass only persons
born within the geographic boundaries of the fifty states, or does it include
individuals born in Puerto Rico and other United States territories? 6 What
about Native Americans born on tribal lands, 7 or children born to American
parents living abroad? 8 Does the Fourteenth Amendment's declaration that
2 U.S. CONST. amend XII ("But no Person constitutionally ineligible to the office of
President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.").
3 3 U.S.C. § 19(e) (2000).
4 The line of succession begins with the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
followed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and then the members of the cabinet,
provided they have been appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate - i.e., cabinet
members who hold office as a result of unconfirmed recess appointments are not eligible to
serve as Acting President. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 184-192.
5 See U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 5.
6 See generally Ediberto Roman, The Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of
U.S. Colonialism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1998) (discussing the limited citizenship rights
of Puerto Ricans).
7 In Elk v. Wilkins, the Supreme Court held that a member of an Indian tribe recognized
by the United States was not a citizen of the United States pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, because he was not born "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States. 112
U.S. 94, 109 (1884). Although Congress conferred birthright citizenship on all Native
Americans by statute in 1924, see infra note 259, the Supreme Court has never overruled
Elk. As discussed in more detail in Part II, as a result of the Elk decision, the natural born
citizenship status of many Native Americans is unclear.
8 The status of children born to United States citizens living abroad has been at the heart
of much of the controversy surrounding the natural born citizenship proviso. As early as
1790, Congressman Burke stated: "The case of children of American parents born abroad
ought to be provided for." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1160 (1790), quoted in Charles Gordon, Who
Can Be President of the United States: The Unresolved Enigma, 28 MD. L. REv. 1, 8 (1968).
"[T]he Constitution arguably excludes from Presidential eligibility persons born to
American citizens, and thus born as Americans [pursuant to federal statutes], but born
abroad.... [T]hese two million Americans fall under a substantial legal cloud." James C.
Ho, President Schwarzenegger, or at Least Hughes?, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 108, 108 (2004)
[hereinafter President Schwarzenegger]. Compare Weedin v. Chin Bow, 275 U.S. 657, 670
(1927) ("[Alt common law the children of our citizens born abroad were always natural
born citizens from the standpoint of this Government .... "), with United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702-03 (1898) ("A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United
States can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of the
annexation of foreign territory; or by authority of Congress, exercised either by declaring
certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon
foreign-born children of citizens, or by enabling foreigners individually to become citizens
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"[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside[] ' 9 alter the original meaning of Article II? The answers to these
questions have proven intractably elusive throughout our nation's history.
The exclusivity of the natural born citizenship proviso has caused both
politicians and scholars to describe it as anachronistic and "decidedly un-
American" because it bars so many Americans, including thousands who have
fought for their country, from serving as President.' 0 The clause almost
certainly precludes popularly elected officials such as Michigan's Canadian-
born Democratic Governor Jennifer Granholm and California's Austrian-born
Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger1 1 from the Presidency and Vice
by proceedings in the judicial tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization
acts."). The natural born citizenship status of children born to United States citizen parents
living abroad is addressed in Part II.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10 149 CONG. REC. S9251 (2003) (remarks of Sen. Orin Hatch) [hereinafter Remarks of
Senator Hatch]. Senator Hatch pointed out that "[p]erhaps most disturbing is that the scores
of foreign-born men and women who have risked their lives defending the freedoms and
liberties of this great nation. . . remain ineligible for the Office of President. More than 700
recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor - our Nation's highest decoration for valor
- have been immigrants." Id. at S9252; see also President Schwarzenegger, supra note 8, at
108 (characterizing the ineligibility of naturalized citizens for the Presidency as a form of
second-class citizenship); Randall Kennedy, A Natural Aristocracy?, 12 CONST. COMMENT.
175, 176 (1995) (criticizing "idolatry of place of birth" that bars even individuals who have
risked their lives for their country from the nation's highest office); Robert Post, What Is the
Constitution's Worst Provision?, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 193 (1995) (attacking the
validity of birthplace as a "proxy for allegiance"); Akhil Reed Amar, Natural Born Killjoy:
Why the Constitution Won't Let Immigrants Run for President, and Why that Should
Change, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Apr. 2004, at 16, 16-17 [hereinafter Natural Born Killjoy]
(offering reasons, including the ineligibility of two popular governors to the office of
President, why the clause should be eliminated); Maximizing Voter Choice: Opening the
Presidency to Naturalized Americans: Hearing on S. 2319 before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 108th Cong. (Oct. 5, 2004) (remarks of Congressman Conyers), at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfin?id=1 326 [hereinafter Maximizing Voter Choice] (last
visited November 20, 2004).
11 The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the natural born citizenship proviso
precludes naturalized citizens from serving as President. See, e.g., Schneider v. Rusk, 377
U.S. 163, 165 (1964); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946); Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673 (1944); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913).
Thus, as discussed in Part II, individuals born outside the United States who have no claim
to United States citizenship other than post-birth naturalization by a judicial tribunal
pursuant to federal naturalization statutes are barred from serving as President or Vice
President. However, children born to United States citizen parents living abroad, as well as
Americans born in Puerto Rico and some other United States territories, are birthright
citizens. See discussion infra notes 209-229. Whether they and other birthright citizens
born outside the fifty states are "natural born" within the meaning of Article II has never
been resolved. See infra Part II.
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Presidency, and it differentiates Illinois-born Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
from Mozambique native Teresa Heinz Kerry, although both are United States
citizens.1 2 The impact of the proviso on several current and past presidential
contenders who are birthright, but not necessarily "natural born," citizens is
uncertain. 13 For example, Senator John McCain, whose name has frequently
surfaced as a potential Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidate in recent
years, was bom in the Panama Canal Zone; 14 former Michigan Governor
George Romney, a candidate in the 1968 Presidential primaries, was the child
of American missionaries living in Chihuahua, Mexico; 15 Eleanor Roosevelt
gave birth to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr., a member of Congress once
considered a possible successor to his father, at a family estate on Campobello
Island in New Brunswick, Canada; 16 and Senator Barry Goldwater, who ran
against President Lyndon Johnson in 1968, came into the world in the territory
of Arizona. 17 If any of these men had won a national election, would he have
12 Compare Hillary Rodham Clinton, Biography, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/firstladies/hc42.html (last modified Apr. 14, 2004), with
Teresa Heinz Kerry, Biography, at http://www.johnkerry.com/about/teresa-heinz-kerry
(last visited Nov. 7, 2004).
13 See infra Part II.
14 WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA 3447 (Danielle Netta et al. eds., 57th ed. 2003); JAMES W.
JOHNSON, ARIZONA POLITICIANS: THE NOBLE AND THE NOTORIOUS 10-17 (2002); see also
James C. Ho, Unnatural Born Citizens and Acting Presidents, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 575,
579 (2000) [hereinafter Unnatural Born Citizens] (suggesting that although McCain was
born in the Canal Zone, he is a natural born citizen under the common law).
15 18 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 803 (1999); Unnatural Born Citizens, supra note
14, at 579 & n.2 1; Anthony Ripley, Romney Declares He is in '68 Race: Predicts Victory,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19. 1967, at 1, cited in Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction:
The "Easy Case" of the Under-Aged President, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 250, 252-53 (1989);
M.B.W. Sinclair, Postmodern Argumentation: Deconstructing the Presidential Age
Limitation, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 451, 457 & n.29 (1999). In a legal opinion published in
the Congressional Record in 1967, the Honorable Pinckney McElwee concluded that "Mr.
George Romney of Michigan is ineligible to become President of the United States because
he was born in Mexico and is, therefore, not a natural-born citizen as required by the United
States Constitution." 113 CONG. REC. 15,875, 15,880 (1967) (Brief of the Hon. Pinckney G.
McElwee introduced by Mr. Dowdy) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter McElwee Brief].
16 18 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 826 (1999). On May 16, 1949, The New York
Times reported on a study concluding that Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr., "never can carry
that great name back into the White House" because of his Canadian birth. Warren
Freedman, Presidential Timber: Foreign Born Citizens of American Parents, 35 CORNELL
L. Q. 357, 357 n.2 (1950) (quoting N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1949, at 26). Herbert Hoover's son
and namesake, born when his parents were living in London, was another foreign born
citizen thought of as a potential Presidential candidate. Herbert Hoover Chronology,
Herbert Hoover Presidential Library and Museum, at
http://www.hoover.archives.gov/education/chronology.html (last visited July 28, 2004); see
also McElwee Brief, supra note 15, at 15,879.
17 THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT: 1964, 211-12 (1965)
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been "eligible to the Office of President' 8 pursuant to Article 11, or would he
have been disqualified because he was not a natural born citizen? 19 Absent a
definitive Supreme Court ruling, there is no way to know.
The tragic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the recent threat of a
SARS pandemic 2° raise additional, even more critical, concerns about
Presidential eligibility. If an uncontrolled disease pathogen or another terrorist
attack left both President and Vice President dead or incapacitated, questions
of eligibility pursuant to the natural born citizenship proviso could exacerbate a
tense situation by complicating an already problematic Presidential succession
mechanism. 2' Federal law permits only persons constitutionally qualified to
(recounting Goldwater's birth in the Territory of Arizona in 1909, and the involvement of
the Goldwater family in territorial affairs); see also Gordon, supra note 8, at 1 (mentioning
the Republican Presidential candidate's birth in Arizona prior to statehood).
18 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
" A law suit was apparently filed in a state court - and later dismissed - challenging
Senator Goldwater's qualifications for the Presidency, see Gordon, supra note 8, at 28 n.219
(referencing newspaper accounts of the lawsuit), and legal action against Governor Romney
appeared imminent at the time he withdrew from the race. See D'Amato, supra note 15, at
252-53 (asserting that the Romney campaign's strategy "was to defuse the issue [of his
natural born citizenship credentials] and get Romney nominated by the Republican party.
The matter could then be left for scholars, lawyers and perhaps the Supreme Court justices
to quibble about"); Gordon, supra note 8, at 29 n.229 (noting that the New York Times
published an article on the possibility of a lawsuit challenging Romney's qualifications for
the Presidency, but indicating Romney withdrew from the race before any such lawsuit was
filed); Romney's Foes, or Friends, Expected to File Court Test of His Citizenship, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1967, at 26; see also McElwee Brief, supra note 15, at 15,880 ( "I find no
proper legal or historical basis on which to conclude that a person born outside of the United
States could ever be eligible to occupy the Office of President of the United States.... Mr.
George Romney is ineligible... because he was born in Mexico and.., not a natural-born
citizen, as required by the United States Constitution." (emphasis in original)).
20 See, e.g., Rosie Mestel, SARS May Be Just the Start: Crowded Conditions, Food
Production and World Travel Increase the Odds for Lethal Viruses, L.A. TIMES, May 3,
2003, at Al (reporting on experts' predictions of a widespread outbreak of SARS). For a
gripping account of a past pandemic providing an idea of the potential for a new disease
strain, see JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE EPic STORY OF THE DEADLIEST
PLAGUE IN HISTORY (2004) (describing the speed, lethality, and geographic reach of the
1918 influenza pandemic).
2" This article focuses on issues related to the exclusivity and ambiguity of the natural
born citizen proviso, but there are a number of reasons why we should be concerned about
practical problems with implementing various aspects of presidential succession procedures,
as well as the issue whether the federal succession statute, 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2000), is
constitutional. See Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the
Constitution's Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REv. 215 (1994) (discussing problems with
federal succession law) [hereinafter Succession Gap]; Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David
Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REv. 113, 114
(1995) [hereinafter Is Succession Law Constitutional?] (questioning the constitutionality of
the presidential succession statute); William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, The
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serve as President to become Acting President. 22 Consequently, the proviso
Realities of Presidential Succession: The Emperor Has No Clones, 75 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1392
(1987) (warning that presidential incapacity for even a few minutes is very dangerous);
Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV.
155 (1995) (discussing possible succession scenarios capable of engendering constitutional
crises); Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Constitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653,
1810-12 (2002) (discussing potential complications if a President-elect is not
constitutionally qualified for the Presidency); Paul Taylor, Proposals to Prevent
Discontinuity in Government and Preserve the Right to Elected Representation, 54
SYRACUSE L. REV. 435 (2004) (identifying nine significant problems with current
succession procedures and suggesting solutions); Howard M. Wasserman, Structural
Principles and Presidential Succession, 90 Ky. L.J. 345, 414 (2001) (suggesting revisions
of federal succession statute); see also infra Part I.B.4.
In the fall of 2002, the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution jointly
established the Continuity of Government Commission to review issues pertaining to
possible terrorist attacks on the United States government. See CONTINUITY OF
GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: THE FIRST REPORT OF THE
CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT COMMISSION i-ii,
http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/report/report.html (June 4, 2003) (stating the
mission of the Commission). Lloyd Cutler and Alan Simpson co-chair the Commission, and
former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford serve as honorary co-chairs. Its members
include a number of current and former government officials. Id. at v. The Commission's
first report, issued in May 2003, begins with an apocalyptic description of a hypothetical
inauguration day:
It is 11:30 A.M., inauguration day. Thousands await the noon hour .... Television
networks have their cameras trained on the West Front of the Capitol, beaming live
coverage of the event into millions of homes around the world. Suddenly the television
screens go blank! Al Qaeda operatives have detonated a small nuclear device on
Pennsylvania Avenue halfway between the White House and the Capitol. Everyone
present at the Capitol, the White House, and in between is presumed dead, missing, or
incapacitated. The death toll is horrific... the American people are asking who is in
charge, and there is no clear answer.
Id. at 1. The report also observes that an even greater disaster could have occurred on
September 11, 2001, if United Flight 93 had departed on time and succeeded in hitting the
Capitol. Id. at 2. For additional discussion of the problem of catastrophic attack and
appropriate governmental responses, see Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution,
113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801 (2004). See also, James C. Ho, Ensuring the Continuity of
Government in Times of Crisis: An Analysis of the Ongoing Debate in Congress, 53 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1049 (2004).
22 3 U.S.C. § 19(e) (2000). Commentator James Ho emphasizes that there is no
constitutional bar excluding foreign born citizens from serving as Acting President.
Unnatural Born Citizens, supra note 14, at 584-85. He urges Congress to amend the federal
succession statute to eliminate the requirement that an Acting President meet the criteria for
the Presidency set forth in Article II. He points out that the statute's requirement of prior
Senate confirmation gives Congress a second chance to review candidates for Acting
President, and urges Congress to "extend to millions of current and future mothers and
fathers the distinctively American dream that their children might someday grow up to be
2005]
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would exclude individuals otherwise squarely in the line of succession, such as
former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger, Madeleine Albright, and Christian
Herter,23 and Bush administration cabinet members Elaine Chao, Secretary of
Labor, 24 Melquiades Martinez, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
and Carlos Gutierrez, Secretary of Commerce, 25 because all of these national
leaders originally came to this country as immigrants. The clause also creates
uncertainty about the eligibility of many other Americans to serve in the Oval
Office.26 Karen Hughes, a senior White House advisor to President George W.
Bush, stated the conventional wisdom in a talk show interview: "[M]y mom
always told me because I was the daughter of an Army officer born overseas in
Paris, France, that under the Constitution... I could never run for president.
27
We live in an increasingly mobile society in an era of rapidly escalating
(acting) President." Id. at 585; see infra Part V.C.
23 Secretary Kissinger was born in Fuerthe, Germany; Madeleine Albright was born in
Prague, Czechoslovakia; and Christian Herter was born in Paris, France. Other foreign born
cabinet members in the last thirty years include German-born W. Michael Blumenthal,
Secretary of Transportation under President Jimmy Carter; Mexican-born Governor George
Romney, who served as President Lyndon Johnson's Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development; Swiss-born C. Douglas Dillon, President Johnson's Secretary of the Treasury;
and Italian-born Anthony Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under
President Johnson. THE UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE BRANCH: A BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY
OF HEADS OF STATE AND CABINET OFFICIALS 679 (Robert Sobel & David B. Sicilia eds.,
2003).
24 Chao was born in Taipei, Taiwan in 1953, and moved to the United States in 1961. Id.
at 95.
25 Martinez was born in Sagua La Grande, Cuba in 1946, and became a naturalized
United States citizen in 1971. 2 WHO's WHO IN AMERICA 3393 (57th ed. 2003). Gutierrez
was also born in Cuba. See Elizabeth Llorente, The Breakfast Champ, at
http://www.hispaniconline.com/magazine/2004/jan-feb/coverstory/. The proviso also bars
many other well known Americans from the Presidency, including former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili;,Admiral Hyman Rickover who was known
as the "Father of the Nuclear Navy";, and Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter. General
Shalikashvili was born in Warsaw, Poland, id. at 4781, and Admiral Rickover in Makov,
Russia. 10 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 58 (15th ed. 2002). Justice Frankfurter
was born in Vienna, Austria, in 1882 and immigrated to the United States at age twelve.
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 314 (1992). It
also precludes more than 700 winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor. Remarks of
Senator Hatch, supra note 10, at S9252; see Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Invocations,
65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1295, 1302 (1997) (listing individuals in sensitive and high
government positions who have arguably been ineligible for the Presidency).
26 For example, President Lyndon B. Johnson's Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, Robert Weaver, and President Bill Clinton's Secretary of Commerce, Ron
Brown, both were born in the District of Columbia. See infra Part II.
27 Interview by Rush Limbaugh with Karen Hughes (April 15, 2004), at
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/estack/eib-interviews.guest.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2004). George Romney, however, apparently thought differently. See supra note 19.
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globalization. The results of the 2000 Census indicate that nearly 12.5 million
United States citizens are naturalized immigrants,2 8 more than 2.5 million are
Native Americans, and millions more come from United States territories.
29
Many others are the children of United States citizen parents living abroad at
the time of their births.30 Consequently, a dispute over the meaning of the
natural born citizenship proviso is almost certain to emerge as a national issue
in the near future. If the nation needed to resolve the meaning of the natural
born citizenship proviso tomorrow, who would decide, and how would that
decision impact the country?
31
In the more than two hundred years since the drafting of the 1787
Constitution, a number of legal historians and constitutional scholars have
explored the meaning of natural born citizenship, but no definitive
understanding has emerged. As Alexis de Tocqueville long ago observed:
"Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved,
sooner or later, into a judicial question." 32 If a dispute arises over the natural
born citizenship qualifications of a President or prospective President, it will
almost surely fall to the judiciary, and ultimately the United States Supreme
28 The word "naturalized" connotes different qualities of citizenship depending on the
context in which it appears. The term is often employed to describe a person who becomes
a United States citizen pursuant to the multi-step procedure specified by statute for
individual foreign naturals that culminates when the individual takes an oath of allegiance
before a judicial tribunal. The term "naturalized" can also be employed to describe
Americans who become citizens at birth pursuant to federal statutes - e.g., foreign born
citizens of United States citizen parents - or those who are collectively made citizens
pursuant to a treaty or other agreement. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884)
(describing the process of conferring citizenship on certain Native Americans by treaties
with individual tribes). These various routes to United States citizenship are discussed infra
in Part II.
29 See 2000 Census Chart QT-P14, Nativity, Citizenship Status, and Year of Entry,
http://factfmder.census.gov (last visited Nov. 7, 2004). See generally Dianne Schmidley,
U.S. Census Bureau, The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: March 2002, in
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS (2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-539.pdf
(last visited Nov. 7, 2004).
30 The census data excludes from its "foreign-born" count all persons who were "born in
the United States or a U.S. Island Area such as Puerto Rico or born abroad of at least one
parent who was a U.S. citizen." Schmidley, supra note 29, at 1.
31 As Bruce Ackerman and David Fontana point out in another context, the controversy
over the Presidential election of 2000 took place when "[t]he country was enjoying an
unparalleled period of peace and prosperity." Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas
Jefferson Counts Himself into the Presidency, 90 VA. L. REv. 551, 629 (2004). A dispute
over the meaning of natural born citizenship might well occur in the same kinds of
circumstances Ackerman and Fontana worry about with respect to another vote-counting
controversy - "when ideologically polarized parties may be struggling for the White House
under conditions of grave economic or international distress." Id. at 630.
32 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley, ed., Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc. 1945) (1835).
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Court, to determine the outcome. Yet, as the controversy surrounding the 2000
Bush-Gore contest amply demonstrated, 33 judicial resolution of disputes
arising out of Presidential elections can be painful for all concerned and
divisive for the nation. Whatever the merits of Bush v. Gore,34 the Florida vote
counting debacle eroded public confidence in the electoral process, and the
Supreme Court's reputation as an impartial forum suffered.35 Despite the
relative ease of the 2004 election, a second case placing the Supreme Court in
the position of determining who should hold the office of President could do
far greater damage. 36 Even more importantly, a challenge to the natural born
citizenship of an Acting President in the midst of a national crisis could prove
extraordinarily costly, even paralyzing, for the nation. The country needs a
clear, unassailable answer to the question of who is "eligible to the Office of
President" before a dispute arises. That answer should rest on the fundamental
principles of liberty and equality underlying the constitutional system of the
most powerful nation on earth, not on an artifact of the fears of a struggling
new nation.
This article explores the controversy surrounding the natural born
citizenship proviso in order to demonstrate why a constitutional amendment is
necessary to eliminate its inherent inequity and uncertain applicability, and to
offer substantive recommendations for initiating such an amendment. Part I
begins with a brief discussion of the historical and legal context of the natural
born citizenship proviso. Part II explores the elusive nature of the term
"natural bom Citizen," and Part III focuses on the perils of passively awaiting
judicial resolution of its meaning. The structural and policy reasons why
limiting the Presidency to natural born citizens is inconsistent with the spirit of
modern American democracy are discussed in Part IV, and Part V concludes
with an examination of past efforts to modify the proviso and offers
substantive recommendations for doing so today.
3 See generally BUSH v. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY (E.J. Dionne
Jr. & William Kristol eds., 2001); THE NEW YORK TIMES, 36 DAYS: THE COMPLETE
CHRONICLE OF THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CRISIS (2001).
34 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
31 See infra Part III, discussing reactions to the 2000 election dispute and the Supreme
Court's decision in Bush v. Gore.
36 See supra note 31. Although the battle never materialized, on the eve of the 2004
election, the nation braced for another legal battle "[a]s thousands of lawyers faced off
against a backdrop of a divided nation." John McCormick, Legal Fights Expected If Result
Is Razor-thin: Lawyers Poised in More than I State, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 1, 2004, at 1; see also,
e.g., Henry Weinstein, The Race for the White House: In Ohio Courts It's Almost Like
Florida in 2000, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2004, at A20. There is no reason to assume that we
have seen the end of legal battles over the Presidency.
[Vol. 85:53
'NATURAL BORN' IN THE USA
I. FENDING OFF PRINCES AND PROTECTING THE NATION: THE HISTORICAL
AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF THE PROVISO
Judges and constitutional scholars have come to very different conclusions
about the meaning of natural born citizenship, particularly with respect to the
status of individuals born to United States citizen parents living abroad and to
Native Americans born on tribal lands. The following section offers a brief
summary of the historical circumstances in which the natural born citizenship
language became part of the Constitution37 and discusses its interplay with the
Twelfth, Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-fifth Amendments and the federal
succession statute.
A. The Origins of the Natural Born Citizenship Clause
The phrase "natural born Citizen" appears only in Section 1, Clause 5 of
Article II; there is no reference to "natural born" citizenship in any other part
of the Constitution. The 1787 Constitution grants Congress power "to
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization" 38 and several times specifically
refers to "citizens. '39 It contains no definition of citizenship, 40 however,
17 For many years, scholars have debated the validity of seeking to understand the
original intentions of the Framers as a tool of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 205
(1980) (arguing for a flexible concept of original intent); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the
Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82
Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 227 (1998) (analyzing scholars' common objections to the "original
intent" approach of constitutional interpretation); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J.
1113, 1214 (2003) (suggesting that these documents should be used, although as persuasive
rather than dispositive sources); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877, 881 (1996) (concurring with the view that the intent
of the Framers matters in interpreting the Constitution). Despite concern over the use of the
secret drafting history documents to divine the Framers' intent, Kesavan & Paulsen, supra,
at 1214, "[v]irtually everyone agrees that the specific intentions of the Framers count for
something." Strauss, supra, at 881.
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
39 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; see also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162,
167 (1875) ("The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens.").
40 "[A]lthough the Constitution created a new national legal polity and a shared political
community, it failed to explicitly incorporate birthright citizenship or delineate that
doctrine's geographical boundaries." Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam:
The History, Evolution, and Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 683 (1995); see also Earl M. Maltz, Citizenship and the
Constitution: A History and Critique of the Supreme Court's Alienage Jurisprudence, 28
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1135, 1136-37, 1143 (1996) (contending that, contrary to the views of some
well known constitutional scholars, the concept of citizenship was important to the Framers
of the Constitution, as well as the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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possibly because articulating the bases for United States citizenship would
have required the Framers to confront directly issues pertaining to the status of
slaves and Native Americans.
4 1
The first known use of the term "natural born Citizen" in connection with
presidential qualifications appears in a July 25, 1787 letter from John Jay to
George Washington. 42  In the midst of the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia, Jay, who later became the nation's first Chief Justice, wrote:
Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a
strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our
national Government; and to declare expressly that the Command in
Chief of the American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but
a natural born Citizen.
43
41 The Constitution approved slavery in a sotto voce fashion, although the Framers took
pains never to mention the word. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (the "Three-Fifths
Compromise"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (barring Congressional prohibition of
importation of persons prior to 1808); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (providing for return of
persons "held to Service or Labor"). With respect to Native Americans, see Elk v. Wilkins,
112 U.S. 94, 112 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("At the adoption of the Constitution there were, in
many of the States, Indians, not members of any tribe, who constituted a part of the people
for whose benefit the State governments were established."). See also Drimmer, supra note
40, at 686-89 (discussing the impact of attitudes of racial superiority on the evolution of
United States citizenship); Gordon, supra note 8, at 2 (surmising that the Framers avoided
defining citizenship so as to avoid debates on slavery and state versus federal citizenship).
42 Jill A. Pryor, The Natural-Born Citizenship Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An
Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 888-89
(1988) (identifying Jay's letter as the likely source of the phrase "natural born citizen" in
Article II). Pryor also notes that in June 1787, a month before Jay sent his letter to
Washington, Alexander Hamilton drafted a "sketch of a plan of government" providing:
"No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States unless he be now
a Citizen of one of the States, or hereafter born a Citizen of the United States." Id. at 889
(footnotes omitted). The parallels between Hamilton's sketch and the final form of the
Presidential qualifications clause are obvious. Compare id. at 889 (statement of Alexander
Hamilton), with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. Hamilton apparently thought the President
should be a citizen from birth, but not necessarily by virtue of the place of his or her birth.
Pryor, supra, at 889. This is a reasonable assumption about the perspective of Hamilton,
who was born on the Caribbean island of Nevis, but is far from definitive. The Framers
may have attached significance to the addition of the word natural, or someone familiar
with the phrase "natural born subject," commonly used in English legal parlance, may have
added the phrase. See infra text accompanying note 87. Without additional primary source
material, it is impossible to determine why the Convention delegates added the word
"natural," or even to be sure precisely what Hamilton contemplated by the phrase "born a
Citizen." See Pryor, supra, at 889.
4" Gordon, supra note 8, at 5 (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 237 (1905)); see also
Christina S. Lohman, Presidential Eligibility: The Meaning of the Natural-Born Citizen
Clause, 36 GONZ. L. REv. 349, 352 (2000); Pryor, supra note 42, at 888-89. Some have
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speculated that Jay was concerned about Baron von Steuben of Prussia who fought with
Washington in the Revolutionary War. See CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE
PRESIDENCY 1775-1789, at 137 (De Capo Press 1969) (1923) (expressing a strong belief that
von Steuben was the foreigner worrying Jay when he wrote the letter); Pryor, supra note 42,
at 888 n.39 (recounting Thach's contention). Others have suggested fear of an attempt to
impose the second son of King George III, the Duke of York (also known as the Bishop of
Osnaburgh), as the ruler of the new nation, see, e.g., Remarks of Senator Hatch, supra note
10, at S9251 ("While there was scant debate on this provision during the Constitutional
Convention, it is apparent that the decision to include the natural born citizen requirement in
our Constitution was driven largely by the concern that a European monarch... such as the
Duke of York... might be imported to rule the United States."), or that "the fear of Austria
(and Prussia and Russia, too) ... motivated the Founders." President Schwarzenegger,
supra note 8, at 108 ("Those powers had just rigged the election of their own candidate as
the new monarch of Poland, in order to divide that nation's territory among themselves.");
see also Maximizing Voter Choice, supra note 10 (statement of Forrest McDonald)
(discussing the role of Austria, Prussia, and Russia in influencing Poland's political process
in the late eighteenth century and suggesting that the possibility of foreign influence, as well
as the possible lack of objectivity of naturalized citizens to their country of original
affiliation, remains a risk justifying retention of the natural born citizenship proviso); id.
(statement of John Yinger) (discussing the Framers' fears of foreign intervention and
ambivalence toward barriers to the full participation of naturalized citizens in the new
government); Constitutional Amendment to Allow Foreign-Born Citizens to Be President:
Hearing on H.J. Res. 88 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (July 24, 2000) (statement of Chairman Charles T. Canady),
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju67306.000/hju67306_O.HTM (last
visited Nov. 7, 2004) ("Some sources suggest that Jay was responding to a rumor that the
Convention was secretly designing a monarchy to be ruled by a foreign monarch, but Jay's
warning can also be seen simply as a reflection of the widely held fear of foreign influence
in this new country's elections and of a general distrust of executive power at that time.").
Placing restrictions on eligibility to serve in the role of a nation's chief executive is not
unique to the United States Constitution. A number of other countries have placed various
conditions on equivalent offices. See J. Michael Medina, The Presidential Qualification
Clause in this Bicentennial Year: The Need to Eliminate the Natural Born Citizen
Requirement, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 253, 255 n.9 (1987) (listing native-born citizen
requirements for chief executive in many countries' constitutions that are similar to the
United States Constitution's proviso); see also Alon Harel, Economic Culturalism: A
Comment on Dennis Mueller, Defining Citizenship, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 167,
174 (2002) (referring to the American natural born citizen proviso as "one of the most
anachronistic yet revealing legal manifestations of suspicion of foreigners"). Harel also
notes that "[slince Biblical times, it has been common practice to preclude foreigners from
serving as political leaders." Id. at 173 (citing Deuteronomy 17:15).
Public concern over the possibility that the Convention would create a monarchy was so
great that the delegates provided the press with an unofficial statement contradicting rumors
of any intent to establish a "monarchical form of government[:] ... [T]hough we cannot,
affirmatively, tell you what we are doing, we can, negatively, tell you what we are not doing
- we never once thought of a king." Cyril C. Means, Jr., Is Presidency Barred to Americans
Born Abroad?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 1955, at 28 (quoting PENNSYLVANIA
JOURNAL, Aug. 22, 1787).
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A few weeks later, on September 4, 1787, Washington wrote back to Jay
thanking him for his "hints."" In the interim, a number of developments took
place.
Among the many topics the delegates to the Constitutional Convention
debated during the late summer of 1787 was the subject of qualifications for
members of the new government. 45 Notes of the debates reflect that the
delegates discussed and rejected excluding persons who were not "native born"
from serving as Senators and Representatives, 46 but there is no record of any
colloquy involving the term "natural born Citizen. '47 Commentators disagree
as to whether the Framers used the terms "native born" and "natural born"
interchangeably. 48 There are at least some Supreme Court dicta suggesting
that the Court has interpreted the terms as equivalent. For example, in its 1875
decision in Minor v. Happersett, the Court opined: "[I]t was never doubted that
all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became
themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural born
4 Medina, supra note 43, at 259.
5 Id. at 258-60; Gordon, supra note 8, at 3-4.
46 Medina, supra note 43, at 259 n. 19 (citing ARTHUR TAYLOR PRESCOTT, DRAFTING THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 218-27, 266-72 (1941)) ("The principal justification advanced was
fear of foreign involvement and attachments. Madison successfully resisted the inclusion of
more stringent native-born qualifications for Senators and Representatives. He argued that
such limitations conveyed an air of illiberality, discouraged able and dedicated foreigners
from coming to the United States and would, in any event, not be effective against bribery
and corruption by foreign governments." (citations omitted); Natural Born Killjoy, supra
note 10, at 16-17 (reporting rumors of contacts with Prince Henry of Prussia and speculation
about George III's second son, as possible kings of America). The qualifications they
ultimately agreed on are set forth in Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 and Section 3, Clause 3.
Members of the House of Representatives must "have attained to the Age of twenty five
Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States," and each must "be an
Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." U.S. CONST. art. I § 2, cl. 2. Senators
must "have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United
States," and each Senator must also "be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be
chosen." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
41 See Pryor, supra note 42, at 885 (remarking on the lack of evidence of any discussion
of the meaning of the term "natural born citizen"); Gordon, supra note 8, at 3 (describing
the lack of debate at the Convention on the issue of Presidential qualifications). Like the
1787 Constitution, the Articles of Confederation did not define citizenship. See Drimmer,
supra note 40, at 683 (implying that the Framers were deliberately avoiding controversial
issues).
48 McElwee, for example, concludes that the terms were synonymous. McElwee Brief,
supra note 15, at 15,876 (arguing that the terms had the same common law meaning when
the Constitution was adopted). Randall Kennedy makes the same assumption in identifying
the natural born citizenship proviso as the Constitution's worst clause. Kennedy, supra note
10, at 176 ("[I]t wholly excludes from eligibility for the Presidency all persons who are not
native born." (emphasis in original)).
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citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. '49 A number of scholars
contend, however, that the Framers were well aware of the difference between
the two terms.
50
On August 22, 1787, the Convention's Committee on Detail - a five-
member panel assigned responsibility for composing a document incorporating
the delegates' ideas - proposed a first draft of the Constitution. 5' This initial
version included a Presidential qualifications clause with a threshold age of
thirty-five years and a twenty-one year residency requirement.5 2  The
Convention referred this provision and others to the Committee of Eleven - a
task force comprised of representatives from each of the eleven participating
states - for further review and incorporation of ideas generated in the
delegates' debates.5 3 The Committee of Eleven presented its subsequent draft
to the Convention on September 4, 1787. 54 In this draft the Presidential
qualifications clause appeared as: (1) the natural born citizenship criterion; (2)
a grandfather clause exempting those who were citizens at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution; and (3) a residency requirement reduced from
twenty-one to fourteen years. 55  The Convention adopted the clause as
presented by the Committee of Eleven without debate on the natural born
49 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court also
distinguished Native Americans from other Americans in early judicial decisions. See, e.g.,
Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1831) (stating "the relation
of the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions," and
characterizing Native American tribes as "domestic dependent nations"); Elk v. Wilkins,
112 U.S. 94, 111 (1884) (holding that Native Americans born into tribes recognized by the
United States are not U.S. citizens); see supra text accompanying note 7.
50 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 8, at 9 (stating that "a person who was regarded in 1790
as a naturalized [rather than native born] citizen could also be deemed natural born if he
acquired his United States citizenship at birth"); Medina, supra note 43, at 259 (explaining
that in the course of debates on prerequisites for Congressional office the Framers
considered, but ultimately rejected, Constitutional language requiring Senators to be
"native-born"); Alexander Porter Morse, Natural-Born Citizen of the United States:
Eligibility for the Office of President, 66 ALB. L.J. 99, 99 (1904-1905) (arguing that "the
Framers generally used precise language," knew the common meaning of "natural born,"
and distinguished it from "native born"). But see McElwee Brief, supra note 15, at 15,876
("At the time of the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, under the common law, the terms
native born citizen and natural born citizen were synonymous.").
" Pryor, supra note 42, at 885; Gordon, supra note 8, at 3-4; Medina, supra note 43, at
259. As the result of an apparent typographical error, Medina refers to the year of the Jay
letter as 1789. See id.
52 Gordon, supra note 8, at 4 n.21; Medina, supra note 43, at 259.
" Gordon, supra note 8, at 4.
14 Id. at 4 n.2 1.
55 2 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 498 (rev. ed.
1937); Medina, supra note 43, at 259-60; Pryor, supra note 42, at 885. Together with the
grandfather clause, the reduced residency term made all of the fifty-five convention
delegates eligible for the Presidency. Medina, supra note 43, at 260 n.26.
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citizenship requirement. 56 Neither Madison's notes on the Convention nor
other contemporaneous records of the debates offer insight on the delegates'
understanding of the meaning of natural born citizenship or the reasons why
they agreed with the Committee that it should be included in Article II.
57
Records of the debates of the state ratifying conventions are similarly
unenlightening. 58  It is important to note, however, that Jay's "hints" to
Washington rested on a solid foundation. England had a history of importing
foreign born heads of state, including such notable Kings as James I and
William of Orange, a practice confirmed by the inclusion of foreign born
royals in the line of succession set forth in the Act of Settlement of 1701.59
56 Pryor, supra note 42, at 886; see also 1 JONATHAN ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES OF THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 306 (2d
ed. 1859).
57 It should be noted that there is some controversy over the legitimacy of reliance on the
Constitution's secret drafting history as a tool of interpretation. See generally Kesavan &
Paulsen, supra note 37. In this instance, however, neither the materials originally held in
secrecy nor available public writings or records of state ratification debates offer insights
into the meaning of natural born citizenship. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
51 See Gordon, supra note 8 at 3 (noting absence of any meaningful information in
records of Constitutional Convention). McElwee, however, suggests that discussion of the
residency requirement and grandfather clause is instructive. McElwee Brief, supra note 15,
at 15,878-79. McElwee cites Bancroft's History of the U.S. Constitution to the effect that
objections arose at the Convention to the residency requirement on grounds that "no number
of years could properly prepare a foreigner for that place; but, as men of other lands had
spilled their blood in the cause of the United States, and had assisted at every stage of the
formation of their institutions[,] ... it was unanimously settled that foreign-born
residents.., at the time of the formation of the Constitution are eligible to the Office of the
President." Id. at 15,878 (quoting 2 BANCROFT'S HISTORY OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 192
(1882)) (emphasis in original). McElwee therefore argues that the Framers did contemplate
the situation of foreign born persons. McElwee Brief, supra, at 15,878-79. This begs the
question, however, whether the Framers would have considered their own children
foreigners if they happened to be born while their parents were living or traveling abroad,
perhaps in the service of their country. Moreover, McElwee's contention that the Framers
all shared the same heritage as British colonial subjects, id. at 15,879, misses the point that
imposition of the Duke of York as ruler of the new nation was one of the possibilities feared
by the Framers. See Remarks of Senator Hatch, supra note 10, at S9251. Gordon's
argument that the Framers would not have dealt so ungenerously with their own children is
far more persuasive. See Gordon, supra note 8, at 3.
59 Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (Eng.). See Natural Born Killjoy, supra
note 10, at 17. As Professor Akhil Amar testified:
[The Framers'] anxieties had been fed by England's 1701 Act, which, though it banned
foreigners from all other posts, imposed no native-birth requirement on the head of
state himself. In fact, the 1701 Act explicitly contemplated foreign born monarchs -
from the German House of Hanover, in particular. By 1787, this continental royal
family had produced three English kings named George, only the third of whom had
actually been born in England.
Maximizing Voter Choice, supra note 10 (testimony of Professor Akhil Amar). The phrase
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1. The Proviso as a Response to Fears of Foreign Monarchs
An early scholarly explication of the rationale for the natural born
citizenship requirement appdared in' 1933 in Justice Joseph Story's
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States.60 According to Justice
Story, two competing tensions were at work in the drafting of the natural born
citizenship proviso.6 1 First, as noted above, the Framers were concerned that
foreign born individuals purportedly loyal to the new country might secretly
maintain allegiance to the lands of their birth.62 There was at least some basis
for their fears. Contemporary English law presumed that all British subjects
maintained perpetual allegiance to the crown.63 At the same time, however,
there was widespread agreement that those who had fought with the colonists
"natural born citizen," or similar terminology, however, appears in several state
constitutions as a criterion for eligibility to serve in high state office. See Medina, supra
note 43, at 255 n.9 (listing state constitutions with natural born citizenship requirements for
governor).
60 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1479
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., William S. Hein & Co., 5th ed., photo. reprint 1994) (1891).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898) (explaining the British
common law doctrine of perpetual allegiance). To a large extent, the political and
intellectual understanding of the period was shaped by the doctrine of perpetual allegiance.
This concept held that a person born a subject of the English crown owed lifelong allegiance
to the sovereign. See infra text accompanying notes 76-79; see also McElwee Brief, supra
note 15, at 15,877. It also reflects the tension between the Framers' wish to encourage
immigration and "[a] dim and murky fear of foreigners [that] has, on occasion, cast its dark,
isolationist shadow over the entryway to the United States." Robert J. Shulman, Children of
a Lesser God: Should the Fourteenth Amendment Be Altered or Repealed to Deny
Automatic Citizenship Rights and Privileges to American Born Children of Illegal Aliens?,
22 PEPP. L. REV. 669, 670 (1995). Even Benjamin Franklin fell prey to this kind of
prejudice, as reflected in comments he once wrote about the changing demographics of
Pennsylvania: "Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a colony of
aliens who will shortly become so numerous as to Germanize us instead of Anglifying them,
and will never adopt our Language or Customs any more than they can acquire our
complexion." 3 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 73 (Albert H. Smyth, ed., 1905),
quoted in Polly J. Price, Alien Land Restrictions in the American Common Law: Exploring
the Relative Autonomy Paradigm, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 152, 152 (1999); see also Morse,
supra note 50, at 100 ("[T]he Framers thought it wise, in view of the probable influx of
European immigration to provide that the president should at least be the child of citizens
owing allegiance to the United States at the time of his birth."). There is ample evidence
that the Framers had a "vision of a white, English-speaking America." Romdn, supra note
6, at 19. Gabriela Evia, however, points out that non-citizen suffrage began in colonial
times and continued following the Revolution. Gabriela Evia, Consent by All the Governed:
Reenfranchising Noncitizens as Partners in America's Democracy, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 151,
154 (2003). She cites periodic outbreaks of xenophobia as the cause of increasing
restriction of non-citizen suffrage. Id. at 155-58.
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against England merited recognition of their contributions. 64 In Justice Story's
words: I I
This permission of a natural citizeri to become President ... was
doubtless introduced... out of respect to those distinguished
revolutionary patriots who were born in a foreign land, and yet had
entitled themselves to high honors in their adopted country. A positive
exclusion of them from the office would have been unjust to their merits
and painful to their sensibilities. But the general propriety of the
exclusion of foreigners, in common cases, will scarcely be doubted by
any sound statesman. It cuts off all chances for ambitious foreigners,
who might otherwise be intriguing for the office; and interposes a barrier
against those corrupt interferences of foreign governments in executive
elections, which have inflicted the most serious evils upon the elective
monarchies of Europe. Germany, Poland, and even the pontificate of
Rome, are sad but instructive examples of the enduring mischiefs arising
from this source.
65
It is impossible to say whether Justice Story was correct, but his view makes
a great deal of sense. The new nation was a lone democracy - a radical
experiment with a government based on fidelity to ideals and principles in a
world dominated by the politics of bloodlines, religious ties, and ethnic
allegiances. It remained to be seen whether the nation would survive for even
a generation. There is no question that the potential influence of foreign
monarchs on members of the new government was one of the Framers'
principal anxieties. Knowledge of that concern sheds light on their reasons for
placing a restriction on eligibility for the Presidency, but it does not resolve the
meaning of the clause.
2. Natural Born Citizenship and the Common Law
The early common law of the United States rested extensively, although not
exclusively, on English common law.6 6 The prerequisites for citizenship
differed among the states, as did the degree to which each imported and
adopted English common law concepts and began creating its own laws prior
to 1776. There was no uniform rule of naturalization until the First Congress
passed the Naturalization Act of 1790.67 In an effort to understand the natural
' STORY, supra note 60, § 1479.
65 STORY, supra note 60, § 1479 (citations omitted).
66 Pryor, supra note 42, at 887 (explaining that the colonies adopted British common law
to differing degrees) (citing JAMES KETrNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP
1608-1870, at 78, 90-93 (1978)); ELIZABETH G. BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN
LAW 1776-1836, at 14 (1964)); Gordon, supra note 8, at 5 (contending that the colonies'
adoption of British common law varied widely).
67 Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795); see Pryor, supra note
42, at 887-88 (stating that states' naturalization laws varied prior to the Naturalization Act
of 1790).
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born citizenship proviso, however, both courts and commentators have turned
to the English common law extant in 1787,68 although they disagree about the
degree to which the Framers were familiar with or shared a common
understanding of British precedents pertaining to citizenship. 69 The Supreme
Court has often emphasized that "[t]he interpretation of the constitution of the
United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are
framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the
light of its history.
''70
A venerable tenet of the English common law of nationality is that ofjus
soli.7 1 Jus soli72 links the mutual allegiance and protection of subject and
68 See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898); Moore v. United
States, 91 U.S. 270, 274 (1875); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167 (1874);
Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 621 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) (discussing application of common
law to distinction between natural born and native born under New York law); McElwee
Brief, supra note 15, at 15,875; Gordon, supra note 8, at 7 ("The Framers certainly were
aware of the long-settled British [common law.]").
69 Compare McElwee Brief, supra note 15, at 15,877 (arguing that the British common
law rule ofjus soli was shared by all of the English colonies at the time of the Declaration of
Independence and in the United States when the new nation was created), and Gordon,
supra note 8, at 31 (stating that the natural born citizen proviso "must be considered in the
light of the... English common law, particularly as it had been declared or modified by
statute [in 1787]"), with Pryor, supra note 42, at 888 (concluding that in 1787 "there was no
common understanding of what 'natural born citizen' meant).
71 Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888) (quoted in Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at
655). While the original document neither defined citizenship nor indicated whether United
States citizenship was to be based on the English common law understanding, "[t]he
community gradually clarified the Constitution's ambiguities regarding birthright
citizenship by applying common law principles" and defined the boundaries of the nation as
including the territories of the "American empire." Drimmer, supra note 40, at 683-84
(citing Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 319 (1820)). There are important
twists in the process of American adoption of common law nationality principles, however.
First, the government corrupted the principle ofjus soli by denying citizenship to African
American children born to enslaved parents and later, as a result of Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), by denying the citizenship of even free African Americans.
Id. at 404. In later years, the Supreme Court upheld deportations of Chinese laborers denied
any possibility of becoming citizens under then-existing naturalization laws on grounds that
"vast hordes... crowding in upon us... , [who] will not assimilate" need not be accorded
any rights. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706 (1893). Second, the Court
ruled that members of Native-American tribes recognized by the United States government
were not birthright citizens on grounds that they were not subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S.
94, 109 (1884); see supra text accompanying note 7. Third, the Court upheld the exclusion
of United States citizens from "military areas" - part of a series of actions culminating in
the internment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II - simply because of
their ancestry. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944). See generally
Drimmer, supra note 40, at 684-94.
71 Gordon, supra note 8, at 6-7 ("It is indisputable that the jus soli, under which
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sovereign to birth within the sovereign's realm.7 3 In contrast, pursuant tojus
sanguinis7 4 - more commonly associated with civil law during the last two
centuries - nationality is transmitted to children by descent rather than on the
basis of birthplace. 75 As the Supreme Court explained in its 1898 decision in
United States v. Wong Kim Ark,76 "[t]he fundamental principle of the common
law with regard to English nationality was birth within the allegiance.. . of the
King. The principle embraced all persons born within the King's allegiance
and subject to his protection. '77 Encompassed within this relationship were the
children of English parents and those of "aliens in amity. '78 Children of
foreign ambassadors and enemy aliens "were not natural-born subjects,
because [they were] not born within the allegiance, the obedience, or ... the
jurisdiction of the king."
79
Records from as far back as 1343, however, also reflect Parliament's
concern with foreign born children of English subjects, particularly their
inheritance rights.80 In 1350, Parliament enacted a statute declaring that these
nationality is determined by the place of birth, was always the basic tenet of the English
common law.") (citing Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. at 660; Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at
649). See generally Freedman, supra note 16, at 360; Polly J. Price, Natural Law and
Birthright Citizenship in Calvin's Case, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 77-80 (1997).
72 Latin meaning "right of the soil."
73 Gordon, supra note 8, at 6-7. See generally Freedman, supra note 16, at 359-60
(distinguishingjus soli from us sanguinis); Pryor, supra note 42, at 886 & n.24 (describing
jus soli as the "guiding principle[s] of nationality law in England").
7' Latin meaning "right of blood."
7' Gordon, supra note 8, at 6 (defining jus sanguinis as citizenship derived from one's
parents at the moment of birth). See generally Freedman, supra note 16, at 360; Pryor,
supra note 42, at 883 n.8. In the fourteenth century, Italian jurist Bartolus of Sassoferrato
developed one of the earliest theories of naturalization and the equal civic entitlement of
both birthright (cives originarius) and naturalized (civis pacto) citizens. Julius Kerstiner,
Civitas Sibe Faciat Civem: Bartolus of Sassoferrato 's Doctrine on the Making of a Citizen,
48 SPECULUM No. 4 at 694 (1973).
76 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
77 Id. at 655. See generally Gordon, supra note 8; Drimmer, supra note 40; KETrNER,
supra note 66.
78 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 655.
79 Id. On the basis of this common law principle, the Court ultimately concluded that the
American born child of alien parents of Chinese descent, who were neither diplomats nor
official representatives of the government of China, was a United States citizen. Id. With
few exceptions, subsequent commentators agree with the Court's conclusions with respect
to children of alien parents born within the United States. See infra Part II. But see PETER
H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE
AMERICAN POLITY 4 (1985) (questioning a grant of citizenship based on any involuntary
factor and arguing for citizenship based on individual consent as the basis for a well-
functioning polity).
" See Gordon, supra note 8, at 6-7 (noting that the issue was discussed by Parliament in
1343, but that the plague delayed legislative action).
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children should "'have and enjoy the same benefits and advantages'.., in
regard to the right of inheritance" as children born in England.8 1 In 1677,
following the demise of the Puritan Commonwealth, Parliament passed a
statute declaring that the children of persons who had fled England during
Cromwell's rule were to be considered "natural-born subjects. ' 82 A 1708 law
provided that the children of natural born subjects were to be "deemed,
adjudged and taken to be natural-born subjects ... to all intents, constructions
and purposes whatsoever ... ;-83 and a 1731 Act of Parliament declared that
the foreign born grandchildren of natural born subjects were also natural born
subjects.84 During the eighteenth century, Parliament also enacted statutes
governing the eligibility of British subjects born abroad to hold public office.
The Act of Settlement of 1701 barred even naturalized foreign born subjects,
except those "born of English Parents" from serving in Parliament or holding
other high public office - although the royal line of succession confirmed in
the Act included Princess Sophia Eletress, Dowager Duchess of Hannover, and
other foreign born members of the royal family. 85 Several decades later, in
1740, Parliament allowed foreign born subjects to hold office in the colonies,
but not in England or Ireland.
86
By 1787, English law thus included two bases for natural born citizenship:
(1) birth in England; and (2) birth abroad as the child or grandchild of a natural
born English subject. 87 English law, however, also encompassed precedent for
81 Id. at 6-7 (quoting 25 Edw. 3, c. 2, § 5 (1350) (Eng.)).
82 Id. at 7 (quoting 29 Car. 2, c. 6, § 1 (1677) (Eng.)).
83 Id. at 7 (quoting 7 Ann., c. 5, § 3 (1708) (Eng.)). Gordon remarks that the 1708 statute
"was substantially reenacted by 4 Geo. [2], c.21 (1731)." Id. at n.44.
84 Pryor, supra note 42, at 886 & n.27 (citing KETrNER, supra note 66, at 15 n.10;
quoting An Act ... For naturalizing the children of natural-born subjects of the crown, 4
Geo. 2, c. 21 (1731)).
81 Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (Eng.); see also Pryor, supra note 42, at
886 & n.28 (doubting that the Framers imitated the Act of Settlement because colonists
resented the Act ) (citing KETrNER, supra note 66, at 124-26). Kettner and Pryor both reject
the idea that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention intended to incorporate the
principles of the 1701 British Act of Settlement into the American Constitution, because the
colonists viewed the Act of Settlement with hostility and, in the Declaration of
Independence, accused King George III of various transgressions related to migration to the
colonies and naturalization of foreign settlers.
86 Pryor, supra note 42, at 887 & n.29 (citing 13 Geo. 2, ch. 7 (1740), clarified by 13
Geo. 3, ch. 25 (1773).
87 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 5-7. According to Gordon, "the leading British
authorities agree that under the early common law, status as a natural-born subject probably
was acquired only by those born within the realm, but that the statutes ... enabled natural-
born subjects to transmit equivalent status at birth to the children born to them outside of the
kingdom." Id. at 7 (citing 1 COKE ON LITTLETON 8a, 129a (F. Hargrave & C. Butler eds.,
1853); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 154-57 (Dean Gavit ed., 1941); SIR. ALEX
CoCKBURN, NATIONALITY: OR THE LAW RELATING TO SUBJECTS AND ALIENS, CONSIDERED
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restricting the political role of foreign born subjects. Unfortunately, there is no
way to ascertain whether, or to what extent, the Framers were relying on any
particular British precedent when they included the phrase "natural born
Citizen" in Article II. On the basis of the English common law as "declared or
modified by statute,"88 Charles Gordon contends:
'Natural-born citizen' doubtless was regarded as equivalent to 'natural-
born subject,' adjusted for the transition from monarchy to republic. The
Framers certainly were aware of the long-settled British practice,
reaffirmed in recent legislation in England, which unquestionably
'applied to the colonies before the War of Independence,' to grant full
status of natural-born subjects to the children born overseas to British
subjects. There was no warrant for supposing that the Framers wished to
deal less generously with their own children. 89
Although some commentators agree with Gordon's analysis, 90 others believe
it is flawed. Jill Pryor, for example, points out that whether British nationality
laws applied to the colonies is unclear. 9 1 She observes that "[p]rominent jurists
of the time disagreed over the proper legal analogy for the colonies, while the
colonists wanted the protection of the British common law without being
subject to control by Parliament. '92  Commentator Christina Lohman
emphasizes the complexity of the picture.9 3 Reception statutes differed from
colony to colony, and, while courts and legislators looked to the English
common law heritage, they disagreed with many of the enactments of
Parliament, as well as the King's positions on immigration matters. 94 Pinckney
WITH A VIEW TO FUTURE LEGISLATION 9 (1869); A.V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF
ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 173-78 (1896 ed. with Moore's Notes
of American Cases)). Gordon notes that Dicey "is most explicit in stating that a natural-
born subject 'means a British subject who became a British subject at the time of his birth'
and that this designation includes a person born abroad whose father or paternal grandfather
was born in British dominions." Id. at 7 (citing DICEY, supra, at 173-78).
88 Id. at 31. Gordon's qualifying language pertaining to statutory modifications reflects
fundamental differences in perception of what British common law precedents actually
encompassed. Gordon would include statutory declarations and modifications in place prior
to 1787. Id.
89 Id. at 7-8 (citations omitted).
0 Freedman, supra note 16, at 357 ("It is submitted that a foreign born child of
American parents can rightly aspire to the position of President and hold such high office in
accord with the eligibility requirements laid down both under common law principles and
the entire body of statutory law."); Means, supra note 43, at 13171. ("American children
born abroad are eligible to the offices of the President and the Vice President of the United
States."); Morse, supra note 50, at 100 ("the child of citizens of the United States, wherever
born, is 'a natural-born citizen of the United States,' within the constitution requirement").
91 Pryor, supra note 42, at 887.
92 Id.
93 See generally Lohman, supra note 43.
94 The Framers were concerned about encouraging immigration. See, e.g., THE
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McElwee, author of a briefing paper on natural born citizenship submitted to
Congress in 1967 when Mexican-born Governor George Romney was in the
running for the Republican Presidential nomination, argues that only the
English common law, stripped of the gloss of statutory precedent, was
relevant. 95 He contends that under the British common law, "natural born"
meant "native born,"96 and that British subjects would have been aliens in the
absence of statutory law.97 By these lights, foreign born children of American-
citizen parents were not "natural born" within the meaning'of Article II. They
were not even citizens until Congress passed the first national naturalization
law in 1790.98
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2, 9 (U.S. 1776) ("[T]he present King of Great-
Britain ... has endeavoured to prevent the Population of these States; for that Purpose
obstructing the Laws of Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage
their Migrations hither, and raising the Conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.").
95 McElwee Brief, supra note 15, at 15,876.
96 Id. McElwee's position finds support in dicta in the Supreme Court's decisions in
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 658-59 (1898), and Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 665
(1927), as well as lower court decisions. See e.g., Wong Foong v. United States, 69 F.2d
681, 682 (9th Cir. 1934) (holding that children of English fathers born abroad were not
citizens under the common law); Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356, 369-70 (1863)
(discussing the history of the debate as to whether children born to citizen parents abroad
are citizens); Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) (differentiating between
natural born and native born under New York law).
97 McElwee Brief, supra note 15, at 15,876. ("It is very doubtful whether the common
law covered the case of children born abroad to subjects of England.").
98 Id. at 15,877. McElwee bases his conclusions on his analysis of British decisions to
the effect that all children born abroad, except for a few categories such as children of
ambassadors, were aliens who became British citizens through naturalization. Id. at 15,876
("independently of statute, everyone born abroad is an alien") (citations omitted).
McElwee, however, also relies on language from authorities that is ambiguous at best. See,
e.g., id. at 15,876 ("'Natural-born subject' means a British subject who has become a British
subject at the moment of his birth.") (quoting DICEY, supra note 87, at 173). One can
become the subject of a sovereign at birth by the operation of either jus soli or jus
sanguinus. See Freedman, supra note 16, at 363-64. Whether or not they have a
constitutional claim to citizenship, United States law declares foreign born children of
United States citizen parents and Native Americans born on tribal lands citizens as of the
moment of birth. McElwee also cites Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 576
(1856), although it is hard to imagine a Supreme Court precedent weaker than Dred Scott.
He draws on language in Justice Curtis' concurring opinion: "Undoubtedly, [the natural
born Citizen] language of the Constitution... referred citizenship to the place of birth."
McElwee Brief, supra note 15, at 15,877 (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 576 (Curtis, J.,
concurring)). McElwee also cites to pronouncements in Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 649,
that merit attention but are nevertheless dicta. See McElwee Brief, supra note 15, at 15,877.
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B. The Proviso 's Interplay with Naturalization Laws and Key Constitutional
Amendments
1. Pre-Civil War Naturalization Statutes
In 1790, less than three years after the drafting of the Constitution, the First
Congress passed An Act to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,9 9 the
United States' first federal naturalization law. The Act provided for
naturalization of aliens in the United States, the derivative naturalization of
their children, and the transmission of United States citizenship by descent to
foreign born children of United States citizen fathers.10 0 Unfortunately, like
the Constitution's natural born citizenship proviso, the relevant language of the
1790 Act can be interpreted in different ways. In pertinent part, the statute
provided:
And the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born
beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered
as natural-born citizens: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not
descend to persons whose fathers have never been residents in the United
States ....101
Once again, there is no record of any meaningful discussion of "natural born
citizenship" during debate on the provision. 1
02
The 1790 Act could be read as simply declaratory - a means of providing a
clear statement of rights that the Framers already deemed to exist.103 There is
ample precedent for such declarations beginning with the Bill of Rights
itself.'0 4  As Charles Gordon points out, Congress later reaffirmed its
99 Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795) (allowing "any alien,
being a free white person" residing in the United States for at least two years to become a
citizen upon satisfaction of certain requirements); see David P. Currie, The Constitution in
Congress, Substantive Issues in the First Congress 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 822-
25 (1997) [hereinafter Substantive Issues in the First Congress].
10o Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, §1, 1 Stat. at 104 (repealed 1795).
tot §1, 1 Stat. at 104.
12 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 9-10 (citing Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 661
(1927)).
103 See, e.g., Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 714 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (opining that the
1790 Act was "clearly declaratory" of existing rights); Freedman, supra note 16, at 361
(postulating that the Act of 1790 was declaratory of the common law doctrine of Jus
Sanguinis); Morse, supra note 50, at 100 ("This provision as its terms express is declaratory;
it is not the statute that constitutes children of American parentage citizens; it is the fact of
American descent, thejus sanguinus, that makes them citizens at the moment of birth.").
104 As the Ninth Amendment makes clear, the rights of the people were never deemed to
be limited to those set forth in the Constitution - these amendments were intended to clarify
existing rights. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 6.1, at 456 (2d ed. 2002); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-12,
at 903-04 (3d. ed. 2000).
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adherence to jus soli as a basis for United States citizenship in the text of
several subsequent naturalization statutes, even after the Fourteenth
Amendment raised this principle to the level of a constitutional mandate.
10 5
Reading the 1790 Act as declaratory is logical, particularly because the last
sentence appears to be a caveat limiting the corresponding English law
principle extending natural born subject status to both children and
grandchildren of natural born British subjects.
10 6
Alternatively, perhaps Congress believed it necessary to enact the statute
because foreign born children would not otherwise inherit their parents'
citizenship status.' 0 7 If so, questions arise concerning the constitutionality of
the Act.' 0 8 To the extent that bestowing natural born citizenship on the foreign
born children of United States citizen parents constituted a legislative attempt
to expand the field of persons qualified for the Presidency pursuant to Article
II, the statute was arguably unconstitutional. 0 9 As Gordon and Pryor suggest,
however, the concepts of natural born citizenship and naturalization at birth are
not mutually exclusive. 10 Pryor specifically argues that "naturalization can
create natural citizens,"' I Icontending that the large number of Convention
delegates who held seats in the First Congress supports the notion that
Congress acted in accordance with the intent of the Framers." 2 While it is true
105 Gordon, supra note 8, at 10.
106 Id. at 9 & n.68.
107 See, e.g., Pryor, supra note 42, at 894-95; McElwee Brief, supra note 15, at 15,879.
108 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 9-10; Pryor, supra note 42, at 883 n. 9; McElwee Brief,
supra note 15, at 15,877 (contending that "the Act of March 26, 1790 would be
unconstitutional if it attempted to enlarge the rights of a naturalized citizen to be equal to
those of natural-born citizens under the Constitution" and terming inclusion of "natural-
born" in the Act as an error that was never repeated).
109 Gordon, supra note 8, at 9-10. Gordon's position finds support in Powell v.
MeCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), where the Supreme Court held that Congress may not
constitutionally add to the qualifications established for members of the House of
Representatives by Article I, Section 2, and in United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779 (1995), where the Court ruled that states are similarly barred from imposing limits
on Congressional terms and held that the qualifications set forth in the Constitution are
exclusive. See CHtEMERINSKY, supra note 104, § 2.8.5, at 142. See generally SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 1020 (2d rev. ed. 2002).
110 Gordon, supra note 8, at 9; Pryor, supra note 42, at 894.
1" Pryor, supra note 42, at 894 (emphasis in original).
112 Id. at 894-95. Pryor also contends "[t]hat these statutes have never been challenged
on the grounds that they are outside the authority delegated by the naturalization clause
establishes de facto Congress' power to naturalize from birth. Id. at 891; see also Natural
Born Killjoy, supra note 10, at 16 (explaining that "[s]even of the 39 signers of the
Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787 were foreign born, as were thousands of the voters who
helped ratify the Constitution. Immigrant Americans accounted for 8 of America's first 81
congressmen, 3 of our first Supreme Court justices, 4 of our first 6 secretaries of the
treasury, and 1 of our first 3 secretaries of war").
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that in some respects the First Congress continued the work of the
constitutional convention, 13 there are a number of examples of actions by
those who attended the Constitutional Convention that the Supreme Court
deemed unconstitutional. For example, in 1793, the justices declined to
provide advice in response to a request from Secretary of State Jefferson, on
behalf of President Washington, for assistance in resolving legal issues related
to United States neutrality in the Napoleonic wars then raging in Europe on
grounds that advising the President in the absence of an actual "case or
controversy" would violate Article 111.114 One commentator also raises the
possibility that the term "natural born citizens" appeared in the 1790 Act
because of an inadvertent copying error rather than as a result of a substantive
decision by the delegates.' 15  The only real support for this conclusion,
however, is the fact that the words "natural born" soon disappeared from
American naturalization statutes.'
1 16
In 1795, Congress passed a second naturalization statute.1 17  This act
provided that foreign born children of United States citizen parents were to be
"considered as citizens of the United States," but it omitted the "natural-born"
language of the 1790 statute.' 1 8 The term "natural born" never again appeared
1l3 Lohman, supra note 43, at 370.
114 See TRIBE, supra note 104, § 3-9, at 328. The justices also refused an earlier request
to advise the Secretary of War and Congress on legal issues pertaining to pension
applications. Id.
115 McElwee Brief, supra note 15, at 15,877.
116 McElwee, arguing that the foreign born progeny of U.S. citizens are not natural born,
believed the drafters realized their error and its implications on Presidential eligibility, and
thus hastily amended the statute. Id. James Madison, Samuel Dexter, and Thomas A.
Carnes had all been members of the Constitutional Convention and were serving in the
House of Representatives when Congress considered the second naturalization act in 1795.
Id. McElwee states that "the false inference which [the 'natural-born' language of the
statute] might suggest with regard to the President was noted, and the Committee sponsored
a new naturalization bill which deleted the term 'natural-born' from the Act of 1795."
McElwee Brief, supra note 15, at 15,877.
117 Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 (repealed 1802).
118 Id. at 415. McElwee presents this change as a correction initiated by James Madison
after he discovered the erroneous inclusion of the "natural born" modifier in the 1790
statute. McElwee Brief, supra note 15, at 15,877, 79. Freedman and Morse, however, view
the subsequent statutory changes differently. See Freedman, supra note 16, at 361-62
(stating that the 1790 act reaffirmed the Framers' intent by declaring foreign born children
of United States citizens "natural-born"); Morse, supra note 50, at 100 (arguing that the
1795 Act, like the 1790 Act, was merely declaratory of the principle of jus sanguinis).
McElwee contends that the Freedman article "was apparently inspired by a desire to
accomplish a desired result, namely, to urge eligibility for the Presidency on behalf of Mr.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr. who was born at the family summer home at Campobello,
New Brunswick, Canada." McElwee Brief, supra note 15, at 15,879. Interestingly,
McElwee's own work is a briefing paper opposing the candidacy of Governor Romney. Id.
at 15,875.
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in the naturalization laws of the United States. "The accepted modem
designations... refer only to citizenship at birth and by naturalization, with
the former group divided into native-born citizens and citizens at birth
abroad." 119 The several comprehensive naturalization statutes enacted since
1795 reflect these modem designations. 120 All of these laws have provided for
the citizenship of foreign born children of United States citizen parents,
although the language of the Naturalization Act of 1802 left room to argue that
children born abroad to American parents after 1802 were not included as
citizens from birth.' 21 When this ambiguity came to light as a result of a
controversial article published in 1854,122 Congress clarified the law in the Act
of 1855.123 That Act provided - both retrospectively and prospectively - that
foreign born children of United States citizen fathers "shall be deemed and
considered and are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States."'
1 24
2. The Fourteenth Amendment
In 1866, Congress enacted the first of several federal Civil Rights Acts.
25
The Act declared "all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed.., citizens of the United
States." 26 In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment ensconced this principle in the
Constitution: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside."' 27 In so doing, the amendment unequivocally overturned
the holding of the Supreme Court's infamous 1857 decision in Dred Scott v.
Sandford128 and constitutionalized the common law doctrine of jus soli
119 Gordon, supra note 8, at 11.
120 See id. at 12; Act of April 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155, repealed by Act of
Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604.
121 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 12 (examining the possibility that the 1802 Act applied
only retrospectively). The 1802 Act provided for naturalization of foreign born children of
United States citizen parents. § 4, 2 Stat. at 155 (repealed 1855).
122 See Horace Binney, The Alienigenae of the United States, 2 AM. L. REG. 193 (1854).
123 Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, §1, 10 Stat. 604; see Gordon, supra note 8, at 12 n.84
(noting that the Binney article was originally unsigned, but was later published under the
author's name).
124 §1, 10 Stat. at 604.
125 Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
126 Id. §1, 14 Stat. at 27.
127 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
128 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). The Dred Scoti Court held that African-Americans
were not citizens and therefore could not bring suits in federal court under diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction, and ruled that Congress did not have power to preclude slavery in
the territories, thereby invalidating the Missouri Compromise. Id. at 469. The decision is
most infamous for its sweeping denial of African-American citizenship and Chief Justice
Taney's statements about the inferior status of African-Americans in the constitutional
2005]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
citizenship.129 The amendment, however, further complicated interpretation of
the natural born citizenship proviso, because it left room to debate whether
birth and naturalization were .the only methods of acquiring United States
citizenship.
The Supreme Court's position on the exclusivity of Fourteenth Amendment
citizenship has evolved over the years. In its 1898 decision in United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 130 the Court addressed the plight of a man born in San
Francisco to Chinese parents permanently residing in the United States but
ineligible to become United States citizens because of the Chinese Exclusion
Act. 13' The Court ruled that Mr. Ark was a United States citizen by virtue of
his birth in the United States. 132 While concluding that the Fourteenth
Amendment was not intended to impose any new restrictions on citizenship,
the Court reasoned that its language "contemplate[d] two sources of
citizenship, and two only - birth and naturalization. Citizenship by
naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in
the forms of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere fact of
birth under the circumstances defined in the Constitution.'
133
Pursuant to the Wong Kim Ark definition, all United States citizenship rests
on either (1) birth in the United States, or (2) naturalization. 134 Accepting this
premise leads to the conclusion that birthright citizenship is limited to persons
born within the physical limits of the United States - however defined - and
subject to United States jurisdiction. 135 Naturalization broadly covers all other
methods of acquiring citizenship, whether at birth or subsequent to birth, and
the foreign born children of United States citizen parents are included among
those who acquire citizenship by naturalization. Chief Justice Fuller, joined by
Justice Harlan, dissented with respect to both the Wong Kim Ark holding and
the majority's views on the exclusivity of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
basis for natural born citizenship. The Chief Justice disagreed that Mr. Ark
was a United States citizen solely by virtue of his place of birth. 136 He also
disputed the majority's dicta concerning foreign born children of American
order. Id. For analysis of Dred Scott as "[t]he most important discussion of American
citizenship prior to Reconstruction and the Fourteenth Amendment," see Christopher L.
Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 54, 61-62 (1997).
129 See supra text accompanying notes 66-79.
130 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
131 Id. at 652-53.
132 Id. at 704.
133 Id. at 702.
134 Id. ,,,
115 See id.
136 Id. at 732 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting); see infra note 197 (discussing recent arguments
over attempts to amend the Constitution to restrict birthright citizenship to children born to
U.S. citizens or to permanent residents legally present in the United States at the time of the
birth).
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parents, opining, "[i]n my judgment, the children of our citizens born abroad
were always natural-born citizens from the standpoint of this Government.'
' 37
Although it subsequently reiterated the Wong Kim Ark majority's language
with respect to the exclusivity of the two bases for citizenship articulated in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 138 by the latter part of the twentieth century the Court
parted with this aspect of the Wong Kim Ark analysis. The Court made this
departure explicit in its 1971 decision in Rogers v. Bellei,139 a case in which a
man born in Italy to an Italian father and a native born American citizen
mother challenged the constitutionality of the residency requirement of Section
1 of the Naturalization Act of 1934140 pursuant to the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth
Amendments.' 4 1 The Act required children born abroad with one United
States citizen parent and one alien parent to reside continuously in the United
States for a five-year period between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight in
order to retain their United States citizenship. 1
42
The Court ruled against Mr. Bellei and upheld the constitutionality of the
condition subsequent. In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the majority
reasoned that, although Bellei was a United States citizen pursuant to the 1934
Act, the Fourteenth Amendment's citizenship clause did not apply because he
was not born or naturalized in the United States and had not been subject to
United States jurisdiction.1 43 The majority implicitly, disagreeing with birth in
the United States subject to its jurisdiction and naturalization as the exclusive
grounds for United States citizenship, held that Bellei "simply [was] not a
Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence citizen."'144 The Court did not deny that
children born abroad to one or two United States citizen parents were citizens,
but characterized their status as purely statutory and not constitutionally
protected. 45 According to the Court, Congress could - and did - allow the
acquisition of United States citizenship by means other than those provided for
137 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 714.
"I See, e.g., Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 662-64 (1927); Elk v. Wilkins, 12 U.S.
94, 101 (1884).
139 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
140 Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797.
141 Rogers, 401 U.S. at 820.
142 § 102, 48 Stat. at 797.
143 Rogers, 401 U.S. at 827.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 830. ("[T][he first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment] has not touched the
acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad of American parents; and has left that
subject to be regulated, as it had always been, by Congress, in the exercise of the power
conferred by the Constitution to establish an uniform rule of naturalization." Id. (second
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 688 (1898));
see also Pryor, supra note 42, at 893 (decrying "[t]he misconception that naturalization only
refers to the acquisition of citizenship after birth [as] a potential stumbling block for the
courts").
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in the Fourteenth Amendment. 146
Wong Kim Ark and Bellei differ in their perspectives on the exclusivity of
the citizenship grounds articulated in the Fourteenth Amendment. Neither
case, however, conclusively resolves the dilemma posed by the natural born
citizenship proviso. Is an infant who becomes a United States citizen at the
moment of birth - whether she is "naturalized" or "simply not a Fourteenth-
Amendment-first-sentence citizen" - a "natural born Citizen" within the
meaning of Article II?
Charles Gordon wrote his thoughtful article on the natural born citizenship
proviso three years before the Supreme Court decided Bellei.147 Gordon
concluded "that the Framers [of the 1787 Constitution] intended to exclude
only persons who had not been born citizens and that those who acquired
United States citizenship at birth abroad are eligible for the Presidency."'
148
Consequently, for Gordon, the Fourteenth Amendment has little relevance to
the proper interpretation of the natural born citizenship proviso. 49 In contrast,
Jill Pryor, writing several years after the Bellei decision, also concludes that
birthright citizens are "natural born," but does so on different grounds. 50 In
accordance with Wong Kim Ark, but not Bellei, Pryor contends that the
Fourteenth Amendment is the exclusive source of United States citizenship.151
She reasons, however, that citizens may be both naturalized and "natural born"
in the United States.
152
Several scholars share Gordon and Pryor's views with respect to the natural
born status of foreign born children of United States citizen parents.
Alexander Morse concludes "that the child of citizens of the United States,
wherever born, is 'a natural-born citizen of the United States." 1 53 Cyril Means
146 Rogers, 401 U.S. at 830. The Court cites Weedin's emphasis on residence in the
United States as a more important basis for citizenship than descent, and states that
Congress "indulged the foreign-born child with presumptive citizenship, subject to
subsequent satisfaction of a reasonable residence requirement, rather than to deny him
citizenship outright, as concededly it had the power to do, and relegate the child, if he
desired American citizenship, to the more arduous requirements of the usual naturalization
process." Id. at 835.
147 Gordon, supra note 8.
148 Id. at 26.
141 Id. at 15.
1S0 Pryor, supra note 42, at 892.
15' Id. at 892.
152 Id. at 894. Pryor coins the term "naturalized-born" to define citizens who are citizens
at birth by virtue of naturalization statutes or treaties. Id. Another commentator, concurring
with the conclusions reached by both Gordon and Pryor, criticizes Bellei for "creat[ing] the
potential for investiture in Congress of the power, through its plenary control of the non-
fourteenth amendment citizenship process, to make a candidate, or incumbent President
born abroad, constitutionally ineligible to be elected or to continue in office." Medina,
supra note 43, at 267.
153 Morse, supra note 50, at 100; see also Freedman, supra note 16, at 364-65
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similarly believes that if the courts were called upon to resolve the issue, they
would conclude that "American children born abroad are [constitutionally]
eligible to the offices of President and Vice President of the United States."
154
J. Michael Medina also asserts that "persons born as American citizens abroad
probably, but not uncontrovertedly, are natural born." 155
A few commentators have interpreted the natural born citizenship proviso as
either a partial or complete barrier to the presidential aspirations of Americans
born outside the United States. Christina Lohman, for example, appears to
accept that the proviso bars most foreign born citizens from serving as
President.' 56 She contends, however, that children born to United States
citizens employed by the United States government and living abroad in the
line of duty - e.g., those whose parents are diplomats and military personnel -
should be considered "natural born" because they are "subject to the
jurisdiction" of the United States from the moment of their birth.' 57 In
contrast, Pinckney McElwee takes the absolutist position that no person
physically born outside the United States can ever qualify as a "natural born
Citizen."
158
In the absence of a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court, and in light of
the paucity of primary source material, 59 neither position is unreasonable,
although we believe that Gordon and those espousing the view that persons
who become citizens at birth are "natural born" have the better argument.
Unfortunately, as discussed below, 60 neither the relevant constitutional
amendments nor the federal succession statutes enacted over the years resolve
the fundamental dilemma of the meaning of the natural born citizenship
proviso with respect to the foreign born children of United States citizens and
many other Americans.
3. Naturalization Statutes Enacted After Adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment
During the several decades following the adoption of the Fourteenth
(supporting Morse's analysis and arguing that the key to natural born citizenship is not
whether a child acquires citizenship by virtue of common law principles or statutory
provisions, "as long as it is clear that these children were, are, and will be subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States as of birth.")
154 Means, supra note 43, at 31.
155 Medina, supra note 43, at 268.
156 Lohman, supra note 43, at 368.
7 Id. at 367-68.
's8 McElwee Brief, supra note 15, at 15,880.
159 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 3 (describing the lack of discussion of the Presidential
qualifications clause); Pryor, supra note 42, at 896 (stating that the "naturalized born
approach enables courts to forego a misdirected search for specific intent regarding the facts
of each case, for which there are little or no primary source materials").
160 See infra Part II.
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Amendment, Congress made a number of modifications to the system put in
place by the Naturalization Act of 1855. For example, in 1907, Congress
added a requirement that foreign born children of American parents living
outside the United States must declare their intention to become residents and
remain citizens before reaching the age of eighteen. 161 In addition to imposing
a condition subsequent on the citizenship of children born to mixed-citizenship
parents living abroad, the 1934 statute at issue in Bellei provided for transfer of
citizenship status to foreign born children by mothers as well as fathers.
1 62
Congress enacted subsequent naturalization statutes in 1940,163 and again in
1952164 and 1986.165 These laws modified the terms on which foreign born
children of a single United States citizen parent were entitled to birthright
citizenship, 166 but have little relevance to the interpretation of the natural born
citizenship proviso.
4. Amendments and Statutes Related to Presidential Succession
Three constitutional amendments and a series of federal laws pertaining to
executive succession complete the legal framework in which the natural born
citizenship proviso operates: The Twelfth, Twentieth and Twenty-fifth
Amendments, and the federal succession statute set forth in Title 3 of the
United States Code.
a. The Twelfth Amendment
Early in the nation's history, it became evident that the executive selection
161 Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, §6, 34 Stat. 1229; see Freedman, supra note 16, at
362.
162 Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, §1, 48 Stat. 797.
163 Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also Freedman, supra note 16, at 363-64.
"6 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
165 Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-653, 100 Stat.
3655 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
166 The 1940 Act required that the United States citizen parent have resided in the United
States or one of its outlying possessions for ten years, at least five of which were after age
sixteen. Nationality Act of 1940 § 201(g). The 1952 Act lowered from age sixteen to
fourteen the five-year portion of the residence requirement. Immigration and Nationality
Act § 30 1(g). The 1986 Act, applicable to children born after November 14, 1986, reduced
the ten-year residence requirement to five years, at least two of which must take place after
age fourteen. Id. § 301(g), amended by Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of
1986, § 12, Pub. L. 99-653, 100 Stat. 3655, clarified by Immigration Technical Corrections
Act of 1988, §23(d), Pub. L. 100-S25, 102 Stat. 2609, 2618; see CHARLES GORDON ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 93.02(5)(c) (2004); see also T. ALEXANDER
ALE1NIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 167-175 (4th ed.
1998); Robert A. Mautino, Acquisition of United States Citizenship, 6 BENDER'S IMMIGR.
BULL. 3, 35-36 (Jan. 1, 2001).
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mechanism set forth in Article II was problematic. 167 Although the Framers
originally hoped to avoid a government immersed in partisanship, it was soon
apparent that political parties were an inescapable reality.' 68 Realization of the
inevitability of party politics and their impact on the executive branch, along
with concerns about the mechanics of the Electoral College system, led to the
adoption of the Twelfth Amendment in 1804.169
The principal innovations of the Twelfth Amendment were amending the
Constitution's original system for electing the Vice President - the candidate
with the second most electoral votes in the Presidential election - and, in the
event no candidate received a majority of electoral votes, establishing
procedures for selection of the President by the House of Representatives and
the Vice President by the Senate. 170 The last line of the Twelfth Amendment,
however, provides that "no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of
President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States."' 171
This sentence effectively applies the qualifications set forth in Article II,
Section 1, Clause 5 - including natural born citizenship - to the Vice President
as well as the President.
b. The Twentieth and Twenty-fifth Amendments
The Twentieth Amendment, adopted in 1933, specifies dates and times for
167 See Ackerman & Fontana, supra note 31, at 558-59 (theorizing that the Framers
designed the Electoral College with the notion of a non-partisan republic in mind); Akhil
Reed Amar, Essay, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REv. 913, 921-23 (1992) [hereinafter
President Quayle?] (stating that "the framers of the Twelfth Amendment [recognized] that it
would enable one party more easily to capture both the presidency and the vice-presidency,"
but reasoning that "the inversion problem, and not the tendency of the election scheme
under Article II towards a split executive, was the primary motivating force behind the
adoption of the Twelfth Amendment."); Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The
Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 12 J.L. & POL. 665, 675-78 (1996) (examining the
concerns over unchecked discretion by the Electoral College). See generally TADAHISA
KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1804 (1994).
168 The Framers "equated party with faction, and thought parties an unmitigated evil."
Ackerman & Fontana, supra note 31, at 558. The Madisonian republic tried to create a
space for leaders to transcend the rule of faction all together. Id. at 559; see also George
Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796),
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/49.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2004)
(warning the citizens of the United States "in the most solemn manner against the baneful
effects of the spirit of party generally").
169 See Ross & Josephson, supra note 167, at 677; Ackerman & Fontana, supra note 31
at 558-59; President Quayle?, supra note 167, at 921-23.
170 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, § 1.3, at 12-13; Brown & Cinquegrana, supra
note 21, at 1412 n.8 1; Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 505, 513 (1995).
171 U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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the beginning of Congressional terms of office, annual sessions of Congress, 172
and the inauguration of the President and Vice President. 73 Most importantly
for purposes of this discussion, the Twentieth Amendment authorizes Congress
to enact procedures to be followed in the event of the death or failure to qualify
of a President-elect, or both a President-elect and a Vice-President-elect.1
74
The Twenty-fifth Amendment provides procedures for filling a vacancy in
the Vice-Presidency, reaffirms Congress' authority to legislate a course of
action to be followed in the event of the death, removal, or resignation of a
President, and establishes procedures to be followed in the event that a
President becomes temporarily or permanently disabled while in office.175 The
Twenty-fifth Amendment became part of the Constitution in 1967, during the
turbulent era bracketed by the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in
1963176 and the assassinations of Presidential candidate Senator Robert F.
Kennedy 177 and Civil Rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968.178
Gerald R. Ford was the first Vice President appointed pursuant to the
Twenty-fifth Amendment. 179 He became Vice President on December 6, 1973,
following the abrupt resignation of Spiro Agnew in the midst of a criminal
investigation, 80 and on August 9, 1974, he became President of the United
States following the resignation of Richard Nixon as a result of the Watergate
scandal. 18 1 Shortly thereafter, Nelson Rockefeller became President Ford's
Vice President and the second Vice President chosen pursuant to the Twenty-
172 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2.
173 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
174 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3; see Kesavan, supra note 21, at 1796, 1808-11
(suggesting that the Twentieth Amendment provides a solution in the event that electors
choose a constitutionally ineligible President or Vice President).
171 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2; see Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 21, at 1393
(recounting the Twenty-Fifth Amendment's procedures for filling a presidential vacancy);
see also Goldstein, supra note 170, at 508 (suggesting that the Twenty-fifth Amendment
reflects a charge in perceptions of the role of the Vice President).
176 President Kennedy's assassination, coupled with concern over President Johnson's
heart problems, motivated Congress to initiate the amendment process. See Brown &
Cinquegrana, supra note 21, at 1393-94 (stating that the effort that culminated in the
Twenty-fifth Amendment began almost immediately after President Kennedy's
assassination).
177 See generally BRIAN DOOLEY, ROBERT KENNEDY: THE FINAL YEARS 137-47 (1996).
171 See generally LENWOOD G. DAVIS, I HAVE A DREAM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. 247-52 (Greenwood Press 1973) (1969).
179 Gerald R. Ford, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, at http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/F/Ford-
Gler.asp (last visited Nov.7, 2004).
180 Spiro T. Agnew, WIKIPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spiro-Agnew (last visited
Nov. 7, 2004).
"', Richard M. Nixon, THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICIAL WEB SITE, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/m37.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2004).
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fifth Amendment. 182  The procedures established by the Twenty-fifth
Amendment to deal with Presidential incapacity were first utilized on July 14,
1985, when President Ronald Reagan, about to undergo surgery, transferred his
executive authority to then-Vice President George H.W. Bush for several
hours. 183
Both the Twentieth and Twenty-fifth Amendments implicitly assume that all
of those eligible to assume the offices of President and Vice President satisfy
Article II's eligibility criteria, but neither explicitly addresses the issue.
c. Federal Succession Laws
Congress enacted the first Presidential succession statute in 1792.184 The
1792 Act provided that, upon resignation or death of both the President and
Vice President, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, followed by the
Speaker of the House, was to serve as Acting President pending the outcome of
a special election.185 This law remained in place until 1866, the year following
President Lincoln's assassination. At that time, Congress eliminated the role
of the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House,
placed the members of the President's cabinet in the line of succession, and
gave itself discretion to decide whether or not to hold a special election in the
event of vacancies in both the Presidency and Vice Presidency.186
In 1948, Congress again revised the succession law. 187 The 1948 Act, still
in force today, eliminated the special election option and revised the order of
those designated to follow the Vice President in the line of succession.
188
President Truman raised concerns about putting unelected cabinet members
first in line for the Presidency in the event of a double vacancy, and expressed
reluctance to name his own potential successor in choosing a Secretary of
State. In response, Congress revised the statute to place elected officials -
182 Nelson Rockefeller, WIKIPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nelson Rockefeller
(last visited Nov. 7, 2004).
183 Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 21, at 1390. A number of other instances have
arisen in which the Twenty-fifth Amendment could have been invoked to transfer
Presidential authority, but was not. See id. at 1390-91 nn.2-3 (describing instances in which
Presidents Nixon, Carter, and Reagan underwent, or contemplated undergoing, temporarily-
disabling medical procedures).
184 Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, §§ 9-10, 1 Stat. 239, 240-41 (repealed 1886) (mandating
that, in case of removal, death, or resignation of the President and the Vice President, the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate, followed by the Speaker of the House, will act as
President, and further providing for appointment of electors by the states for a special
Presidential election whenever the Offices of President and Vice President both become
vacant). See generally Wasserman, supra note 21, at 353-54.
8 Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 9.
186 Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, § 1, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947).
187 Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-771, §1, 62 Stat. 672 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 3 U.S.C.).
188 Id.
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albeit officials elected by the voters of single states rather than the whole
nation - first in line following the Vice President. 89 The current order of
succession to the Presidency, following the Vice President, begins with the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. The President Pro Tempore of the
Senate is next in line, and the members of the cabinet follow beginning with
the Secretary of State.' 90  As noted earlier, however, only persons
constitutionally qualified to serve as President may succeed to the office of
Acting President. 191
The interaction of the federal succession statute with the Twentieth and
Twenty-fifth Amendments is potentially quite complex. 192 For purposes of this
discussion, however, the principal issue relates to the eligibility provision. So
long as the law limits eligibility to the office of Acting President to those
constitutionally qualified for the Presidency, uncertainty will continue to exist
with respect to the eligibility of anyone in the line of succession bom anywhere
189 See Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 21, at 1423-29; Wasserman, supra note 21, at
356-57.
190 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2000). The order of succession for cabinet members is as follows:
Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense; Attorney General; Secretaries of Interior,
Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban
Development, Transportation, Energy, Education, and Veterans Affairs. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1)
(2000). Congress has not yet included the most recently created cabinet position, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in the line of succession. Legislation to place the Secretary
of Homeland Security in the line of succession following the Attorney General, and to
clarify that acting members of the cabinet are not eligible to act as President, was introduced
in 2003. See H.R. 2319, 108th Cong. (2003).
There is some question whether the current succession statute is constitutional. The
Constitution provides that "Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death,
Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer
shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be
removed, or a new President shall be elected." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (emphasis
added). Neither the Speaker of the House of Representatives nor the President Pro Tempore
of the Senate is an officer of the United States in the sense of a member of the Executive
Branch. Consequently, it is arguable that the current succession statute violates both the
literal mandate of Article II and separation-of-powers principles. See generally Is
Succession Law Constitutional?, supra note 21, at 113 (attacking the constitutionality of the
current presidential succession statute); Calabresi, supra note 21, at 156 (agreeing with the
Amars that the current federal succession statute is probably unconstitutional).
191 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2000). The office of Acting President differs from that of
President. The Constitution provides that "Congress may by Law provide for the Case of
Removal, Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and Vice President,
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly,
until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
5 (emphasis added). The Constitution does not afford Congress the power to declare a new
President. See Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 21; Unnatural Born Citizens, supra note
14.
192 See articles cited supra note 21.
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other than within the geographic confines of one of the fifty states. In addition,
persons naturalized after birth will remain unqualified for both the Presidency
and Vice-presidency.
The following section of this article surveys some of the many ways of
acquiring United States citizenship in order to identify the many different
groups of Americans whose natural born citizenship status is uncertain. If an
individual in this situation were to run for President or Vice President, or rise
to the threshold of the Oval Office as a result of a national crisis, this
uncertainty could impact the entire nation.
II. WHO IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN?: PERMUTATIONS AND
COMBINATIONS OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP
There are many paths to United States citizenship, but "the rights of
citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same
dignity and are coextensive. The only difference drawn by the Constitution is
that only the 'natural born' citizen is eligible to be President. ' 193  To
understand the need to eliminate, or at least clarify, this distinction, it is helpful
to survey the principal categories of United States citizenship and to ask who
among Americans is a natural born citizen. The discussion begins with an
exploration of citizenship pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's
incorporation of jus soli, then turns to the application of jus sanguinis
principles.
A. Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship
In light of the language of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, at a
minimum, individuals "born... in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof' 194 are natural born citizens eligible to become
President. 195 The difficulty, however, lies in defining what constitutes "in the
United States," and "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," as well as in
determining whether both conditions need to be satisfied simultaneously at the
time of birth, or whether birth in the United States, combined with subsequent
subjection to its jurisdiction, is sufficient. 1
96
1. Birth "in the United States"
a. States and Territories that Have Become States
United States citizens born to parents subject to United States jurisdiction in
"I Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964).
194 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
195 See Id.; see also Pryor, supra note 42, at 881; Gordon, supra note 8, at 1; Means,
supra note 43, at 13169.
196 See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
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one of the fifty states are unquestionably natural born citizens. 197 Even the
narrowest reading of the Fourteenth Amendment dictates that all current states
are in the United States. This is true regardless of parental citizenship, unless a
child's parents are protected by the full immunity extended to foreign
diplomats and their families, or they are enemy combatants. t98
United States citizens who, like Senator Goldwater, were born in
jurisdictions that are now states but were territories at the time of their birth are
arguably in a less certain position. Today, individuals born in Alaska before
January 3, 1959, or in Hawaii prior to August 21, 1959, are most likely to fall
into this category. 199 Before the Supreme Court's early twentieth century
'1 Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 328 (1939); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 85
(1934); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898). Attempts have been
made to amend the Constitution to exclude children born in the United States to illegally
present aliens or non-permanent residents from acquiring birthright United States
citizenship. E.g., H.R.J. Res. 42, 108th Cong., (2003); see also SC-tUCK & SMITH, supra
note 79, at 6-7 (arguing that some categories of people born in the United States should not
be citizens), reviewed by David S. Schwartz, The Amorality of Consent, 74 CAL. L. REV.
2143 (1986) (disagreeing with Schuck and Smith on political and moral theory grounds);
Eisgruber, supra note 128, at 177 (acknowledging that everyone born in the United States
receives citizenship automatically); Peter H. Schuck, The Re-evaluation of American
Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 4 (1997) (confirming that citizenship is extended to
essentially all individuals born on United States soil); Robert J. Shulman, Children of a
Lesser God: Should the Fourteenth Amendment be Altered or Repealed to Deny Automatic
Citizenship Rights and Privileges to American Born Children of Illegal Aliens?, 22 PEPP. L.
REV. 669, 674 (1995) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizenship to all
people born in the United States); Note, The Birthright Citizenship Amendment: A Threat to
Equality, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1026 (1994) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment
provides that all persons born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction are citizens).
198 See In re Thenault, 47 F. Supp. 952, 953 (D.D.C. 1942) (holding that children born to
the Air Attachre of the French embassy did not acquire U.S. citizenship upon their births in
the District of Columbia and Hyannis, Massachusetts). Children born in the United States to
diplomats acquire United States permanent resident status at birth. GORDON ET AL., supra
note 166, § 92.03(3)(b) (explaining that, although children born to foreign sovereigns or
accredited diplomatic officials do not acquire United States citizenship at birth, they may be
considered lawful permanent residents at birth).
"9 These dates are the official dates of statehood of Alaska and Hawaii. Act of July 7,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. note preceding §
21 (2000)) (setting out the terms for Alaska's admission into the Union); Proclamation No.
3269, 24 Fed. Reg. 81 (1958) (admitting Alaska into the Union); Act of March 18, 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. note preceding § 491 (2000))
(setting out the terms for Hawaii's admission into the Union); Proclamation No. 3309, 24
Fed. Reg. 6868 (1959) (admitting Hawaii into the Union). Prior to statehood, both Alaska
and Hawaii were "incorporated" territories, and their residents U.S. citizens. Act of April
30, 1900, ch. 34, 31 Stat. 41 (declaring Hawaii an incorporated territory after this date, and
considering all persons who were citizens of the Republic of Hawaii at the time of
acquisition on August 12, 1898 to be U.S. citizens). Alaska was considered an incorporated
territory from the time of its acquisition by purchase from Russia in 1867. Rassmussen v.
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decisions in the Insular Cases,200 territories were viewed as "infant states"
destined for future membership in the Union, and birth in a United States
territory appeared equivalent to birth in a state. 20' Early American common
law defined the "United States" as synonymous with what Chief Justice
Marshall termed "the American empire" 202 - "our great republic, which is
composed of States and territories." 20 3 Early jurists did not foresee, however,
that the United States would one day acquire territories around the world, or
that it would be either impractical or politically undesirable to bestow
statehood on all of these territories.20 4 Eventually, however, both practical
considerations and the ugly specter of racism led Congress to designate some
of these areas as "unincorporated" territories, and still others as merely
United States, 197 U.S. 516, 525 (1905) (holding that Alaska was an unincorporated
territory); see also GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, §§ 92.02(2)-(3) (indicating that
determination of citizenship of inhabitants of new states requires determination of whether
they were members of the political community of the state at the time of its admission, and
discussing citizenship by birth in the United States in general).
A question also could be raised about the constitutional qualifications of John Nance
Garner, Vice President from 1933 to 1941 during the first two terms of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt. Vice President Garner was born in Texas in 1868, several months prior to
Texas' readmission to the union after the Civil War. However, there does not appear to be
any record of a legal challenge to his qualifications for the office on natural born citizenship
grounds. See Biography of John Nance Garner, The Handbook of Texas Online, at
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/GG/fga24.html (last visited Nov.
7, 2004).
200 See infra notes 212-214 and accompanying text.
201 Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 324 (1820) (describing territories as
being in a "state of infancy advancing to manhood"). For example, one state appellate court
opined that it did not believe the state Constitution should be construed so "that a person
born in the republic of Texas prior to its admission into the Union is ineligible to the
presidency of the United States .. " Gibson v. Wood, 49 S.W. 768, 769 (Ky. 1899); see
also Snow v. United States, 85 U.S. 317, 320 (1873) (describing territorial status as a "term
of... pupilage").
102 Loughborough, 18 U.S. at 319; see also Drimmer, supra note 40, at 684 (recognizing
common law tradition of defining American sovereignty as coextensive with the American
empire). But see David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Jefferson and the West,
1801-1809, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1441, 1444-45 (1998) (hereinafter Jefferson and the
West] (distinguishing the sovereignty of states from territories' dependence on the federal
government).
203 Loughborough, 18 U.S. at 319.
204 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, text available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/nworder.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005), envisioned
the eventual creation of three to five new states in the territory. See ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ,
DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL
RELATIONS 6 (1989); see also Jefferson and the West, supra note 202, at 1469-70 ("[I]t
seems very difficult to deny that the Framers would have wanted any territory that might be
acquired to come within the statehood provision.").
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"outlying possessions. '20 5
Today, whether a territory is "in the United States" within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment may turn on Congressional intent with respect to
future statehood.20 6 The Constitution applies in full force from the moment
Congress designates a territory as incorporated, because incorporation
presumably leads to future statehood.20 7 Individuals born within territories
destined for statehood subsequent to this designation should be deemed
constitutional birthright citizens within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as natural born citizens within the meaning of Article II.
Consequently, Senator Goldwater was probably safe in seeking the Presidency,
as are Alaskans and Hawaiians born before the forty-ninth and fiftieth states
officially entered the union.20 8 Nevertheless, because the Supreme Court has
never ruled on this question, the natural bom citizenship of these Americans
remains unsettled.
b. Unincorporated Territories
The eligibility of persons born in Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, or
the Northern Mariana Islands to the Presidency is questionable. Pursuant to its
power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," 20 9 Congress has
defined "the United States" in various immigration and nationality statutes to
include the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and
205 See infra text accompanying notes 212-229. Justice Gray, concurring in Downes v.
Bidwell, distinguished between "[t]erritories, in the strict and technical sense, being those
which lie within the United States, as bounded by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the
Dominion of Canada and the Republic of Mexico, and the territories of Alaska and
Hawaii[,]" with "territory, in the broader sense, acquired by the United States by war with a
foreign State." 182 U.S. 244, 345 (1901) (Gray, J., concurring). ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra
note 109, at 85 (citing Richard H. Pildes, The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law: Democracy,
Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 305 (2000) (linking
acquiescence in disenfranchisement of African-Americans in the south and residents of
United States territories and possessions)).
206 Pursuant to Section 3 of Article IV of the Constitution, Congress has plenary power
over territories. See Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168 (1899) (holding that
considerations of sovereignty that would otherwise remove federal jurisdiction over divorce
suits do not apply to territories).
207 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and
Prospects, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 15, 25-26 (1994) (discussing the constitutional status of
Puerto Rico).
208 See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1905) (stating that the treaty
by which the United States acquired Alaska from Russia expressly provided for the
incorporation of Alaska into the United States); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 210-11
(1903) (holding that the Hawaiian islands were annexed to the United States on July 7, 1898
but not incorporated as the territory of Hawaii until the Act of Congress of June 14, 1900, at
which time the Constitution was formally extended).
209 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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the United States Virgin Islands,2 10 and, for purposes of these statutes, has
broadened the term "state" to include these same territories as well as the
District of Columbia. 21' These statutes, however, do not resolve the question
whether residents are natural born within the meaning of Article II.
The natural born citizenship claim of a person born in a United States
territory lacking a Congressional designation regarding statehood is much
more tenuous than that of an individual born in a territory already destined for
future statehood. In the Insular Cases,212 a series of decisions handed down
between 1901 and 1922, the Supreme Court held that the United States could
possess permanent territories without intending to grant statehood or
independence, and without applying the United States Constitution in full force
to these territories. 213 This position was contrary to conventional wisdom
because it allowed Congress to create "unincorporated" territories.
2 14
210 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(38) (2000) (defining
"geographic United States" for purposes of immigration and nationality).
211 Id. § 1101 (a)(36) (defining "State" for purposes of immigration and nationality).
212 There is general agreement that one of the earliest cases, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244 (1901), is the most important for its development of the doctrine of incorporation, but
the identity of the other cases that compose the canon of the Insular Cases is unsettled.
Some scholars limit the series to the six original 1901 cases, while others include between
twenty-three and twenty-eight Supreme Court decisions through 1922, ending with Balzac
v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). See Juan R. Torruella, One Hundred Years of Solitude:
Puerto Rico's American Century, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO Rico,
AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 241, 248 n. 14 (Christina Duffy Burnett &
Burke Marshall eds., 2001) [hereinafter FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE] (noting that,
although strictly speaking the Insular Cases are the original six opinions issued in 1901, the
series of cases involving status of territories that culminated in Balzac is often included in
the same discussion); Christina Duffy Burnett, A Note on the Insular Cases, in FOREIGN IN A
DOMESTIC SENSE, supra, 389, at 389-92 (indicating reasons for including in the Insular
Cases rubric between twenty-three and twenty-eight cases in addition to the original six).
213 E.g., Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905) (holding the territory of
Alaska to be incorporated as of the time of its acquisition by treaty, and thus finding the
Constitution to be fully applicable); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904)
(holding that the Constitution did not require the right to trial by jury in the Philippine
Islands while it was a U.S. territory); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 210-11 (1903)
(stating that the Constitution was not "formally extended" to the Hawaiian islands until June
14, 1900, when Congress incorporated them as a United States territory); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (holding that "Puerto Rico is a territory appurtenant and
belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States within the revenue clauses
of the constitution").
214 Downes, 182 U.S. at 341-42 ("[While] in an international sense Porto Rico [sic] was
not a foreign country, since it was subject to the sovereignty of and was owned by the
United States, it was foreign to the United States in a domestic sense, because the island had
not been incorporated into the United States, but was merely appurtenant thereto as a
possession."). The constitutionality of indefinitely maintaining unincorporated territories
remains suspect. See Aleinikoff, supra note 207, at 25-26 (discussing the historical debate
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Currently, the territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, the
Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, and Swains Island are
unincorporated. 2 15  Congress has statutorily provided different citizenship
arrangements for their people, 216 and the Court has ruled that, apart from basic
fundamental rights, Congress may determine which provisions of the
Constitution will apply in each territory. 217 For example, in one of the first of
the Insular Cases, Downes v. Bidwell,218 the Supreme Court held that the
Uniformity Clause2 19 does not apply to Puerto Rico and that United States
citizens residing in Puerto Rico are not entitled to the Constitution's full
surrounding the United States' acquisition of Puerto Rico and whether, or to what extent, the
Constitution must apply to United States territories); Drimmer, supra note 40, at 704
("[Tlhe Supreme Court has subsequently limited the Insular Cases to their immediate
holdings regarding the imposition of duties... [and] has recognized that the racially
exclusive dicta in the Insular Cases contradicted America's premise of equality, and
perverted the nation's constitutional principles.") (citing Harris v. Rosario 446 U.S. 651,
653 (1980) (Marshall, J. dissenting); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1979));
Nelson D. Hermilla, Puerto Rico 1898-1998: The Institutionalization of Second Class
Citizenship?, 16 DICK. J. INT'L L. 275 (1998) (discussing Puerto Rico's current and
historical political status ); Sanford Levinson, Installing the Insular Cases into the Canon, in
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 212, at 121, 125 ("Can the United States blithely
govern, indefinitely, any territory in a decidedly nonrepublican manner and cite the text of
Article IV as licensing such governance?") (emphasis in original); Jos6 Trias Monge,
Injustice According to Law: The Insular Cases and Other Oddities, in FOREIGN IN A
DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 212, at 226, 226-27 (arguing that the Insular cases were part
of the "disease ... of an empire" contracted by the United States in the late nineteenth
century). See generally Mark Tushnet, Partial Membership and Liberal Political Theory, in
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 212, at 209 (discussing the "partial membership"
status of Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia).
215 GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, § 92.04(l)(c) (indicating that Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, and Guam are now designated as part of the United States for the purposes of
nationality laws, and only American Samoa and Swains Island are outlying possessions).
216 The Jones Act of 1917 granted U.S. citizenship to inhabitants of Puerto Rico. Act of
Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 953 (1917) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 48
U.S.C.); see infra note 226 for statutes providing citizenship to inhabitants of other United
States territories.
217 See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 528 (1905) (holding Alaska to be an
incorporated territory to which the Sixth Amendment applied); Dorr v. United States, 195
U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (holding the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury was inapplicable
to the Philippine Islands); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 215-18 (1903) (holding Fifth
and Sixth Amendments inapplicable until formal incorporation of territory of Hawaii);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 342 (1901) (holding uniformity clause of the Constitution
not applicable to Puerto Rico); see also Jefferson and the West, supra note 202, at 1480
(explaining that the terms of the 1803 treaty purchasing Louisiana from France made it clear
that the Constitution did not apply to the territory until authorized by Congress).
218 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
219 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. The Uniformity Clause provides that "all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Id.
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panoply of due process protections. 220 Lower courts have since ruled that
United States citizens resident in Puerto Rico do not have the right to vote for
the President of the United States 22 1 or to have representation in Congress.
222
Consequently, Puerto Rican residents do not pay federal income tax; they are
entitled to a lower level of social security benefits; 223 and they may only vote
in presidential primary elections. 224 The treatment of Puerto Rican citizens by
the courts and Congress sheds little light, however, on whether United States
citizens born in Puerto Rico are natural born within the meaning of Article
11.225 It is unlikely, though, that an individual who is not entitled to vote for the
President of the United States is constitutionally eligible to become President.
220 Downes, 182 U.S. at 287; see also Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 313 (1922)
(finding no Congressional intent to incorporate Puerto Rico into the Union "with the
consequences which would follow"). The Court has, however, since held that "[t]he
fundamental protections of the U.S. Constitution extend to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico."
LEIBOWITZ, supra note 204, at 154.
221 Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 386 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Igartua
III] (holding United States citizen residents of Puerto Rico have no constitutional right to
vote in national Presidential elections); Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 83-
84 (1st Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Igartua I1] (holding that Puerto Rico is not a State within
Article II of the Constitution, and therefore may not designate electors to the electoral
college and vote for President and Vice President of the United States); Igartua de la Rosa v.
United States, 32 F.3d 8, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Igartua 1] (holding also that
Puerto Ricans may not vote in the national election); see also Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d
118, 124 (2001) (holding that Congress may distinguish between those "former residents of
States residing outside the United States" and "former residents of States residing in Puerto
Rico").
222 See Alicra v. United States, 180 F.2d 870, 872 (1st Cir. 1950) (holding the Selective
Services Act applicable to Puerto Rico notwithstanding its lack of Congressional
representation).
223 See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980) (holding that the Territorial
Clause authorizes Congress to treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as there is a
rational basis); accord Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5 (1978) (per curiam) (determining
that exclusion of Puerto Rico residents from Supplemental Security Income is
constitutionally permissible, so long as legislation is rational and not invidious).
214 Puerto Rican residents have been eligible to vote in presidential primary elections
since 1980. See Hermilla, supra note 214, at 284 n.29 (citing sources discussing Puerto
Rico's first participation in the Presidential primaries in 1980).
225 An even trickier question would arise over the status of a child born in Puerto Rico to
parents from one of the fifty states who are either visiting or temporarily residing on the
island. The child's United States citizenship could be derived from physical birth in Puerto
Rico, or by descent from one or both United States citizen parents. Future complications are
also possible if Puerto Rico or another current territory becomes a state, or declares itself an
independent sovereign. See, e.g., Jose Julian Alvarez Gonzalez, The Empire Strikes Out:
Congressional Ruminations on the Citizenship Status of Puerto Ricans, 21 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 309 (1990) (discussing the citizenship status of Puerto Ricans in the event the
territory became an independent sovereign).
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While the bulk of judicial decisions and legal scholarship has tended to
focus on citizenship issues pertaining to Puerto Rico, the status of nationals of
the territories of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands
raises similar questions. Separate treaties and statutes grant United States
citizenship to persons born on these islands.226 As with Puerto Rico, Congress
determines which constitutional rights apply to these citizens.
227
Congress has designated American Samoa and Swains Island as "outlying
possessions of the United States." 228 American Samoans are not born United
States citizens, but are "nationals" who may subsequently become citizens
through an expedited naturalization process. 229 Given that they are not citizens
at birth, it is unlikely that Americans born in these territories are natural bom
citizens within the meaning of Article II.
c. The Special Case of the District of Columbia
District of Columbia residents - in many ways the orphans of our republican
democracy - have long lamented their political status. 230 For most of the
District's history, it had neither Senators nor Congressional Representatives.
This situation changed only in 1970 when Congress voted to permit the
226 Organic Act of Guam, ch. 512, sec. 4, § 206(a), 64 Stat. 384 (1950) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (2000)) (granting United States citizenship to persons born on
Guam). In the Virgin Islands, all persons born on or after January 17, 1917, who were
subject to United States jurisdiction as of February 25, 1927, are citizens through collective
naturalization. Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 192, § 3, 44 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). Domicilaries of the Northern Mariana Islands have been
United States citizens since November 4, 1986. Act of Mar. 24, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-241,
90 Stat. 263 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 1801-05 (2000)) (providing ten year
transition period for United States citizenship); see GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, §
92.04(5), (6), (9) (outlining the various treaties or statutes governing the Virgin Islands,
Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands).
227 See Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 8 n.12 (1955) (acknowledging
that the Virgin Islands is an unincorporated territory); Soto v. United States, 273 F. 628,
633-34 (3d Cir. 1928) (categorizing the Virgin Islands as an unincorporated territory to
which the Insular Cases applied).
228 8 U.S.C. § 1 10(a)(29) (2000).
229 Residence as a national in American Samoa satisfies the permanent residency
requirement for naturalization, and American Samoans can freely enter the United States
and become naturalized after three months. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, § 92.04(7).
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines a "United States national" as either a
citizen of the United States, or "a person who, though not a citizen of the United States,
owes permanent allegiance to the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2000).
230 See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. Democrats Win Voting Rights Forum: Norton to
Address Party's Convention, WASH. POST, July 22, 2004, at BI (recounting the District of
Columbia's "long quest" for representation in Congress). See generally, Jamin B. Raskin, Is
This America? The District of Columbia and the Right to Vote, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
39 (1999); ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 109, at 88-90.
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District to have "shadow" representation in the House of Representatives.
231
Although it is improbable that anyone would seriously challenge the eligibility
of an individual born in the District to serve as President or Vice President of
the United States, given the continuing circumscription of their political rights
in other respects, it is reasonable to ask whether individuals born in the District
of Columbia are natural born citizens for purposes of Article II.
A would-be President born in the District, however, would have compelling
arguments for eligibility to the office of President. It is almost unimaginable
that the center of a nation's government would not be defined as "in the United
States." In the words of Chief Justice John Marshall in 1820, "the district of
Columbia... is not less within the United States, than Maryland or
Pennsylvania. '232  The District has never been determined to be an
unincorporated territory, and the Constitution applies in full force to the
District.
In District of Columbia v. Carter,233 the Supreme Court stated that
"[w]hether the District of Columbia constitutes a 'State or Territory' within the
meaning of any particular... constitutional provision depends upon the
character and aim of the specific provision involved. '234 Thus, the District of
Columbia is not considered a state for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, 235 Congressional representation, 236 or
diversity jurisdiction pursuant to Article 111,237 but District residents are
231 See Act of Sept. 22, 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-405, Title II, § 202, 84 Stat. 845 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 25(a) (2000)).
232 Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 325 (1820) (holding "Congress
possesses, under the constitution, the power to lay and collect direct taxes within the District
of Columbia"); see also Drimmer, supra note 40, at 684 (stating that the United States
adhered to the traditional common law when defining its borders for application of
birthright citizenship).
233 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973) (holding that the District of Columbia was not a "State or
Territory" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
234 Id. at 420.
235 Id. at 424; see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (companion case to
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), holding racial segregation in District of
Columbia public schools unconstitutional on grounds of Fifth Amendment due process
rather than the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection applied in Brown).
236 Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 50 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that the District of
Columbia is not a state for purposes of congressional representation).
237 Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Title Co., 337 U.S. 582, 588 (1949) ("[The
Founders] obviously did not contemplate unorganized and dependent spaces as states. The
District of Columbia being nonexistent in any form, much less as a state, at the time of the
compact, certainly was not taken into the Union of states by it, nor has it since been
admitted as a new state is required to be admitted."). The Court in Tidewater upheld a
statute extending diversity jurisdiction of federal district courts to District citizens as within
Congress' power to legislate for the District under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17. Id. at 603-
04.
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protected by the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee. 238  District
residents also must pay federal income tax, and are entitled to the same social
security benefits as the residents of any of the fifty states. Even so, the District
of Columbia is not a state, and Congress has never designated it for
statehood.2 39  It was necessary to amend the Constitution to enfranchise
District residents to vote in presidential elections,240 and, as noted above, the
District still does not have Congressional representation on a par with that of
the states. The Court has never decided whether a United States citizen born in
the District is a natural born citizen. Consequently, a modicum of uncertainty
remains.
2. "Subject to the Jurisdiction" of the United States
The second element of citizenship set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment is
birth "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States.241 This additional
requirement excludes the children of foreign diplomats and enemy combatants
from United State citizenship. 242 Although present in the United States, these
individuals are not subject to United States jurisdiction because they fall within
"certain well known and universally recognized exceptions to the rule of
territorial jurisdiction and supremacy .... -243 In 1884, the Supreme Court also
denied Fourteenth Amendment citizenship to members of recognized Native
American tribes on grounds that, as "alien nations," they are not subject to
United States jurisdiction.244  The following discussion explores the
implications of the Fourteenth Amendment's jurisdictional prerequisite with
respect to interpretation of the natural bom citizenship proviso.
238 Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499 (1954).
239 The Constitution grants Congress authority over the nation's capitol. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 17. Several attempts have been made to admit the District of Columbia into the
Union as the State of New Columbia. E.g., S. 898, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 51, 103d Cong.
(1993); see JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-2002, 140-41 (2d ed. 2003).
240 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. This situation could well have resulted in a bizarre
anomaly. Prior to the constitutional amendment granting District residents the right to vote
in the presidential election, a District resident would have been eligible to become President,
but unable to vote in the election.
241 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
242 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898) (stating that the
Fourteenth Amendment excludes from citizenship the progeny of diplomats and enemy
combatants); see also Drimmer, supra note 40, at 698 & n. 223 (discussing the Wong Kim
Ark decision). See infra note 246.
243 Thomas P. Stoney, Citizenship, 34 AM. L. REG. 1, 4 (1886), quoted in Bernadette
Meyler, The Gestation of Birthright Citizenship, 1868-1898 States' Rights, the Law of
Nations, and Mutual Consent, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 519, 533-34 (2001)).
244 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884). See infra notes 248-261 and accompanying
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a. Children of Diplomats, Other Representatives of Foreign
Governments, and Enemy Combatants
Courts have consistently held that ambassadors, other representatives of
foreign governments who enjoy full diplomatic immunity, and enemy
combatants are not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
245
Consequently, United States citizenship does not extend to the progeny of
foreign diplomats and enemy combatants,246 even when these children are born
in one of the fifty states.247 In contrast, children of parents who are non-
American-citizen representatives of a foreign government that the United
States does not recognize, as well as children born to non-United States
citizens who work with an international organization such as the United
Nations, are subject to United States jurisdiction at birth. These children
therefore acquire birthright and, presumably, natural born citizenship. The
anomaly of this situation with respect to unrecognized foreign governments is
inescapable. The United States generally declines to recognize certain
governments for strategic reasons, often because they are considered
245 See In re Thenault, 47 F. Supp. 952, 953 (D.D.C. 1942) (holding that children born in
the United States to foreign diplomats do not automatically receive United States
citizenship); see also Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 96 ("A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and
administrative jurisdiction .... "). Each month, the United States Department of State
publishes "Blue" and "White" lists of diplomats. The Blue List identifies all diplomatic
officers and their family members entitled to full diplomatic immunity. The White List
identifies diplomatic employees entitled to some protection but not to diplomatic immunity
for their family members. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, § 92.03(3)(b).
246 The category 'enemy combatant' is especially complex because U.S. citizens may
also be declared enemy combatants. Hamdi v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004)
(holding that citizens detained as enemy combatants must be afforded core due process
rights); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942) (holding that United States citizenship
does not preclude an individual from being designated an enemy combatant). Would a child
born in the United States to one or two citizen enemy combatants be a natural born citizen?
247 See supra note 242. An individual in this position must base his United States
citizenship on grounds other than jus soli. For example, if one parent is an American
citizen, but the other is covered by the foreign representative exclusion, the child may
receive statutory birthright citizenship on the same basis as a child born abroad to a couple
composed of a non-United States citizen and an American citizen parent. See DANIEL LEVY,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK § 4:6 (2003). If neither parent is a
United States citizen, the child must go through the statutory naturalization procedure just as
any foreign born immigrant. In either case, the child would be a naturalized citizen
physically born in the United States. Would the natural born requirement in conjunction
with the Fourteenth Amendment recognize such an individual as eligible for the office of
President? Must the President be simultaneously born in the United States and subject to its
jurisdiction, or would it suffice that the putative candidate was both physically born in this
country and currently an American citizen? The more one reflects on the possible
permutations and combinations, the more mind-numbing possibilities arise.
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illegitimate or their objectives are deemed antithetical to American interests.
Nevertheless, unlike children of representatives of recognized foreign
governments, children born in this country to officials of unrecognized
governments are born in the United States for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However anomalous, there is no reason why these children
would not be "natural born Citizens" for purposes of the presidential eligibility
clause of Article II.
b. The Plight of Native Americans
Ironically, it is unclear whether Native Americans, particularly those who
belong to tribes recognized by the United States government, are natural born
citizens of the United States within the meaning of Article II. As noted above,
in 1884, the Supreme Court held that members of Native American tribes are
not subject to United States jurisdiction. 248 In Elk v. Wilkins,24 9 the state of
Nebraska denied a Native American permission to vote in a state election on
grounds that he was not a citizen, even though he was no longer affiliated with
his tribe or living on tribal lands. The Supreme Court upheld the state's action,
ruling that Native Americans were not subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and therefore not citizens within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 250 The Court disowned Native American children, stating:
"Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States.. . although in a
geographical sense born in the United States, are no more 'born in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,'. . . [than] ... children born
within the United States, of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign
nations. '251 In reaching its decision, the Court cited the natural born citizen
proviso to distinguish "citizenship by birth" from "citizenship by
naturalization": "Persons not.., subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards, except by being naturalized,
either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, or
collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is
acquired. '252 As a result of the Court's ruling in Elk, for several years Native
248 Elk, 112 U.S. at 109. Native Americans born on tribal lands are subject to the
jurisdiction of tribal laws even though they are within the geographic borders of the United
States. See Eisgruber, supra note 128, at 63 (noting that the Court has never overruled Elk
and Native Americans derive their citizenship from statute); see also Drimmer, supra note
40, at 698-99 (describing the courts' view of Native American tribes as "distinct, racially
defined entities.. . owing ... allegiance to their ancestral tribes, and 'not part of the people
of the United States"') (citing Elk, 112 U.S. at 99).
249 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
250 Id. at 109.
251 Id. at 102.
252 Id. at 100 (citing treaties declaring Cherokees, Choctaws, and other specific tribes to
be either U.S. citizens or individually eligible to become citizens). Congress also granted
citizenship to many Native Americans under the Allotment Act of 1887. Act of Feb. 8,
1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388; see GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, § 92.03(3)(e) (stating that
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Americans were treated as foreign born aliens for citizenship purposes and
required to complete an administrative naturalization procedure to obtain
United States citizenship.
253
Justice Harlan dissented in Elk v. Wilkins on grounds that the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 conferred citizenship on Mr. Elk because he was residing in a state
and subject to taxation.254 Justice Harlan also raised the possibility that one
need not be simultaneously born in the United States and subject to its
jurisdiction to be born a citizen within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 255 He opined that persons born in the United States, including
Native Americans, could later become subject to its jurisdiction. If so, they
could be considered citizens within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.256 Justice Harlan castigated the majority, stating:
[T]here is still in this country a despised and rejected class of persons,
with no nationality whatever; who, born in our territory, owing no
allegiance to any foreign power, and subject, as residents of the States, to
all the burdens of government, are yet not members of any political
community nor entitled to any of the rights, privileges, or immunities of
citizens of United States.
257
Although the Court has never overruled Elk,2 5 8 ill 1924 Congress provided
the Allotment Act of 1887 conferred citizenship on many Native Americans who resided in
the United States). As Pryor points out, only "free white inhabitants" were initially eligible
to naturalize pursuant to the 1790 Act. Pryor, supra note 42, at 882 n.7. African Americans
were not included in naturalization laws until 1870. Id. Racial restrictions were also placed
on "Japanese, Chinese, Hindus, Afghans, Burmese, and Hawaiians[, and] the last of these
restrictions was not removed until 1952." Id. (citing Note, Constitutional Limitations on the
Naturalization Power, 80 YALE L.J. 769, 791 n.95 (1971)).
253 Members of certain tribes were permitted to apply to a United States court for
naturalization "upon satisfactory proof of fitness for civilized life." Elk, 112 U.S. at 100. It
is unclear from the Court's opinion whether Elk belonged to one of the tribes granted
authorization to become a United States citizen through administrative naturalization. See
id.
254 Elk, 112 U.S. at 112-13 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
255 Id. at 116-17 ("There is nothing in the history of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment which, in our opinion, justifies the conclusion that only those Indians are
included in its grant of citizenship who were, at the time of their birth, subject to the
complete jurisdiction of the United States."); see also Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth
Amendment and Native American Citizenship, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 555, 570-71 (2000)
(discussing Justice Harlan's dissent in Elk, and stating that "The decision in Elk clearly
limited the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment to Native Americans seeking to
become citizens of the United States.").
256 Elk, 112 U.S. at 121.
211 Id. at 122-23.
258 Eisgruber, supra note 128, at 63. At least one scholar suggests that the Court's ruling
in Wong Kim Ark entitled the children of Native Americans to constitutional citizenship so
long as they were born outside of tribal lands. Maltz, supra note 255, at 571-72.
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statutory birthright citizenship to all Native American children born in the
United States.259  The current citizenship statute pertaining to Native
Americans states that persons "born in the United States to a member of an
Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other aboriginal tribe" are United States citizens
at birth.
260
It is unlikely that a federal court would ever hold a putative. President
ineligible for office solely on grounds of membership in a Native American
tribe. Nevertheless, the United States citizenship of many Native Americans
purportedly arises from collective naturalization by statute rather than the
Constitution.26 1 Consequently, the natural born citizenship requirement casts a
shadow over the eligibility of at least some Native Americans to serve as
President of their country.
c. Children Born in Embassies, on Military Bases, and in Other Areas
of Special United States Jurisdiction
Birth within United States territorial waters or airspace imparts United
States citizenship based on the common law definition of land areas as
including "the ports, harbors, bays and other enclosed arms of the sea along its
coast and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the coast line outward a
marine league, or three geographical miles."262  Territorial waters are
considered an extension of the land. Consequently, whether a birth occurs
along the coast of Virginia or that of Puerto Rico could be significant in
determining whether a citizen is natural born.
263
In contrast, birth in places outside the United States but subject to United
States jurisdiction does not automatically result in United States citizenship.
Consequently, whether citizens born in such circumstances are natural born is
259 Act of June 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (2000)) (conferring United States citizenship upon all Native
Americans who had not previously acquired citizenship).
260 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 301(b), 66 Stat. 267
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000)).
261 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, § 92.03(3)(e).
262 Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923); see GORDON ET AL., supra note
166, § 92.03(2)(b) (describing the territorial limits of the rule ofjus soli as encompassing
the fifty states and territorial waters and airspace). Territorial waters have since been
extended to twelve nautical miles from the baselines of the United States. Proclamation No.
5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988).
263 Interestingly, a child born in the international zone of a United States port of entry to
an alien mother who is not yet legally admitted into the United States may grow up to be
President. Although immigration statutes create a legal fiction that an alien at an
immigration checkpoint is not technically within the country until formal "admission," the
principle ofjus soli citizenship is based on actual physical presence, not legal presence.
Therefore, children born to aliens in international zones are arguably natural born United
States citizens. Their situation is identical to that of children born to an undocumented alien
mother illegally present in the United States. GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, § 92.03(2)(d).
[Vol. 85:53
'NATURAL BORN' IN THE USA
questionable. Although the law considers United States civilian and military
vessels in international or foreign waters or airspace subject to United States
jurisdiction for many purposes, birth aboard these vessels does not in itself
result in citizenship. 264 Likewise, contrary to popular belief, birth in United
States embassies, consulates, or United States military facilities, does not result
in United States citizenship in the absence of another basis for citizenship.
265
As noted earlier, Christina Lohman argues that the natural born citizenship
proviso should be interpreted to include children of United States government
and military personnel living abroad on active duty assignment. 266 The
ambiguity of their status is evident, however, from both the periodic publicity
about the citizenship quality of well-known political figures, and the number of
resolutions introduced by members of Congress seeking to ensure that they are
considered natural born citizens.
267
3. Persons Whose Birthplace is Unknown
Could a United States citizen whose place of birth remains a mystery
become President? Nationality law confers conditional United States
citizenship on children less than five years old who are found in the United
States. 268 These "foundlings" are presumed to have been born in this country.
They retain United States citizenship unless it is proven that they were born
elsewhere before they reach the age of majority.269 It is unclear whether a
person whose place of birth is never discovered would be eligible for the
Presidency. Some risk would always remain that a foreign birthplace would be
subsequently discovered.
B. Citizenship Based on Jus Sanguinus Principles
Despite the distinctions frequently drawn between common law and civil
law countries - and the preference of the former for jus soli versus jus
sanguinis - the nationality laws of most countries, including the United States,
contain elements of both sources of citizenship. Although the Supreme Court
has held that United States citizens have no constitutional right to transmit
citizenship by descent, 270 as early as 1790, Congress accorded birthright
264 See Lam Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1928) (holding that a child born to
alien parents while aboard an American ship outside of United States territorial waters did
not acquire United States citizenship); GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, § 92.03(2)(c); see
also Drimmer, supra note 40, at 705-06 (discussing Lam Mow).
265 GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, § 92.03(2)(d).
266 See supra notes 15-16 and text accompanying note 26.
267 See infra Part V.A.
268 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, §301(f), 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(f) (2000)).
269 Id.
270 Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 830 (stating "the Court has specifically recognized the
power of Congress not to grant a United States citizen the right to transmit citizenship by
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citizenship to foreign born children of United States citizens.2 71 Restrictions
on acquiring citizenship through descent have varied from allowing fathers, but
not mothers, to pass on United States citizenship, to imposing enhanced
burdens of proving legitimacy on persons who claim to be the offspring of
citizen fathers and other conditions subsequent on foreign born children of
citizen parents.272 These statutes have always required the physical presence
of United States citizen parents in the United States for at least some period of
time prior to the child's birth.
273
Current nationality statutes provide that birth to two United States citizen
parents, to an alien mother and United States citizen father who are married, or
to a United States citizen mother, results in the automatic acquisition of
citizenship at birth subject to parental residency requirements.274 Birth to an
alien mother and United States citizen father who are not married imposes an
additional requirement of legitimation by the father before his child can claim
United States citizenship. 275 In addition, at least one United States citizen
parent must have resided in the United States prior to the child's birth, and,
depending on date of birth, there may be certain conditions subsequent that the
descent" (footnote omitted)); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 688 (1898)
(stating in dicta that the citizenship status of children born abroad to United States citizens is
subject to regulation by Congress). See generally STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1038 (2d ed. 1997).
271 Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 104 (repealed 1795); see supra Part
I.A.2.
272 United States citizen mothers were unable to transmit citizenship to their children
until a 1934 statute granted them equality of status. See Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, 48
Stat. 797 (providing that a child born abroad, whose mother or father was a United States
citizen, is a citizen at birth if certain conditions of prior residence are satisfied); see also,
GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, §93.02(6)(b) (describing conditions subsequent to
citizenship applicable to children born abroad set forth in federal statutes enacted from
1907-1994). Children born out of wedlock to a United States citizen mother acquire United
States citizenship at birth, while children born to an alien mother and United States citizen
father must be legitimated by the father. The Supreme Court upheld these gender
discriminations in Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1961).
273 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, § 93.02(5)(a)-(c) (stating that residence of the
parent(s) in the United States has always been "an indispensable prerequisite" to passing
citizenship onto the child, then discussing the history of statutes specifying the exact type of
residence required). A child's citizenship depends on the parent's citizenship status at the
time of the child's birth; a foreign born child may not acquire United States citizenship from
a former United States citizen. However, if a parent is denaturalized or expatriated
subsequent to the child's birth, the child retains United States citizenship, regardless of the
child's age at the time the citizenship of the parent was lost.
274 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, §301, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000)); see GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, §
93.01(4).
275 Immigration and Nationality Act § 309 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)).
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foreign born child must satisfy in order to preserve United States citizenship. 276
These statutory rules of jus sanguinis citizenship apply regardless of the
reasons why a citizen parent is outside the United States at the time of the
child's birth.277 Accordingly, children born abroad to parents who are United
States government employees engaged in military or civil service receive
United States citizenship on the same basis as any other child born abroad to
American parents who are private citizens.278 Time spent abroad honorably
and actively serving in the Armed Forces, however, may be counted as
physical presence in the United States for purposes of computing the prior
minimum residence required to transmit citizenship to a child. 27
9
Likewise, American diplomats' children receive United States citizenship on
the same statutory basis as other United States citizens' foreign born
offspring. 280 However, the children of American diplomats may also be United
States citizens by application of the common law.281 Children born in the
United States to foreign diplomats are not subject to United States jurisdiction,
276 If both parents are United States citizens, at least one must have resided in the United
States or its outlying possessions, but no minimum time period is prescribed. Immigration
and Nationality Act § 301(c) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)(2000)). If only
one parent is a United States citizen, he or she must have been physically present in the
United States or its outlying possessions for not less than five years, at least two of which
were after age fourteen. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g). If one parent is a citizen and the other is a
United States noncitizen national, the citizen parent must have been physically present in the
United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of at least one year
prior to the child's birth. Id. § 1401(d). Generally, children born abroad to United States
citizens prior to October 10, 1978 must reside in the United States either two or five years -
again, depending on date of birth - between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight. This
condition subsequent withstood constitutional challenge in Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815,
831 (1971). See supra text accompanying notes 139-146. However, Congress has since
eliminated the requirement and it does not apply to citizens born after October 10, 1978.
Act of Oct. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-432, § 1, 92 Stat. 1046; see GORDON ETAL., supra note
166, § 93.02(6) (describing how Congress repealed the requirement of U.S. residency to
retain citizenship).
277 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401.
279 Id.
279 Immigration and Nationality Act § 301(a)(7) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(7)); see also Lohman, supra note 43, at 366-68 (arguing that children born abroad
to military personnel and other United States government employees on active duty
assignments should be considered natural born citizens, because the protection provided by
the military, the role of the United States government in stationing their parents abroad, and
the historical nature of troops stationed abroad indicates that such children are born "within
the allegiance" of the United States).
280 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401.
281 Lohman, supra note 43, at 365 (discussing Sir Edward Coke's view that children born
abroad within the protection of the sovereign, such as children of ambassadors, were natural
born, and explaining that under this rule the children born abroad of United States diplomats
would be natural born).
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and therefore are not United States citizens. By the same token, children born
abroad to American diplomats are arguably natural born, at least in terms of a
common law understanding of that term.
Analogous principles of citizenship apply to non-United States citizen
minors adopted by United States citizens. With the recent passage of the Child
Citizenship Act,282 foreign born children adopted by United States citizens are
treated identically to biological children for citizenship purposes once their
adoptions are finalized, but it is far less likely that they could be considered
"natural born citizens." Adoption laws generally do not permit prenatal
adoptions. 283 Consequently, if natural born citizenship arises as a result of the
circumstances of one's birth - place of birth or parental citizenship status -
then it is difficult to see how foreign born adoptees, even newborns, could be
considered natural born for purposes of Article II.
C. Multiple Nationalities
Regardless of how United States citizenship is acquired, a United States
citizen may simultaneously hold citizenship in one or more foreign countries.
This has not always been the case. Prior to 1967, naturalizing in a foreign
country was among several denationalizing actions triggering the loss of
United States citizenship.284 In Afroyim v. Rusk,285 however, a naturalized
United States citizen contested the loss of his United States citizenship as a
consequence of voting in a foreign election. The Supreme Court ruled in his
favor, holding that a specific intent to relinquish citizenship is required before
United States citizenship can be lost.286 A foreign born individual who
282 Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1431) (stating that the provisions for automatically acquiring
citizenship and for acquiring a certificate of citizenship apply equally to validly adopted
children). Foreign born children adopted by United States citizens may now automatically
acquire citizenship once their adoptions are final. Prior to the Act, these children were
required to go through the administrative naturalization process in order to obtain United
States citizenship.
283 See infra note 486 and accompanying text.
284 See, e.g., Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, § 2, 34 Stat. 1228, repealed by
Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401(a), 54 Stat. 1168, repealed by Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 349(a)(1), 66 Stat. 267 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, § 100.02(4)(c)
(discussing the varying conditions under which a citizen could be expatriated as a result of
naturalizing in a foreign state).
285 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
286 Id. at 268. The Court further clarified its position that voluntary intent to relinquish
United States citizenship was required in Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 260-64 (1980)
(affirming Afroyim and holding that "an expatriating act and an intent to relinquish
citizenship must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence"). See GORDON ET AL.,
supra note 166, § 100.02(2)(b) (discussing the consequences and aftermath of the Terrazas
decision and noting that Congress adopted the approach of the Terrazas case). At present, a
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becomes a naturalized United States citizen may now preserve his or her
foreign citizenship, so long as naturalization in another country does not result
in loss of citizenship pursuant to the laws of the country of origin.28 7 Persons
naturalized in the United States must take an oath of renunciation of foreign
citizenship, but this provision is rarely substantively enforced.
288
The intersection of rules of citizenship based on jus soli and jus sanguinis
may also result in the acquisition of two or more nationalities at birth.
Children born in the United States to parents who are citizens of a foreign
country may be birthright citizens of both nations, if their parents' country
follows jus sanguinis citizenship rules. Likewise, children born abroad to
United States citizens may acquire the citizenship of the country where they
are born if that country follows jus soli citizenship. They may maintain both
citizenships because United States law does not require election in these
circumstances. Birthright triple nationality is another possibility in cases
where parents of two different countries (both of which adhere tojus sanguinis
principles) have a child born in a third country with jus soli citizenship. It
would even be possible, albeit quite rare, for a child to acquire four or more
nationalities at birth if the parents are themselves dual or triple nationals.
Foreign born nationals subsequently naturalized in the United States come
United States citizen who naturalizes in a foreign country "is presumed to have intended to
retain U.S. citizenship." Id. § 100.02(4)(c). An action such as swearing oaths of allegiance
to foreign states "gives rise only to a highly persuasive inference that U.S. citizenship was
abandoned, which inference may be rebutted with proof that the person did not intend.., to
relinquish citizenship." Id.
287 The trend is towards a greater acceptance of dual citizenship than in the past. See
Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411, 1456-
57 (1997) (explaining that the United States now tolerates dual citizenship, and listing Italy,
Turkey, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Great Britain, Ireland, Switzerland, Greece,
Israel, and El Salvador among the countries now permitting the retention of nationality after
naturalizing in a foreign state); see also Eugene Goldstein & Victoria Piazza,
Naturalization, Dual Citizenship and Retention of Foreign Citizenship: A Survey, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 517, 520, app. at 545-47 (1996) (describing the increased trend in
favor of dual citizenship, and including the results of an eighty-five country survey on the
legality of dual citizenship); GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, §§ 91.01(3)(d), 96.05(1) n.16
("The [oath of allegiance] prohibition against dual allegiance does not preclude dual
citizenship"); see also U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Dual
Nationality, at http://travel.state.gov/travel/dualnationality.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
288 Sanford Levinson, Constituting Communities Through Words that Bind: Reflections
on Loyalty Oaths, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1440, 1464-65 (1986) (exploring the significance of
loyalty oaths and comparing political to religious oaths of loyalty); Karin Schemer-Kim,
Note, The Role of the Oath of Renunciation in Current U.S. Nationality Policy: To Enforce,
to Omit, or Maybe to Change?, 88 GEO. L.J. 329, 330-33 (2000) (explaining that the oath is
rarely enforced and arguing for greater enforcement on the grounds that "naturalization
decisions [should] include affective considerations [such as] a desire to share in the United
States' cultural and national identity, and particularly an adherence to a common set of core
values"). Id. at 331.
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to mind as possible dual nationals. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates,
however, even an individual who is indisputably a natural born American can
also be a dual national. The Constitution does not bar dual nationals from
becoming President, and, in recent years, United States nationality law has
become increasingly tolerant of multiple citizenship, thereby increasing the
possibility that a dual national will become President. At least one
commentator has suggested that a constitutional amendment eliminating the
natural born citizenship requirement should also include a provision
prohibiting the President from holding any foreign citizenship.289  This
measure would eliminate the existence of alternative citizenship claims, even
though the danger may be more apparent than real.
D. Citizenship and Uncertainty
There are currently many ways of acquiring United States citizenship, and
the future offers even wider possibilities. Children born to surrogate mothers
may already face unique dilemmas if the surrogate mother's citizenship differs
from that of the parents who conceived and will raise the child.290 One day,
children born in a space station or in artificial gestation environments may face
even more complex issues. At present, as the foregoing discussion illustrates,
the natural born citizenship status of millions of Americans is open to question.
Natural born citizenship is absolutely certain only for United States citizens
born post-statehood in one of the fifty states, provided that they are not
members of Native American tribes recognized by the United States
government. To varying degrees, the natural born status of all other United
States citizens is suspect.
III. NATURAL BORN CITIZENSHIP, ELECTIONS, SUCCESSION AND THE COURTS
Without a constitutional amendment naturalized persons who are not
birthright citizens would have no realistic claim to eligibility to the Presidency.
289 See Medina supra note 43, at 255-59 & n.9 (discussing provisions in state and foreign
constitutions "requiring a specified quality of citizenship"); Maximizing Voter Choice, supra
note 10 (statement of Matthew Spalding) (raising the issue of dual citizenship and arguing
for enforcement of requirement that naturalized citizens take oath of renunciation of past
allegiances). Several countries do prohibit dual nationals from holding either any public
office or at least certain high elected positions. See Paula Gutierrez, Mexico's Dual
Nationality Amendments: They Do Not Undermine US. Citizens'Allegiance and Loyalty or
U.S. Political Sovereignty, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 999, 1010 (1997) (listing
key political positions - including President, Senator, Congressperson, Supreme Court
Justice - open only to Mexican born nationals who do not hold any other nationality).
290 See, e.g., Audrey McAvoy, Japan Refuses Mother's Recognition Request, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 11, 2004,
http://www.intendedparents.com/News/Japan-refuses_%20mothers-recognition-request.ht
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Any of the many birthright citizens whose natural born status is unclear,
however, could become entangled in a battle over the meaning of the natural
born citizenship clause in a variety of ways. Early in the Presidential selection
process, for example, media coverage of a prospective candidate's origins
could trigger a national controversy over constitutional qualifications. A
public credentials contest could, in turn, cause the candidate to withdraw from
the race, or persuade supporters that backing the candidate would be too
risky. 291  Alternatively, vigorous public debate might result in a popular
consensus that birthright citizenship should suffice for the Presidency,
regardless of the precise meaning of Article II. A popular consensus could
persuade state election officials to include a Presidential hopeful's name on an
election ballot, despite questionable natural born citizenship credentials, and it
might dissuade potential challengers from initiating a legal action contesting
the eligibility of the candidate to serve as President.292 Given the nature of
present-day political battles, however, it is hard to imagine that competitors
would pull any punches in a Presidential contest.
Nor would winning the Democratic or Republican nomination necessarily
insulate a Presidential candidate from legal action or convince a disappointed
rival to abandon the quest for the Presidency. Moreover, as long as the
constitutional standard remains ambiguous, the risk of contentious legal
disputes will linger, even in the midst of a national emergency. Without
absolutely clear standards, contention over who should succeed to the
Presidency in the wake of a disaster would not be at all surprising.
Absent a constitutional amendment, it is likely that the judicial branch
ultimately will be called upon to address any serious dispute over the natural
born citizenship credentials of an actual or prospective President, Vice
President, or Acting President. 293 In the exercise of their duties, both the
President and Congress necessarily interpret the Constitution and determine
courses of action on the basis of their understanding of its mandates.294 When
291 These kinds of considerations may have been a factor in George Romney's decision
to withdraw from the 1968 Republican Presidential primary race. See supra note 19; see
also D'Amato, supra note 15, at 252-53.
292 Barry Goldwater's natural born citizenship credentials were at least susceptible to
challenge, but apparently only one state court legal action contested his qualifications for the
Presidency, and it was dismissed. See supra note 19.
293 Hereinafter the discussion focuses on the natural born citizenship of the President. It
is important to remember, however, that the Twelfth Amendment provides that no person
ineligible to the office of President may serve as Vice President. The same considerations
applicable to Presidential citizenship qualifications would also apply to the Vice President,
although the stakes at issue in a judicial dispute would be somewhat lower unless
circumstances required the Vice President to step into the Presidency.
294 As Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer point out, "[w]hen nonjudicial
constitutional interpretation occurs against a background of judicial inaction, no conflict
exists between the interpretive acts of nonjudicial officials and those of judges. In such
cases, constitutional interpretation by nonjudicial officials is rarely controversial .... "
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the actions of the executive or legislative branches are appropriately
challenged in a court of law in the context of an actual case or controversy,
however, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is."' 295 Courts sometimes decline to entertain constitutional
challenges on prudential grounds, but when they do reach a decision on the
merits, "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution.
' ' 296
Resolution of a challenge to an individual's qualifications to serve as
President would involve in-depth exploration of the kinds of constitutional
questions discussed above in Part J.297 Before reaching the merits of the
natural born citizenship proviso, however, the courts would need to deal with a
number of jurisdictional obstacles involving justiciability. Courts are required
to address justiciability questions sua sponte regardless of whether the parties
do so, and the importance of these issues increases dramatically when major
constitutional issues arise. 298 As the Supreme Court explained in its 2004
decision in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,2 99 "[t]he command
to guard jealously and exercise rarely our power to make constitutional
pronouncements requires strictest adherence when matters of great national
significance are at stake. '300 Although many would argue that the Court's 2000
decision to rule on the merits of the election dispute in Bush v. Gore30 raises
questions about the Court's fidelity to this philosophy, 302 the Court consistently
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REv. 1359, 1360 (1997). Alexander and Schauer also note that, from time to time,
both the executive and legislative branches have made a case for non-deference to judicial
interpretation of the Constitution, as did President Abraham Lincoln in denying that the
Dred Scott decision was binding on the President. Id. at 1360-61. In their view, the
argument for non-deference "is not only widely accepted today, but it has also enjoyed a
remarkable persistence." Id. at 1360.
295 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); accord Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (citing Marbury and noting that this "principle has ever since been
respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our
constitutional system").
296 Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
297 See supra text accompanying notes 37-192.
298 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, § 2.3. The constitutional aspects of
justiciability arise out of the cases or controversies language of Article III. See U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2.
299 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
300 Id. at 2308.
301 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
302 See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 275 (2002) ("The
Court did not pause even for a sentence in Bush I to explain why the Article II question...
did not present a political question for resolution by Congress); see also discussion infra
Part III.B & note 423.
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has reiterated its "'deeply rooted' commitment 'not to pass on questions of
constitutionality' unless adjudication of the constitutional issue is
necessary."
303
A legal dispute over the meaning of the natural born citizenship proviso
could involve both constitutional and prudential justiciability issues.
Assuming - as is likely in at least- some contexts - that the constitutional
hurdles would not prove insurmountable, a significant question would remain:
Should the Court decide what the natural born citizenship proviso means? The
answer to this query has important consequences for the Court in that it poses
significant questions of judicial self-restraint. The subject is at least equally
important for Congress, because it directly ties into the question whether
constitutional amendment of the natural born citizenship proviso is necessary
or advisable. The following discussion explores potential issues of
constitutional and prudential justiciability, as well as the more general question
whether it is in the best interests of the Court and the nation to rely on the
judiciary to resolve problems of Presidential eligibility pursuant to the natural
born citizenship proviso if and when they arise. The discussion begins with a
look at some of the ways in which such questions might come before the
Court.
A. The Justiciability of a Challenge Pursuant to the Natural Born
Citizenship Proviso
The justiciability of a legal dispute over natural born citizenship could turn
on the context of the controversy. Several distinct scenarios are possible. The
form of disputes arising out of a Presidential election would depend to a large
extent on timing. Early in the electoral process - from the first state primary
campaigns up until the eve of a national election - a number of potential
actions are conceivable. Possible scenarios 3°4 include challenges to actual or
threatened actions such as (1) a state election official's decision to include or
exclude a candidate's name from a primary ballot; 305 (2) a determination by the
officials of a political party to permit or deny a Presidential hopeful an
opportunity to be considered as a candidate at a state nominating caucus; (3) an
303 Newdow, 124 S.Ct. at 2308 (quoting Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323
U.S. 101, 105 (1944)).
" See generally Gordon, supra note 8, at 28-31 (speculating on possible means by
which the natural born citizen clause could be tested in court); Pryor, supra note 42, at 896
n.85 (similarly speculating on how such a challenge might validly come into court).
305 See, e.g., Kneip v. Herseth, 214 N.W.2d 93, 100 (S.D. 1974) (issuing declaratory
judgment in case involving state governor running for third term contrary to statutory
limitation). For examples of other kinds of electoral challenges at the state and local levels
see Archer v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pima County, 800 P.2d 972, 973 (Ariz. 1990) (holding
that incumbent constable had standing to challenge sufficiency of signatures to put
defendant challenger on the ballot in the other party's primary); In re Dixler, 493 N.Y.S.2d
52, 52-53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (determining eligibility of candidates for the Monroe
Town Council).
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election official's decision to include or exclude a candidate's name on a
general election ballot; and (4) a ruling by the Federal Election Commission
with respect to a candidate's eligibility for federal funds.306 Potential plaintiffs
could include a Presidential hopeful, rival candidate, voter, political party, or
other association.
307
At the culmination of the electoral process, litigants conceivably could
challenge the eligibility of a President-elect to take office,30 8 or even contest
the qualifications of a sitting President.30 9 Outside of the electoral context, a
challenge could arise to the constitutional eligibility of a person called upon to
assume the duties of Acting President pursuant to the federal succession
statute. 310 In the latter circumstances, the most likely plaintiffs would include
persons with subsequent claims to the office of Acting President, other
government officials, or members of the public.
The precise nature of a legal dispute over presidential citizenship credentials
would, of course, depend on the particular circumstances giving rise to the
controversy. A resulting lawsuit could originate in either state or federal court,
although an action initiated in a state forum might well be removed to federal
court.3 11 The parties would most likely seek injunctive and/or declaratory
relief.31
2
306 See 26 U.S.C. § 9004 (2000) (stating that "eligible candidates" are entitled to receive
election funds). See generally THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, THE PRESIDENTIAL
PUBLIC FUNDING PROGRAM (1993), http://www.fec.gov/info/pfund.htm (last visited Nov. 7,
2004).
317 Associations generally have standing to bring suit when the association itself or its
members have suffered injury. See Sierra Club v. Martin, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)
(rejecting a claim by the Sierra Club because it failed to allege that the association or its
members would be affected by the challenged development).
308 See Pryor, supra note 42, at 898 n.92. Another conceivable legal attack might seek to
prevent members of the Electoral College from casting votes for a candidate whose
constitutional qualifications were arguably lacking.
319 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 30-31; Pryor, supra note 42, at 897 n.85.
310 See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2000).
311 In instances where an issue of federal constitutional or statutory law is an essential
component of plaintiffs action, the case could be brought in or removed to federal court
even though it arises from a state cause of action. See Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co.,
255 U.S. 1801 (1921).
312 In most cases, the parties would probably seek injunctive relief. In addition, or as an
alternative, either party could seek a declaratory judgment in federal court resolving the
foreign born candidate's eligibility to serve as President. In appropriate circumstances, the
threat of adverse action could be sufficient to permit an action pursuant to the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000). The Supreme Court has articulated the
standards for declaratory judgments as "a concrete case admitting of an immediate and
definitive determination of the legal rights of the parties in an adversary proceeding upon
the facts alleged.... although the adjudication of the rights of the litigants may not require
the award of process or the payment of damages. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S.
227, 241 (1933) (citations omitted). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, at § 2.4
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Whatever the particular form of legal action, the justiciability questions
inherent in these situations merit careful consideration. While comprehensive
analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this article, a few examples
should suffice to demonstrate the tangled web of complex questions the courts
could have to unravel before reaching the merits of a legal dispute over the
meaning of the natural born citizenship proviso.
1. Standing
Questions of standing would likely arise in many of the scenarios outlined in
the preceding paragraphs. Standing focuses on whether the person or entity
initiating an action is the appropriate party to bring suit.313 In its June 2004
decision in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 31 4 the Supreme
Court synthesized its holdings on this aspect of justiciability as follows:
[O]ur standing jurisprudence contains two strands: Article III standing,
which enforces the Constitution's case or controversy requirement...
and prudential standing, which embodies "judicially self-imposed limits
on the exercise of federal jurisdiction"...... The Article III limitations are
familiar: The plaintiff must show that the conduct of which he complains
has caused him to suffer an "injury in fact" that a favorable judgment will
redress. Although we have not exhaustively defined the prudential
dimensions of the standing doctrine, we have explained that prudential
standing encompasses "the general prohibition on a litigant's raising
another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches,
and the requirement that the plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of
interests protected by the law invoked." "Without such limitations -
closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-
governance - the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions
of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions
may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial
intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights." 315
An otherwise qualified candidate whose name is excluded from a primary
ballot by state election officials on grounds of ineligibility to serve as President
(distinguishing between declaratory judgments and advisory opinions). As in any other
context, requests for declaratory relief pertaining to election campaigns "must be presented
in the context of a specific live grievance." Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 110 (1969);
see also, e.g., Wagner v. Milwaukee Co. Election Comm'n, 666 N.W.2d 816, 823 (Wis.
2003) (granting declaratory judgment in contested election context); cf Fernandez v.
Georgia, 716 F. Supp. 1475, 1479 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (granting declaratory judgment that a
state statute restricting eligibility for state trooper positions to natural born citizens was
unconstitutional).
313 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, § 2.5.1, at 60.
314 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
315 Id. at 2308-09 (citations omitted).
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pursuant to the United States Constitution should have little difficulty
establishing standing to challenge that exclusion. From an Article III
perspective, the exclusion would constitute an injury in fact fairly traceable to
the decision of election officials. The purpose of the lawsuit would be to
redress that injury by means of a declaratory judgment establishing the
candidate's eligibility for the Presidency and/or an injunction directing election
officials to place the candidate's name on the ballot. From a prudential
perspective, the candidate would be asserting her own rights rather than those
of third parties, 316 and the associated grievance would be quite particular. The
standing of other potential plaintiffs - e.g., a rival candidate, a voter, or
political party - raises more complex questions. A rival candidate's standing
would likely depend on a fact-specific analysis. 317 For example, a court might
hold that a Republican candidate had standing to challenge the citizenship
credentials of a rival Republican at the state primary stage but not those of a
Democratic contender. 318 For a voter raising a federal constitutional challenge,
however, standing seems unlikely. The critical question would be whether an
allegation of injury arising out of the inclusion or exclusion of a Presidential
candidate on an election ballot would constitute a sufficiently direct injury or
merely a "generalized grievance." The latter would not support standing.
319
316 In Bush v. Gore, however, the Court allowed the candidates to litigate the rights of
third parties in an equal protection context. 531 U.S. 98, 98-103 (2000).
317 For analysis of analogous standing questions arising under state law, see, e.g., Welch
v. Gossens, 25 So. 472, 475 (La. 1899) (allowing a challenge to defendant's election as
mayor of Alexandria by plaintiff who was the opposing candidate in the election);
McLaughlin v. French, 492 So. 2d 254, 255 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing incumbent to
contest challenger's eligibility in school board election, on the ground that the incumbent
had standing as a registered voter).
318 Some state courts have reached similar conclusions with respect to state elections.
See, e.g., In re Nominating Petition of Pasquay, 525 A.2d 13 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987), affd,
529 A.2d 1076 (1987) (holding that a registered Democrat lacked standing to challenge a
Republican primary candidate's nominating petitions). Some states, however, allow voters
or rival contenders to challenge the qualifications of candidates from other parties pursuant
to state statutes that afford broad rights designed to help safeguard the integrity of the
electoral process. See, e.g., Archer v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pima County, 800 P.2d 972,
973 (Ariz. 1990) (allowing Republican incumbent to contest nomination of challenger
despite incumbent's inability to vote in Democratic primary); In re David Z. Dixler, 493
N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding that any registered voter is entitled to
challenge a candidate's designating petitions).
319 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (finding lack of standing in
matter involving generalized complaints of environmental injury and suggesting that
standing has a separation-of-powers component); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)
(declining to rule on the merits of a matter involving "a 'generalized grievance' shared in
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens"); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923) (refusing to permit plaintiff taxpayer alleging only a "generalized
grievance" to challenge federal expenditure). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104,
§ 2.5.5, at 90 (explaining that the "prudential principle," bars hearing "generalized
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Despite the bar on generalized grievances, the Court has made it clear that a
real injury does not move beyond judicial reach simply because it is "widely
shared. '320 In the Court's words, "[t]o deny standing to persons who are in
fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the
most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by
nobody."321 Nevertheless, in light of the overall tenor of the Court's standing
jurisprudence, it is difficult to believe that a voter claiming an alleged injury
shared by tens of millions of Americans could, without more, establish
standing to challenge the natural born citizenship credentials of a Presidential
candidate.
In 1937, the Supreme Court addressed an analogous situation when Albert
Levitt, a member of the bar of the Court, alleged that Justice Black's
appointment violated Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the Constitution.
322
Levitt filed a motion seeking an order directing Justice Black to show cause
why his appointment was lawful. The Court summarily dismissed the motion
on grounds that "the motion papers disclose[d] no interest upon the part of the
petitioner other than that of a citizen and a member of the bar of th[e]
Court. ' 32 3 The Court admonished:
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke
the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative
action, he must show that he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of
sustaining, a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient
that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public.
324
Applying Levitt, as well as the lessons of nearly seventy subsequent years of
standing jurisprudence, it is unlikely that a plaintiff whose claim of injury is
simply that of a voter or concerned citizen would have standing to challenge
the natural bom citizenship qualifications of an incumbent President or Acting
President. An individual in the line of succession, however, should have
standing to challenge the natural born citizenship credentials of an Acting
President. A cabinet member, for example, might argue that an Acting
President held office unlawfully because he or she was not a natural born
citizen within the meaning of Article II. The alleged injury of the plaintiff
grievances" brought by individual citizens or taxpayers).
320 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998) (holding that voters had
standing to seek disclosure from lobbying group under federal law, and while the alleged
injury was "widely shared" it was nevertheless "sufficiently concrete and specific" to be
actionable).
32 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669,
688 (1973).
322 Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). Levitt also claimed that there was no vacancy
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would be direct, fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and capable of
redress by means of injunctive relief. Regardless of the standing element,
though, the Court could well decline to entertain such a challenge on political
question grounds.325  Before turning to the political question doctrine,
however, the next section will consider threshold issues pertaining to the
timing of a dispute over the natural born citizenship proviso.
2. Ripeness, Mootness and Other Timing Issues
One of the principal criticisms of the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v.
Gore is that the case was not ripe for adjudication at the time the Supreme
Court agreed to hear it.326 The Supreme Court has defined ripeness as the
determination whether a matter is sufficiently developed to merit review by the
federal courts. 327 The purpose of the doctrine is to sift out cases that involve
speculative injuries that may never cause concrete harm. 328 Ripeness is also
intertwined with standing to the extent that both doctrines focus on the
plaintiffs claimed injury. Standing addresses the sufficiency of the injury and
the plaintiffs personal connection to it, while ripeness focuses on whether the
plaintiff's alleged injury either actually has occurred or is sufficiently likely to
occur that the issues are concretely framed and judicial resolution is not
deemed unnecessary. 329 In some instances, the two aspects of justiciability are
readily distinguishable, while in others they overlap - e.g., when it is unclear
whether an alleged injury is sufficiently concrete and personal to the party
alleging the harm to merit review as of the time suit is filed. 330
325 The political question doctrine is discussed infra Part III.A.3.
326 Erwin Chemerinsky, for example, contends that the case could not have been ripe
until all of the counting was completed in the state of Florida, principally because it was
unclear whether then-Governor Bush would be ahead or behind until the state finished the
recount. If Mr. Bush had ended up ahead, the controversy might have been avoided. In
addition, as a result of its decision to take the case before the recount ended, the Court
arguably ended up "improperly treat[ing] an 'as applied' Equal Protection challenge as if it
were a facial challenge" and overlooked the impact of the appointment of a single judge to
hear all of the vote challenges on the Equal Protection claims. Erwin Chemerinsky, How
Should We Think About Bush v. Gore, 34 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 14 (2002). Although he does
not use the term "ripeness," this concept is inherent in Justice Stevens' criticism of the
majority's reasoning. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 126-28 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that majority's decision to terminate recount before tabulation of all
votes was premature, particularly in light of the appointment of an "impartial magistrate" to
hear all challenges to the recount process).
327 Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). The Court evaluates both whether
the issues of the case are fit for review and the hardship to the parties of withholding review.
Id.
328 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, § 2.6.1, at 102 (explaining that the ripeness inquiry is
meant to bar consideration of injuries that are "speculative and never may occur").
329 Id.
330 Id. § 2.6.1.
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In the context of a Presidential campaign, ripeness considerations may
preclude adjudication of the merits of a dispute at some stages but not at
others. 331 Once serious candidates emerge, even early in a primary race, the
ripeness doctrine is unlikely to bar resolution of a bona fide challenge to a
candidate's constitutional eligibility to serve as President for several reasons.
First, the issue would be concrete, and the case would not require development
of the kind of record critical to most judicial decisions. The only essential
facts would be the candidate's birthplace and the citizenship of her parents.
The heart of the matter would not involve the interplay of legal principles with
complex facts, but interpretation of extensive legal and historical research
concerning Article II and the intentions of the Framers in light of relevant
principles of constitutional interpretation.
332
Second, and more importantly, the Supreme Court has ruled that in
determining whether a case is ripe, federal courts must consider "both the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration." 333  In the context of a dispute over the
natural born citizenship qualifications of a serious candidate for the
Presidency, denying judicial review, even temporarily, could inflict great
hardship. For example, excluding a would-be candidate from the ballot in an
upcoming election would not only deprive that person of a place on a particular
ballot, but would hinder his or her chances to raise funds and establish a viable
presidential candidacy across the country. A contested decision to permit the
name of a candidate with questionable natural born citizenship credentials to
appear on a ballot, however, might cause a court to pause on grounds that the
challenged candidate could well lose the election, thereby mooting the issue.
Nevertheless, because of the obvious impact of a cloud on the qualifications of
a candidate, there would be compelling reasons to resolve the issue prior to the
election. If an excluded candidate were to prevail on the merits of the natural
born citizenship issue after the election - for example, where a court held that
the controversy was not moot on grounds that it was "capable of repetition yet
evading review" 334 - fashioning post-election relief would be difficult and
331 See, e.g., Boschetti v. MacKay, 748 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (finding
eligibility dispute in primary campaign ripe under state law because the County Board of
Elections had already validated the candidates).
332 See supra Part I.
333 Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
314 Once the election at issue takes place, regardless of the outcome, the matter may be
moot. See, e.g., Krajicek v. Gale, 677 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Neb. 2004) (dismissing a challenge
to a determination of ineligibility pursuant to Nebraska law because the primary election
date had passed and plaintiff could no longer obtain the relief sought). In a number of cases,
however, both federal and state courts have declined to hold disputes moot even after an
election has taken place on grounds that the controversy is "capable of repetition yet
evading review." See, e.g., Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 235 n.48
(1996) (declining to hold election dispute involving delegate fees moot where matter was
"capable of repetition yet evading review").
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disruptive at best, and the legitimacy of the election itself would be in question.
It is also possible that equitable doctrines could come into play in
connection with a dispute over the timing of a challenge to the constitutional
eligibility of a Presidential candidate. For example, in 1968, the Peace and
Freedom Party filed an original action for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme
Court of Hawaii contesting the refusal of Hawaii's Lieutenant Governor to
place its candidate on the state's 1968 Presidential ballot.335  The Party
originally proposed Eldridge Cleaver for President, but the state declined to
place Mr. Cleaver's name on the ballot on grounds that, at thirty-three years of
age, he was ineligible for the Presidency pursuant to Article II, Section 1,
Clause 5.336 Although the Lieutenant Governor informed the Party of the
state's decision nearly eight weeks prior to the election, and offered the party
an opportunity to replace Cleaver's name with that of an eligible candidate, the
Party took no action until a few days prior to Election Day when its attorneys
filed the mandamus action.337 Hawaii's highest court denied the writ.3 38
Deftly avoiding both substantive issues and complex justiciability questions,
the court held that the Peace and Freedom Party's action was barred by
laches.
339
While laches and other equitable doctrines theoretically could be factors in
the context of a dispute over natural born citizenship issues, it seems unlikely
that these kinds of issues would arise with respect to litigation involving a
serious Presidential candidate's right to seek the Presidency or a cabinet
member's challenge to the constitutional qualifications of an individual with a
prior claim to the office of Acting President. To the contrary, those concerned
are likely to act expeditiously. 340
3. The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine dates back to Marbury v. Madison,341
although it has evolved dramatically since Chief Justice Marshall penned his
masterpiece in 1803.342 During the intervening years, the Court has invoked
131 Jones v. Gill, 446 P.2d 558, 558 (Haw. 1968).
336 Id. at 558; see U.S. CONST. art II, § 1 (requiring that a person be thirty-five years old
to be eligible for the Presidency).
131 Jones, 446 P.2d at 558.
338 Id. at 559.
331 Id. at 619.
340 See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 19 (discussing likelihood of legal action prior to the
New Hampshire primary election to seek judicial resolution of objections to Govemor
Romney's citizenship qualifications for the Presidency).
341 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (declaring that political questions "can never be
made in this court").
341 See Barkow, supra note 302, at 300 (discussing the "decline" of the political question
doctrine); Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the
Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 643, 644-45 (1989) (listing subject matter
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the doctrine in cases involving subjects as varied as the Constitution's
guarantee of a republican form of government, 343 foreign policy prerogatives
of the Executive, 344 judicial impeachment, 345 and the ratification process for
constitutional amendments. 346  While the Court's pronouncements have
overtones of separation-of-powers theory, it remains uncertain whether the
doctrine is essentially constitutional or prudential in nature.
347
The Court's most comprehensive articulation of the factors relevant to a
determination of whether a case presents a non-justiciable political question
appears in Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority in the Court's 1962
decision of an equal protection challenge to a Tennessee reapportionment in
Baker v. Carr.348 The opinion sets forth criteria applicable to the political
question determination:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
that the courts have deemed to be within the boundaries of the political question doctrine);
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question, " 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 103 1,
1031, 1034-35 (1984) (reviewing cases in which the Supreme Court has addressed the
political question doctrine); Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political
Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 441, 465-77 (2004) (categorizing the various
applications of the political question doctrine); Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law
of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine,
80 N.C. L. REv. 1203, 1204-05 (2002) (suggesting that the political question doctrine has all
but disappeared from Supreme Court jurisprudence). See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962);
CHEMER1NSKY, supra note 104, § 2.8.
343 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 102-03 (1849) (holding-that whether citizens
have changed their form of government is a question to be settled by a political power).
14 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-32 (1937) (confirming power of
Executive in foreign relations field and holding that foreign nationals who accuse their
government of taking their property must look to their own nations' courts for relief).
345 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 251-52 (1993) (holding challenge to Senate
impeachment procedure nonjusticiable).
346 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939) (holding that Congress holds the
ultimate authority regarding the efficacy of ratifications of Constitutional amendments).
347 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, § 2.8.2, at 132 (reflecting on debate of "whether the
political question doctrine is constitutional, prudential, or both").
348 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2005]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
various departments on one question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar,
the case should not be dismissed for nonjusticiability on the ground of a
political question's presence.
349
The United States House of Representatives argued that several of these
factors were present in Powell v. McCormack,350 a case involving a challenge
by Congressman Adam Clayton Powell to the refusal of the House to seat him
during the second session of the 90th Congress in 1967, despite his
reelection. 351 The Court, however, rejected the argument that Article I, Section
5 of the Constitution - providing that each House of Congress "shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members" and
that each House may, "with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member"
352
- rendered the matter a political question. 353 The Court reasoned that these
provisions invested the House of Representatives with judicially unreviewable
discretion to determine its members' satisfaction of the constitutionally
specified requirements of age, citizenship, and residence. 354 The Court ruled,
however, that it could review the question of Congress' authority to impose
membership qualifications in addition to those set forth in the Constitution and
proceeded to consider the merits of the House of Representatives' refusal to
seat Mr. Powell. In so doing, the Court admonished:
Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion
interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction
given the document by another branch. The alleged conflict that such an
adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts' avoiding their
constitutional responsibility.355
A few years later, in Roudebush v. Hartke,356 the Court upheld the right of
state election officials to order a recount of votes in a senatorial contest, but
cautioned: "[The Senate] is the judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its members. It is fully empowered, and may determine such
matters without the aid of the House of Representatives or the Executive or
Judicial Department. ' 357
141 Id. at 217.
350 395 U.S. 486, 495 (1969); see also, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237-
38 (1993) (see discussion infra notes 358-367).
351 Powell, 395 U.S. at 490.
352 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
311 Powell, 395 U.S. at 513.
314 Id. at 506 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5).
351 Id. at 549 n.86 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 24 (1892) (remarking that it
is "an impermissible suggestion" that a political branch might act in contravention of a
judicial order)); see infra text accompanying note 421.
356 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
357 Id. at 19 n.6 (quoting Reed v. County Comm'rs, 277 U.S. 376, 388 (1928) (citation
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Several years after Hartke, in Nixon v. United States,358 the Court refused to
review the merits of a former federal judge's claim that the Senate had violated
the Constitution with respect to the conduct of his impeachment
proceedings. 359 Mr. Nixon objected to the conduct of a substantial portion of
the proceedings by a Senate Committee, contending that the use of the word
"try" in the Impeachment Clause360 required the full Senate to participate in all
phases of the impeachment proceedings.
361
The Court rejected the former judge's arguments on grounds that the word
"try" did not limit the authority constitutionally committed to the Senate with
respect to impeachment proceedings. Consequently, the conduct of the Nixon
impeachment was a nonjusticiable political question that the Court would not
review. 362 In reaching its decision, the Court focused on the existence of a
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to a coordinate political
branch" - evidenced by the authority vested solely in the Senate to conduct
impeachment proceedings and the inconsistency of judicial review with the
Constitution's system of checks and balances3 63 - and the "not completely
separate" issue "of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving [the dispute]". 364 The Court then turned to the issues of finality
and relief, essentially concluding that judicial intervention in the impeachment
process would be ill-advised and impractical. The Court noted the danger of
"'expos[ing] the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years of
chaos"' during judicial review of impeachment proceedings, particularly if the
President were impeached, 365 and the uncertainty of the Court's ability to grant
relief if it were to overturn the impeachment conviction.366 The Court
concluded: "[W]e are persuaded that the lack of finality and the difficulty of
fashioning relief counsel against justiciability.
' 367
Surprisingly, the Court did not address the relevance of its political question
jurisprudence in Bush v. Gore,368 although ripples of the doctrine are evident
just below the surface of the case. The per curiam opinion, for example, states:
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are
omitted)) (alteration in original).
358 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
359 Id. at 228, 238.
360 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
361 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230.
362 Id. at 237-38.
363 Id. at 228-33.
364 Id. at 227.
365 Id. at 236 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
366 Id.
367 Id.
368 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). For discussion of the conspicuous absence of
reference to the political question doctrine in Bush v. Gore, see Barkow, supra note 302, at
275; Tushnet, supra note 342, at 1203-04.
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the Members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the
Constitution's design to leave the selection of the President to the people
through their legislatures, and to the political sphere. When contending
parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it becomes our
unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the
judicial system has been forced to confront.
369
Reference to the doctrine is also implicit in Justice Breyer's dissent: "[T]he
selection of the President is of fundamental national importance. But that
importance is political, not legal. And this Court should resist the temptation
unnecessarily to resolve tangential legal disputes, where doing so threatens to
determine the outcome of the election.
'370
The potential applicability of the political question doctrine to questions of
Presidential eligibility should depend on context. The force of arguments for
nonjusticiability on political question grounds would be stronger following a
national election than in the midst of a political campaign, and even greater in
the face of a challenge to the natural born citizenship credentials of an
incumbent President or Acting President. The lack of cohesiveness in the
Court's political question jurisprudence, however, makes it difficult to predict
whether, and in what circumstances, the Court would agree to adjudicate the
substance of a dispute involving the natural born citizenship proviso.
Nevertheless, this question merits consideration, if only to demonstrate the
difficulty of navigating the currents and eddies of the doctrine in the context of
the scenarios most likely to arise.
Despite their differences, in each of the scenarios discussed above, a
political question analysis would begin with the question of the existence of a
textual commitment to a coordinate political branch. As Steven Calabresi has
aptly noted, "'[t]extual' commitments must be discovered by structural
analysis, since constitutional clauses do not come with footnotes attached
saying which clauses are enforceable through judicial review and which are
not."'371 There is no readily apparent answer to the question of a demonstrable
textual commitment in connection with the natural born citizenship proviso.
The Constitution's provisions for counting electoral votes372 and the role of the
369 Bush, 531 U.S. at 111.
370 Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also cautions that "Madison, at least,
believed that allowing the judiciary to choose Presidential electors 'was out of the
question[,]"' id. at 155 (quoting James Madison, remarks of July 25, 1787, reprinted in 5
ELLIOTT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 363 (2d ed. 1876)), and that "[t]he
decision by both the Constitution's Framers and the 1886 Congress to minimize this Court's
role in resolving close federal Presidential elections is as wise as it is clear ... Congress,
being a political body, expresses the people's will far more accurately than does an
unelected Court. And the people's will is what elections are all about." Bush, 531 U.S. at
155.
371 Calabresi, supra note 21, at 157.
372 Relevant provisions were originally set forth in Article II, Section I, Clause 2, and
[Vol. 85:53
'NATURAL BORN' IN THE USA
legislative branch in choosing a President in specified circumstances - if a
President-elect fails "to qualify"373 or in the event of simultaneous vacancies in
the offices of President and Vice President37 4 - arguably constitute textual
commitment of issues pertaining to executive qualifications to the legislative
branch. This, however, is not a particularly satisfactory answer.
First, Congress has no constitutional role to play in the Presidential electoral
process until the primaries are a distant memory, the national election is over,
and the members of the Electoral College have cast their votes. Only then does
the President of the Senate, in the presence of the members of the House and
Senate, open and count the electors votes. 375 Even if an overwhelming
majority of the members of Congress believed the President-elect to be
constitutionally unqualified on natural born citizenship grounds, at this point in
the process action to preclude a popularly elected candidate from taking office
could prove disastrous. Regardless of the circumstances, such a step would be
antidemocratic and very probably fracture the legislative branch and the
country along party or other factional lines. If, despite the Twentieth
Amendment's provision that "Congress may by law provide for the case
wherein neither the President nor the Vice President elect shall have
qualified," 376 the actual determination whether a candidate has qualified may
be justiciable, as Vasan Kesavan suggests, 377 the Court would enter
treacherous seas by taking on this task.
Whatever its post-election effect, however, this arguable textual
commitment should not preclude justiciability prior to a national election.
Awaiting Congressional reaction to the natural born citizenship qualifications
of a candidate would color all phases of a Presidential campaign. The
candidate, rivals, party leaders, state election officials, Federal Election
Commissioners, and voters would be forced to act on the basis of speculation
over the candidate's constitutional eligibility for the Presidency. In these
circumstances, judicial restraint would not lead to orderly resolution of the
issue; to the contrary, a refusal could infuse the entire electoral process with
damaging uncertainty. A candidate with questionable natural born citizenship
credentials - for example, an individual who had been born to military
personnel serving abroad, or a Native American born on tribal lands -might
never build the support necessary to reach the national ticket, creating anger
and alienation among major segments of the population. Conversely, if the
candidate did receive a major party nomination, judicial refusal to rule on a
qualifications challenge would gravely undermine the finality of the election if
the candidate were to win.
later modified by the Twelfth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
373 See U.S. CONST. amend. XX.
374 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
371 U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
376 U.S. CONST. amend. XX.
377 See Kesavan, supra note 21, at 1809-10.
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Nor would the absence of "judicially discoverable and manageable"
standards counsel judicial restraint prior to a national election. Early in the
electoral process, the courts would be well suited to resolve questions of
natural born citizenship on the basis of traditional constitutional analysis. The
courts should also have little difficulty in fashioning relief at this stage. The
available tools - declaratory judgments, stays and injunctions - would be those
with which courts are intimately acquainted. In addition, prior to the national
election it would be quite unlikely that one of the political branches would
have taken a formal position on the matter. Hence, there would be little risk
that judicial intervention would demonstrate a lack of respect for coordinate
branches of government, undercut any existing political decision necessitating
unquestioning adherence, or create a risk of embarrassing multifarious
pronouncements by various departments.
378
Once the national electoral process is concluded, however, key elements of
the calculus would change dramatically. The most complicated scenario would
entail a challenge to a popularly elected candidate 379 just before or just after the
vote of the Electoral College. Suppose, for example, Congress determined that
the President-elect was not constitutionally qualified to serve as President.
Although the political machinations involved in such a scenario are mind-
boggling, this scenario is not inconceivable. If the President-elect challenged
Congress' determination, judicial consideration of the merits of this claim
would arguably intrude on responsibility constitutionally committed to
Congress.380 Analysis of the intricacies of this hypothetical situation, while
fascinating, is far beyond the scope of this discussion. However, even
envisioning the possibilities and the extraordinary political fallout likely to
result demonstrates why Congress should initiate steps to make sure the nation
never needs to face a dispute over the meaning of natural born citizenship.
The question whether a challenge to the natural born citizenship credentials
of a sitting President would be justiciable pursuant to the political question
doctrine is analytically easier. The very pendency of a legal challenge to the
constitutional legitimacy of the nation's Chief Executive could undermine the
President's ability to lead the nation, particularly with respect to foreign
affairs. Review on the merits in such circumstances would fly in the face of
several of the Baker factors, especially the respect due to a coordinate branch
of government; the existence of an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; and the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments. A decision that an
378 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
379 As Akhil Amar points out, in constitutional terms, the victorious candidate may not
be the "President-elect" until the electoral votes are cast and counted. Succession Gap,
supra note 21, at 218.
380 Id. at 222-23, 231 n.22. Vasan Kesavan has suggested that the narrow question of a
President-elect's constitutional qualifications may be justiciable. See Kesavan, supra note
21, at 1809-10.
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incumbent President was not constitutionally qualified to serve would put the
Court in the position of unseating a popularly elected official, one of only two
federal officials for whom all Americans have the opportunity to vote 381 -- a
decision that would take the Court light-years beyond Bush v. Gore. It is
difficult to imagine circumstances less appropriate for judicial involvement or
more likely to strain our constitutional system.
Finally, a legal question about the natural born citizenship qualifications of
an individual called upon, or about to be called upon, to serve as Acting
President would raise somewhat different issues. In these circumstances, the
question of the existence of a demonstrable textual commitment to a coordinate
political branch of government should focus on the plenary authority Article II,
Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution confers on Congress to provide for
Presidential succession in the event of a double Executive vacancy, 382 as well
as on the provision of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 requiring the President to
obtain the advice and consent of the Senate to appoint "Officers of the United
States 383 The Constitution vests Congress with both the responsibility to
approve persons nominated by the President to serve as officers of the United
States and the authority to designate which officers of the United States are
included in the line of succession and in what order. Consequently, as Steven
Calabresi has argued persuasively in connection with a challenge to the
constitutionality of the succession statute on grounds that it impermissibly
includes legislative officials who are not officers of the United States in the
line of succession, 384 there are strong arguments that Presidential succession
concerns are the sole province of Congress.385 In addition, as discussed above
with respect to the possibility of a challenge to the natural born citizenship
credentials of an incumbent President, other Baker factors, including respect
for a coordinate branch, the need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made, and the potential for embarrassment - or worse - from
multifarious pronouncements by different branches of government, should all
counsel against judicial review in most circumstances. 386 In sum, even a
381 The same kinds of considerations would pertain to a challenge to the natural born
citizenship of a Vice President or Vice President-elect, albeit somewhat less forcefully given
the preeminent position of Presidential candidates in national elections and the very
different roles fulfilled by the incumbents of the two offices in the absence of events leading
to the invocation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment. See supra Part I.B.4.b.
382 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
383 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
384 Steven Calabresi specifically addresses Congress' inclusion of the Speaker of the
House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate in the statutory line of succession. See
Calabresi, supra note 21, at 156-57.
385 As Calabresi points out in his discussion of a possible successful legal challenge to
the constitutional eligibility of the Speaker of the House or the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate serving as Acting President, "What if the [Acting President] refused to obey the
Court's order and the House of Representatives backed him[?]" Id. at 170.
386 Some scholars have suggested that, for a number or reasons, Bush v. Gore marks the
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cursory review of a few of the scenarios in which a dispute is likely to arise
over the meaning of the natural born citizenship proviso of Article II
demonstrates that they would raise serious issues of justiciability.
The foregoing discussion is necessarily speculative because it is impossible
to envision the particular circumstances in which these kinds of issues might
arise. In any event, regardless of the outcome, placing these issues before the
judicial branch could put the courts - particularly the Supreme Court - and the
entire United States government in a profoundly difficult situation. Assuming
that the issue is justiciable, the following discussion further explores the
possible consequences of a judicial determination of the issue as a means of
demonstrating why Congress needs to take action to eliminate the natural born
citizenship proviso before these potential dangers become a reality.
culmination of a move away from application of the political question doctrine by the
Supreme Court. Whatever the longterm issues pertaining to the political question doctrine,
in the context of a dispute over natural born citizenship credentials, the circumstances and
the degree of the alleged transgression should be significant. It may be, as Laurence Tribe
suggests, that the political question doctrine involves flexible but not permeable boundaries.
As he reflects:
[Clalling something a political question has served merely as shorthand for saying that
the branch initially entrusted with making a decision - or, to put it another way, the
institution to which the Constitution has granted the power to resolve such disputes -
did so within the outer boundaries of its constitutional authority as policed by the
Court. Perhaps, then, the real difficulty is that the political question doctrine really
isn't about "political questions." Rather, the doctrine suffers from a "truth in
advertising" problem - a problem ... that is hardly unique to the Court's decision in
Bush v. Gore. Simply put, the political question doctrine is misleadingly named; it
really ought to be called the political process doctrine.
Laurence H. Tribe, The Unbearable Wrongness of Bush v. Gore, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 571,
595-96 (2002). Tribe goes on to conclude that "Bush v. Gore presented a political question
that most likely never should have been decided - and, at a minimum, provided an answer
that never should have been given - by a federal court." Id. at 573.
Other scholars, however, believe that the case was justiciable. Louise Weinberg, for
example, states: "A presidential candidate with a certified state election in his favor surely is
an individual with rights and standing to assert them." Louise Weinberg, When Courts
Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 623 (2002).
Acknowledging that prudentialists - both past and present - would likely view the matter
differently, Professor Weinberg asserts:
Courts cannot win legitimacy points by denying access to meritorious claims. Rather,
in shying away from controversy courts are rightly perceived as shirking a duty.
Moreover, since to decline jurisdiction persistently is to favor defendants persistently,
courts faithfully exercising "the passive virtues" are rightly seen as actively unfair. No
doubt jurisdiction in a contested election invites the opprobrium of the political faction
on the losing side. But the possible wrath of the loser does not justify a court in
refusing to perform a judicial duty.
Id. at 623-24 (footnotes omitted).
Regardless of how one views the justiciability of Bush v. Gore, Tribe's point is a
compelling one that could well apply in the context of a dispute over the natural born
citizenship proviso.
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B. The Risks of Forcing Judicial Resolution of the Meaning of Natural Born
Citizenship
In the best-case scenario, a legal challenge to the meaning of the natural
born citizenship proviso would arise in the early stages of a Presidential
election campaign. It is possible, however, that a reprise of the post-election
trauma of 2000 could occur. It is also an unfortunate reality that neither a
national disaster caused by a terrorist attack or pandemic, nor a legal dispute
about Presidential succession following such an event, is inconceivable. A
judicial determination in any of these situations could raise deep questions
pertaining to the role of the Court, vis-A-vis those of the "political" branches of
government at a time of far greater national vulnerability than in 2000. As
Bruce Ackerman and David Fontana point out, the controversy over the 2000
election arose during a period when the country was in a particularly strong
position. 387 Since then, the events of September I Ith, the United States'
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and the economic slowdown have
profoundly impacted the nation.388  While the fears expressed by some
commentators of the potentially disastrous consequences of another Bush v.
Gore situation for both the Court and the nation are undoubtedly exaggerated,
there is reason for concern. 389 The following discussion briefly explores the
lessons Bush v. Gore offers with respect to a dispute over the natural born
citizenship proviso and then turns to other landmark Supreme Court decisions
relevant to this subject.
On December 12, 2000, the Supreme Court ensured that George W. Bush
would become the forty-third President of the United States when it ordered a
halt to Florida's vote recount in Bush v. Gore.390 Consequently, despite the
majority's effort to limit its holding to the particular circumstances of the
case,39 1 there is widespread agreement that Bush v. Gore is - and will remain -
one of the most significant decisions in the Court's history. Some
311 See supra note 28. Cf Calabresi, supra note 298, at 155 (stating that "if 'double
death' ever occurs, the country will feel shaken to its very roots in a way that only those
who lived through the Civil War, Lincoln's assassination, and Andrew Johnson's
impeachment and near removal could hope to understand").
388 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 326, at 2 ("The events of September 11, 2001,
increased, not lessened, the importance of Bush v. Gore."). But see Howard M. Wasserman,
Structural Principles and Presidential Succession, 90 Ky. L.J. 345, 357 n.48 (2001)
(asserting that an even greater risk of wholesale devastation of the government existed
during the Cold War because of the potential impact of a nuclear attack on the entire
nation).
389 See Gary C. Leedes, The Presidential Election Case: Remembering Safe Harbor Day,
35 U. RICH. L. REv. 237, 248 (2001) ("[T]he world watched to see how the United States
would resolve an election dispute between two leading presidential candidates who both
claimed victory.")
390 531 U.S. 98 (per curiam).
391 See id. at 109 ("Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances ... .
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constitutional experts defend the decision as "fair and balanced, '392 "well
reasoned, '393 an "act of courage, ' 394 and an essential step in avoiding a
national crisis. 395  Others, however, call it a "constitutional coup," 3 9 6
amounting to a judicial "act of usurpation. '397 One scholar describes the result
392 Leedes, supra note 389, at 245.
393 Charles Fried, An Unreasonable Reaction to a Reasonable Decision in Bush v. Gore,
in BUSH v. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 3, 8 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002)
[hereinafter THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY].
394 Nelson Lund, An Act of Courage: Under Rehnquist's Leadership, the Court Did the
Right Thing, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 25, 2000, at 19.
395 Richard Posner and John Yoo argue that the Court acted appropriately to prevent a
constitutional crisis. See RICHARD POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 188 (2001) (arguing that Bush v. Gore "enable[d] a
national crisis to be averted by constitutional means," comparing the decision to other
unconstitutional actions with "good effects"); John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's
Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REv.,775, 781 (2001) ("Indeed, the Court perhaps was best suited,
as a rational decisionmaker, to settle questions involving rules of constitutional process that
may stalemate the other branches of government."); see also Fried, supra note 393. at 8
("[Tihe Court's decision to take the case was in accord with past practice."); Leedes, supra
note 389, at 237-38 (asserting that in the face of events "spinning out of control," the
Supreme Court accepted the challenge "to serve as umpire" to prevent a crisis).
396 Bruce Ackerman, Anatomy of a Constitutional Coup, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, Feb.
8, 2001, at 3.
391 Margaret Jane Radin, Can the Rule of Law Survive Bush v. Gore, in THE QUESTION OF
LEGITIMACY, supra note 393, at 110, 114; see also, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 326, at
20 (concluding that "[t]he Supreme Court impermissibly usurped the Florida Supreme
Court's authority to decide Florida law in this extraordinary case"); Peter Gabel, What It
Really Means to Say "Law Is Politics ": Political History and Legal Argument in Bush v.
Gore, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (2002) (arguing that "the Court made transparent what
is usually mystified - the political nature of all legal reasoning."); H. Jefferson Powell,
Overcoming Democracy: Richard Posner and Bush v. Gore, 17 J.L. & POL. 333, 352 (2001)
(arguing that "constitutional adjudication does not ... license [judges] to act as a council of
wise leaders, displacing political processes whenever they believe it is in society's interest
to do so"); Linda Greenhouse, High Court Appears Diminished in Process, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Dec. 14, 2000, at Al (citing a source who referred to the majority opinion in
Bush v. Gore as "analytically weak and untethered to precedent"); cf Roy L. Brooks, The
Use of Policy in Judicial Reasoning: A Reconceptualization Before and After Bush v. Gore,
13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 33, 33-34 (2002) (analyzing case in terms of judicial policy-
making); William P. Marshall, The Supreme Court, Bush v. Gore, and Rough Justice, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 787, 789 (2001) ("[A]lthough the Court's intervention was indeed
appropriate, it ultimately reached the wrong result in its decision."); George L. Priest,
Reanalyzing Bush v. Gore: Democratic Accountability and Judicial Overreaching, 72 U.
COLO. L. REV. 953, 980-81 (arguing that the Court's decision cannot be understood without
taking into account the lower courts' decisions leading up to the ruling, especially Florida
Supreme Court Chief Justice Wells' dissent in Gore v. Harris, which first raised the idea of
halting the recount). For an overview of reactions and approaches to "tak[ing] the sting out
of the criticisms that the decision was infected by blatant partisanship," see Mark Tushnet,
[Vol. 85:53
'NATURAL BORN' IN THE USA
as "an incomprehensible historic blunder.., with the heart-stopping quality of
a fix ... of something sacred."3 9
For purposes of this inquiry, the substance of these views is less important
than recognizing the controversy the decision generated. While the conflict
has faded in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and the 2004 election, the
notion that the Court permitted political partisanship to trump legal principle
remains a concern that could easily resurface. Although none of the justices
retired prior to the 2004 election, an important initial concern was that the
outcome of the case determined not only the winner of the 2000 Presidential
race, but the dominant ideology of the federal courts for a generation. In the
words of Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., one of the decision's supporters:
A conventional understanding of the Bush v. Gore case goes something
like this: The evil Supreme Court majority, bent on securing conservative
appointees to the federal judiciary, engaged in blatant results-oriented
reasoning to rule in favor of Governor Bush. Along the way, members of
the evil majority abandoned all prior principles regarding respect for state
courts and judicial restraint. The decision, accordingly, lacks
legitimacy.
399
"Renormalizing" Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual History, 90 GEO. L.J. 113, 114
(2001) (describing legal scholars' explanations, justifications, and rationalizations of the
Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore).
398 Weinberg, supra note 386, at 615 (comparing the reaction to the Supreme Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore with baseball fans' shock when, "[i]n 1919, the Chicago White Sox
threw the World Series to the Cincinnati Reds"). Weinberg succinctly states the view
shared by many legal scholars who believe that the Court overstepped its constitutional
bounds: "Courts may regulate elections. But courts may not displace elections without
violence to the Constitution." Id. at 639. She describes the Court's decision as an exercise
of "inauthentic power." Id. at 618. For a review of two sharply contrasting analyses of
Bush v. Gore - "a polemic" by Alan Dershowitz and "an apologia" by Richard Posner - see
Robert J. Muldoon, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Judging the Judges, 87 MASS. L. REv. 131, 133-34
(2003) (book review).
39 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios for Neutral Principles in Constitutional
Law: Bush v. Gore and the Emerging Jurisprudence of Oprahl, 90 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2089 n.3
(2002) (citations omitted). Louise Weinberg suggests that by directly deciding the outcome
of the 2000 Presidential election, the conservative justices who formed the majority in Bush
v. Gore improperly perpetuated their own ideologies far beyond both life tenure and stare
decisis "by seizing an opportunity to name the President of the United States," thereby
doing violence to both Article III and separation of powers principles. Weinberg, supra
note 386, at 659. In her view, "The Supreme Court was the great prize in the election of
2000, no matter what the candidates said." Id. at 662 (emphasis in original). It was the
means of "gaining and holding the ideological future ground." Id. at 663. A number of
other legal scholars have joined the four dissenting justices in criticizing the Court's refusal
to remand the case to the Florida Supreme Court. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Not as Bad as
Plessy. Worse., in THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 393, at 20, 24-26 (attacking
the majority's imposition of a false December 12 deadline); Mark Tushnet, The
Conservatism in Bush v. Gore, in THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 393, at 163,
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Even more important is the impact of controversial Supreme Court decisions
on public perceptions of the judiciary, government in general and, in this
instance, the electoral process. As Justice Breyer stated in his dissent in Bush
v. Gore, "[t]he political implications of this case for the country are
momentous. '400 Nelson Lund, who defends the decision as "straightforward
and legally correct," 40 1 describes how the events of late 2000 might have
appeared to the American public:
Partisans on both sides accused judges of manipulating the law in order to
assist the candidate they favored, and aspersions were cast on the integrity
of some judges even before they ruled. For the vast majority of observers
who lacked the time or expertise to form an independent judgment, it
must have seemed unlikely that all the judges involved behaved
impartially. And many Americans may well have quietly concluded that
they're all just a bunch of political hacks in robes.402
Erwin Chemerinsky, Michael Klarman, and a number of other scholars
believe that the decision is unlikely to have a serious adverse impact on the
Court or undermine its legitimacy in the long run.4 0 3 Louis Siedman suggests
that the decision reflects a "contagion of ideological malleability," 40 4 but he,
too, concludes that "maybe it's not so bad, after all," because it offers new
tools to combat sociopolitical problems and reaffirms "a set of commitments
that allows people motivated by contradictory and irreconcilable substantive
views to speak a common language. '405
Lani Guinier, however, argues that there is particular reason for concern
over the message that those traditionally shunted aside in American politics -
165-68 (asserting that he had "not yet seen a decent legal defense of the majority's decision
to preclude Florida authorities from conducting a recount..."). Other commentators,
including Charles Fried and Robert Pushaw, while conceding that the Supreme Court's
decision on the remedy question is "vulnerable," contend that it was correct given applicable
Florida law pertaining to completion of election recounts, as well as the impracticability of
completing a recount in a timely fashion. Fried, supra note 393, at 17-18 (remarking on
how long it would take for Florida to proceed with a constitutional recount).
400 531 U.S. 98, 144 (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
401 Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219,
1219 (2002).
402 Id. at 1221-22 (citations omitted).
403 See Chemerinsky, supra note 326, at 5 (describing the popular realization that the
Court must "make political choices" and characterizing the Court's legitimacy as robust
rather than fragile); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional
History, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721, 1764 (2001) (suggesting that the decision "seems unlikely to
harm the Court's standing very much, especially if the Justices' constitutional jurisprudence
continues to manifest the uneven political valence that it has in recent years").
4o Louis Michael Seidman, What's So Bad About Bush v. Gore? An Essay on Our
Unsettled Election, 47 WAYNE L. REv. 953, 956 (2001) (commenting that, after the Court's
decision, partisanship "infected" politicians, media, and academics).
405 Id. at 1025.
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women, people of color, and individuals in lower economic classes generally -
take away from the tumultuous aftermath of the 2000 election.40 6 Guinier
points out that voters in these groups were disproportionately affected by the
results because they tended to favor Gore, and levels particularly harsh
criticism at the Court:
Animated by a passion for political stability, rather than political equality,
the justices in the majority deployed the Equal Protection Clause as a
formal tool to accomplish a goal that has little to do with noble ideas of
political equality and much to do with an elite-centered political
orientation. Indeed, the decision limited, rather than broadened, the
concept of equality as the Court sought to avoid its greatest fear: the
nightmare of too much democracy.
40 7
The underlying problems Guinier highlights were exacerbated by the fact
that Florida's vote counting machines rejected higher numbers of ballots in
predominantly African-American and Latino precincts.40 8 Other commentators
who do not go so far as Guinier still accuse the Court of failing to appreciate -
or to concern itself with - the impact of its decision on voters outside the
mainstream of American political power.40 9 Various sources describe the
406 Lani Guinier, Supreme Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux, 34 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 23, 44
(2002) ("In the 2000 election, most women and people of color voted for the losing
candidate, as did a majority of all those who [cast] ballots in the presidential race").
407 Id. at 23. Guinier suggests that class distinctions - principally those differentiating
women and people of color from the mainstream American society - frequently cause
women and minorities to become alienated and withdraw from the political process. Id. at
25-26. Another author suggests that "[w]ithout a consideration of race.., the conversation
about Bush v. Gore remains woefully incomplete." Spencer Overton, A Place at the Table:
Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 469, 471 (2001)
(concluding that the Bush v. Gore majority's "limited vision of democracy inadequately
protects the political rights of racial minorities and other Americans as well..."). For a
discussion of the impact of the electoral process on minority voters in "winner take all
states," see Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President: Minority Vote Dilution and
the Electoral College, 105 YALE L.J. 935, 949-62 (1996) (describing the role of race in the
Presidential election, particularly in the southern states).
408 See Overton, supra note 407, at 470 (observing that twice as many punch card ballots
were rejected in African-American precincts as in Latino precincts and that four times as
many were rejected in African-American precincts as in white precincts).
409 Michael Klarman suggests that "history's verdict on a Supreme Court ruling depends
more on whether public opinion ultimately supports the outcome than on the quality of the
legal reasoning or the craftsmanship of the Court's opinion." Klarman, supra note 403, at
1722. He notes that "[t]he legal reasoning of Brown [v. Board of Education] was widely
ridiculed at the time... [y]et, over the course of ensuing decades, Brown became a cultural
icon." Id. at 1722-23. Klarman states that "the Court's heroic decision in Brown seems, in
the public mind, vastly to outweigh ignoble judicial deeds such as Dred Scott, Plessy,
Korematsu, and the like." Id. at 1757. He also asserts that "the Court's standing and
legitimacy are most at risk when it renders unpopular or controversial decisions in bunches,
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reaction of minority voters to the Court's decision as particularly "angry, bitter
and disenchanted[,] ' 410 although voter turnout for the 2004 election may blunt
these criticisms somewhat.
4t1
Opinion is divided as to the degree to which Bush v. Gore is likely to impact
the Court and the nation in the long run.4 12 Scholars have long debated the
Supreme Court's legitimacy, Some have argued that the Court's legitimacy is
fragile and that the Court must vigilantly exercise prudential wisdom to
safeguard the independence of the judicial branch and its ability to carry out its
constitutional function.4 13 Others observe that the last two hundred years of
history demonstrate that the Court as an institution is in robust health and that
its institutional power rests on a solid foundation unlikely to be easily shaken
and far from fragile. 414 Even so, Justice Stevens' words have the ring of truth:
Time will one day heal the wound.., that will be inflicted by today's
decision. One thing, however, is certain. Although we may never know
with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's
Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the
Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of
law.
4 15
rather than individually." Id. at 1759. Klarman concludes that, unlike Brown, there is no
reason for popular attitudes to change regarding Bush v. Gore, and that the case is unlikely
to undermine the Court's legitimacy to any significant degree in the long run. Id. at 1764.
4 1 Stephen G. Bragaw & Barbara A. Perry, The "Brooding Omnipresence" in Bush v.
Gore: Anthony Kennedy, The Equality Principle, and Judicial Supremacy, 13 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 19, 19 (2002) (quoting remarks of Bronx Congressman Jose E. Serrano, who
was recounting the reactions of his "mostly black and Hispanic constituents").
411 See, e.g., John M. Glionna & James Rainey, Election 2004 The White House, The
Voter: Long Lines and Intense Feelings, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at Al.
412 One legal scholar suggests: "We are raised on judicial review as we are on baseball.
When the greatest judicial umpire of them all makes a call - however bad - we submit."
Weinberg, supra note 386, at 612; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore
on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32, 38 (2001)
(demonstrating the changes in the public's knowledge and approval of the Court before and
after the Bush v. Gore decision). Kritzer's statistics showed that the largest change was that
more people learned the name of the Chief Justice. The author also observed that
Democrats' approval of the Court decreased after Bush v. Gore, while Republicans'
approval increased - likely a function of whether the candidate they voted for won. Id.
413 The most famous exposition of this viewpoint is by Alexander Bickel. See generally
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1967).
414 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 326, at 5 (asserting that "no single decision is
likely to make much difference in the public's appraisal of the Court").
415 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (per curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Many other
lessons could be extrapolated from Bush v. Gore and other high-profile judicial decisions to
the context of a Supreme Court decision addressing natural born citizenship, particularly in
the context of a Presidential election. For example, Mark Klock argues that "permitting a
losing candidate to litigate ... creates a moral hazard problem whereby the losing
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In a similar vein, George Anastaplo observes:
The legitimacy of Congress is not properly called into question when it
acts 'politically,' however much it may be faulted from time to time for
its judgment. But courts are different, or at least they are supposed to be
different, partly because they cannot be held accountable in the way that
Congress (like the President) may be.
4 16
Evaluation, or even synthesis, of the scholarly commentary and popular
reaction to Bush v. Gore is far beyond the scope of this article. The intensity
of the tiny sampling of reactions discussed above, however, illustrates that the
Supreme Court enters dangerous waters when it takes on questions of
Presidential succession. It is difficult to imagine how any question that is
likely to determine the nation's Chief Executive could be decided in an
apolitical manner. Such decisions are inherently political.417 Any doubt as to
the perils of these seas should be laid to rest by history. While the Court has
sometimes succeeded in reigning in overly aggressive actions by the nation's
Chief Executive,41 8 its members have encountered difficulty in dealing with
electoral contests. In 1802, in the aftermath of the hotly contested election of
1800, the Republican Congress suspended the Supreme Court's term for
fourteen months due, at least in part, to the Republicans' trepidation that the
Federalist judiciary would continue to engage in the same kinds of political
machinations that arguably underlay the courts' refusal to hold the Alien and
Sedition Acts unconstitutional.
4 19
candidate's incentive is to maximize political and legal uncertainty, uncertainty that can
adversely affect other important aspects of society." Mark Klock, Is it "The Will of the
People" or a Broken Arrow?: Collective Preferences, Out-of-the-Money Options, Bush v.
Gore, and Arguments for Quashing Post-Balloting Litigation Absent Specific Allegations of
Fraud, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 53-54 (2002).
416 George Anastaplo, Bush v. Gore and a Proper Separation of Powers, 34 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 131, 146 (2002); see Seidman, supra note 298, at 960 (opining with respect to Bush v.
Gore: "There simply was no neutral, apolitical way in which the case could have been
decided"); cf Howard Gillman, Judicial Independence Through the Lens of Bush v. Gore,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 263 (2003) (suggesting that "[o]f all the judges who were involved in
the 2000 election dispute, the ones whose behavior appeared the most partisan, and the least
motivated by good faith understandings of the law, were the ones who enjoyed the most
extreme insulation from conventional political pressure").
417 Jeffrey Rosen, Political Questions and the Hazards of Pragmatism, in THE QUESTION
OF LEGITIMACY, supra 393, at 145, 156 (declaring that "[cilearly, Congress is better
equipped than the courts" to resolve elections, and that "these are political questions
masquerading as legal questions, not fit for the wrangling of lawyers").
418 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)
(holding that the President did not have the authority, under the Constitution, to authorize
the Secretary of Commerce "to take possession of private property in order to keep labor
disputes from stopping production").
419 See Alien Enemies Act of 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577. See generally JAMES MORTON
SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTER: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
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Years later, as Justice Breyer points out in his Bush v. Gore dissent, Justice
Bradley's chairmanship of the Electoral Commission appointed by Congress to
resolve the Hayes-Tilden contest of 1876, and his role in casting the deciding
vote for Hayes, immediately subjected Bradley to "vociferous attacks[,]...
accus[ations] of accepting bribes, of being captured by railroad interests, and
of an eleventh-hour change in position after a night in which his house 'was
surrounded by the carriages of Republican partisans and railroad officials.'
420
While neither accusations nor public perceptions should affect the Court's
performance of its constitutional duties, they do give reason to ask whether it is
in the nation's best interests to ignore a problem that could easily cast the
federal judiciary into the middle of another political maelstrom with
extraordinarily far-reaching consequences and no good solution.421 Whatever
the actual long-term effects of Bush v. Gore, the questions it has generated
about the legitimacy of the Court and its alleged "antidemocratic" bent, the
resulting public controversy, and the arguably disproportionate impact of the
decision on people of color are difficulties that could be magnified greatly if
the Court were forced to determine the meaning of the natural born citizenship
proviso of Article II.
IV. THE PROVISO AS AN INEQUITABLE AND DANGEROUS ANACHRONISM
A. The Evanescence of Historical Justifications
The natural born citizenship requirement no longer serves any purpose in the
American constitutional system.422 Any historically legitimate justification for
the proviso faded away long ago. As previously discussed, the Framers almost
certainly incorporated the requirement into Article II in an effort to prevent a
British nobleman or foreign prince from infiltrating the vulnerable infant
government. 423 Fortunately, our independence from England is now secure,
35-62 (1956).
420 531 U.S. 98, 156 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting C. WOODWARD, REUNION AND
REACTION 159-60 (1966)); see also Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Act Unconstitutional?,
80 N.C. L. REv. 1653, 1688 (2002) (discussing the Hayes-Tilden controversy). For an in-
depth discussion of the election of 1876 and the Hayes-Tilde controversy, see William H.
Rehnquist, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876 (2004).
421 See Klock, supra note 415, at 54.
422 See Maximizing Voter Choice, supra note 10 (testimony of Professor Akhil Amar)
("Modem Americans can best honor the Founders' generally egalitarian vision by repealing
the specific natural-born rule that has outlived its original purpose."); Medina, supra note
43, at 255-256 (asserting that the natural born citizen proviso "creates significant potential
crisis points, and it has no rational relationship to the needs of the Presidency"); Victor C.
Romero, Proxies for Loyalty in Constitutional Immigration Law: Citizenship and Race After
September 11, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 871, 878-88 (2003) (questioning the distinction between
naturalized citizens and the immigrant founders).
423 See supra Part I; Remarks of Senator Hatch, supra note 10, at S9251.
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and the United States has grown from a fledgling former colony into the most
powerful nation in the world. Despite the American public's occasional
fascination with members of European royal families, there is no longer any
reason to fear that foreign princes will seduce the nation's voters and
undermine its democratic government. Moreover, the basic structures of the
federal government are no longer new, and the extent of each branch's powers,
while still uncertain at the margins, has been shaped by more than two
centuries of history. 424 The major political parties have accepted "certain basic
constitutional principles and no longer contest the basic form or powers of the
government.
425
In any event, it is unclear whether the natural born citizenship requirement
ever functioned effectively to safeguard the early republic from foreign
influence. For example, James Madison was skeptical that similar
requirements for Senators and Representatives would serve any purpose. He
argued that a foreign nation could operate just as easily through a natural born
citizen.426 Despite Madison's doubts, when the Constitution was drafted the
natural born citizenship requirement arguably served a purpose. As noted
earlier, in 1787 the prevailing understanding of citizenship undoubtedly was
influenced by the English common law doctrine of perpetual allegiance.
427
This doctrine held that the relationship between subject and sovereign endured
forever; individuals were deemed incapable of transferring allegiance to any
other sovereign.428 Birth within the physical dominion of the King created this
allegiance as a matter of natural law.429  Man-made laws - such as
naturalization statutes - could not destroy this tie, nor could an individual
renounce this allegiance.430 English authorities considered those born in the
mother country and its colonies - including those colonies in North America -
to be British subjects legally incapable of renouncing their allegiance to the
English crown. Most other nations followed a similar philosophy in the late
eighteenth century. 431  Thus, limiting presidential eligibility to birthright
citizens arguably served some purpose by disqualifying those most likely to be
424 Wasserman, supra note 388, at 381.
425 Id
426 Medina, supra note 43, at 261 (discussing Madison's remarks "pointing out the
ineffectiveness of [a native born requirement for members of Congress] in policing foreign
influence" during the Convention debates) (citing A. PREsCOTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTioN 268-69 (1941)).
427 See supra text accompanying notes 71-79.
428 Spiro, supra note 287, at 1420.
429 Id. at 1419 (stating that "individuals were identified... by personal allegiances tied
to natural law").
430 David A. Wishart, Allegiance and Citizenship as Concepts in Constitutional Law, 15
MELB. U. L. REv. 688, 693 (1986) (stating that since naturalization was a man-made law, an
alien did not gain natural law allegiance by becoming naturalized).
431 Spiro, supra note 287, at 1420-1429.
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impacted by the doctrine of perpetual allegiance from ascending to the
Presidency. The doctrine of perpetual allegiance, however, faded into
obscurity during the nineteenth century. Allegiance has become synonymous
with individual loyalty based on personal beliefs rather than feudal notions of
relationships.
432
B. The Irrationality and Inequity of Place of Birth as a Surrogate for Loyalty
Place of birth often has been employed as a proxy for loyalty because there
is no way to measure prospectively an individual's allegiance to the United
States.433 The idea of distinguishing between natural born citizens and "non-
natural born" citizens is based on the presumption that some citizens are more
loyal than others as a result of the means by which they acquired their
citizenship. James Madison disputed this proposition in 1787,434 and his
conclusion that it is an unreliable measure of loyalty has been confirmed
repeatedly. Of course, some naturalized citizens have been disloyal to the
United States, but so have many of those who fall within the category of
"natural born citizens." American Taliban fighter John Walker Lindh,435 the
notorious spy Robert Hanssen,436 Oklahoma City bombers Terry Nichols and
Timothy McVeigh, 437 and many other native born citizens have worked for
foreign powers for pecuniary gain or committed violent acts in the name of
innumerable causes. In contrast, few would question the loyalty of
Czechoslovakian-bom former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Polish-
born former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, the
hundreds of foreign born citizens who have received the Congressional Medal
of Honor, 43 8 or the thousands of naturalized citizens who have served
honorably in the Armed Forces of the United States. In Randall Kennedy's
words: "This idolatry of mere place of birth seems.., an instance of rank
432 Levinson, supra note 288, at 1445 (stating that American allegiance is based on
consent, not descent); Romero, supra note 422, at 891 (equating loyalty and allegiance).
433 Romero, supra note 422, at 883-91.
434 See supra note 426.
411 See George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C. L. REv. 1611, 1611-12
(2004) (describing the young American who "fought for the Taliban with full knowledge
that it was engaged in hostilities against the United States"); Josh Tyrangiel, The Taliban
Next Door, TIME, Dec. 17, 2001, at 36 (recounting the story of the capture of "American
Taliban" John Walker Lindh).
436 See ELAINE SHANNON & ANN BLACKMAN, THE Spy NEXT DOOR: THE
EXTRAORDINARY SECRET LIFE OF ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN, THE MOST DAMAGING F.B.I.
AGENT IN U.S. HISTORY 3 (2002) (describing Robert Hanssen as "the quintessential
suburban dad" and commenting that "[njobody would have guessed that... [he] had a very
secret life").
"I See United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v.
McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998).
411 See Remarks of Senator Hatch, supra note 10, at S9251 (remarking that these foreign
born citizens have received "our Nation's highest decoration for valor").
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superstition. Place of birth indicates nothing about a person's willed
attachment to a country, a polity, a way of life. It only describes an accident of
fate over which an individual ha[d] no control. '439 Our world is very different
from that of the Framers of the Constitution, and the destabilizing forces we
fear transcend nation-state borders; individuals whose interests are antithetical
to those of the United States cannot be identified by their place of birth.
Depending on how the courts interpret it, the natural born citizenship
proviso could lead to egregiously unfair outcomes. For example, under a strict
interpretation equating "natural born" to "native born," a child born within the
United States to alien representatives of a government the United States has
refused to recognize would be eligible to become President, while a child born
abroad on a United States military base to two United States citizen parents
serving their country would not be eligible to become President.440 An infant
born in one of the fifty states but raised in a foreign country by non-United
States citizens could serve as President, while a foreign born child adopted by
United States citizens at two months of age and raised in the United States
would not be eligible to become President.
It is unrealistic to believe the Framers intended this result in light of the
grandfather clause excepting all those who were citizens at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution from the natural born citizenship requirement of
Article II.44 1 Justice Story asserts that they did this "out of respect to those
distinguished revolutionary patriots who were born in a foreign land, and yet
had entitled themselves to high honors in their adopted country.
442 Most of
these patriots won these honors through fighting for their country in the
Revolutionary War. Since that time, many others have sacrificed as much or
more for the United States, 443 yet, unlike their eighteenth century counterparts,
they are not eligible to seek the Presidency.
Preserving the natural born citizenship proviso is inconsistent with the
progressively more democratic nature of the United States government. 444 As
4" Kennedy, supra note 10, at 176.
440 See supra note 27 and accompanying text; 150 CONG. REc. S1598 (2004) (statement
of Sen. James Inhofe regarding Natural Born Citizen Act of 2004) ("[These children] should
not be punished for their parents' willingness to serve their country abroad."); see also
Lohman, supra note 43, at 366-369 (arguing that the foreign born children of parents
serving in the United States military should be considered natural born because the
government is largely responsible for where military dependents are born by posting the
parents to a foreign military base).
441 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
442 STORY, supra note 60, § 1479 (citation omitted); see supra text accompanying notes
60-62.
443 See supra note 10.
"I See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 302-20 (1962) (reviewing the history of
representation proportioned to population in England and the United States). See generally
Wasserman, supra note 388 (discussing the operation of structural principles in presidential
succession).
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one commentator states: "The historical trend has been the shrinking of
constitutional space, the encroachment of the People on selection processes,
and the enhancement of direct (rather than indirect) democracy in selection.
445
United States Senators are now directly elected,446 and states' Congressional
districting plans are subject to constitutional challenges to ensure they
proportionately represent the population. 447 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized in dicta that the natural born citizenship requirement of Article II is
the only area in which our law distinguishes among citizens based on the
method of citizenship acquisition. 448 This distinction endures only because it
is embedded in the Constitution. As Michael Medina points out, this kind of
disparate treatment would be unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny if it were
embodied in a statute rather than the Constitution itself.
4 49
Indeed, in 1989, a United States District Court struck down a Georgia
statute permitting only natural bom citizens to hold positions as officers or
troopers in the state department of public safety.450 Retention of the natural
born proviso also smacks of racial prejudice in light of the current
demographics of United States immigration. The more than twelve million
naturalized United States citizens are significantly more likely than native-born
Americans to belong to racial or ethnic minority groups.451 In recent years,
nearly eighty percent of immigrants have come from Central and South
America, the Caribbean basin, and Asia.452 Moreover, given that the Supreme
44 Wasserman, supra note 388, at 391-92; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77
IND. L.J. 671, 691 (2002) [hereinafter Architexture] ("[N]o fewer than ten of the seventeen
post-1791 amendments have tried to push the system of presidential selection and
succession toward increased democracy.").
446 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
447 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, § 2.8.3 (reviewing Supreme Court decisions
finding challenges to election districting to be justiciable).
448 See, e.g., Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 177 (1964); Knauer v. United States, 328
U.S. 654, 658 (1946); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673 (1944); Osburn v.
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 827 (1944); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22
(1913).
'9 Medina, supra note 43, at 274 n. 100; see also Faruki v. Rogers, 349 F. Supp. 723, 730
n. 15 (D.D.C. 1972) (stating that statutes distinguishing between native-born and naturalized
citizens are subject to strict scrutiny).
450 The court held the statute unconstitutional because the state of Georgia did not meet
its burden of showing a compelling state interest for the statute's distinction between natural
born citizens and other citizens in this context. Fernandez v. Georgia, 716 F. Supp. 1475,
1479 (M.D. Ga. 1989); see also Natsu Taylor Saito, For "Our" Security: Who Is an
"American" and What Is Protected by Enhanced Law Enforcement and Intelligence
Powers?, 2 SEArT.E J. FOR SOC. JUST. 23, 25 n. 13 (2003).
451 See Romero, supra note 422, at 886 (arguing that because most naturalized citizens
today are from Asia and Latin America, the natural born citizenship clause
disproportionately excludes these minority groups from eligibility for the Presidency).
452 See Schmidley, supra note 29, at 2 (stating that, of foreign born Americans, 52.2%
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Court has never overruled Elk v. Wilkins, the proviso also arguably operates to
exclude the more than two million United States citizens of solely Native
American ancestry. Excluding naturalized citizens therefore
disproportionately precludes racial and ethnic minorities from seeking the
Presidency, regardless of their qualifications. 453 Even for individuals who
have no desire ever to serve as President, disqualification from the office of
President perpetuates their marginalization in American society: "[E]ligibility
for office alone promotes democratic values separate and apart from actual
service in office. For one way to assess whether an individual is a full and
equal member of a community is to ask whether the individual is eligible to
serve in the highest office in that community.
454
Finally, the natural born citizenship proviso deprives voters of the right to
choose a President on the basis of credentials, demonstrated ability, and overall
qualification for the position. As discussed below, the perception that
American voters require protection from their own ignorance is an artifact
from a time when travel conditions and primitive communication made it
difficult for a much less literate public to learn about candidates for national
office. Today, however, these barriers are nonexistent. As one commentator
notes, "[e]xpanding the categories of natural-born citizens [would] make[] the
eligible candidates more representative of the voting population, thereby
increasing the rights of voters to select their representatives as well as the
were born in Latin America and 25.5% were born in Asia).
151 See Romero, supra note 422, at 886.
144 Unnatural Born Citizens, supra note 14, at 576. Similarly, Robert Post states:
[A]t the very heart of the constitutional order, in the Office of President, the
Constitution abandons its brave experiment of forging a new society based upon
principles of voluntary commitment; it instead gropes for security among ties of blood
and contingencies of birth. In a world of ethnic cleansing, where affirmations of
allegiance are drowned in attributes of status, this constitutional provision is a chilling
reminder of a path not taken, of a fate we have struggled to avoid.
Post, supra note 10, at 193. But see Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Comm. on the Judiciary on HR.J. Res. 88, 106th Cong. 20 (2000) (statement of Balint
Vazsonyi, Director, Center for the American Founding) (opposing the eligibility of
naturalized citizens to the Presidency), available at
http://conmdocs.house.gov/coimittees/judiciary/hju67306.000/hju67306_0.htm (last
visited Nov. 7, 2004). Mr. Vazsonyi testified:
[A]fter 41 years of making the most strenuous efforts of becoming an American, not
just legally but in every sense of the word, and having spent 40 of those 41 years living
with a native-born American, that I still have not been able to even approach the
temperament, the natural tolerance, the unfailing goodwill toward the world that
Americans are famous for.
Foreigners come here and have to learn it. It is a miracle that within one generation
they can do so ....
... [H]aving grown up in Hungary, I would find it very difficult to make decisions -
not so much affecting Hungarians, but those toward whom Hungarians hold an animus.
Id.
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rights of individuals to vie for the office of President. ' 455 In the words of
Alexander Hamilton, "the people should choose whom they please to govern
them."4 56
C. The Effectiveness of Contemporary Presidential Campaigns as a Screen
for Loyalty
The communications revolution, the consequent explosion of publicly
available information, the increased regulation of election campaigns, and the
expansion of the electorate combine to make the modem campaign serve as a
reliable screen for presidential candidates' loyalty. The intense public scrutiny
of a national presidential campaign waged during today's digital age should
insure that presidential candidates will be called upon to answer for any hint of
past instances of disloyalty or suspicious activities. Compared to American
voters of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, today's citizens have far
greater access to comprehensive information about presidential candidates,
allowing them to make more informed choices. 457 As Christopher Eisgruber
notes:
Voters... might reasonably predict that foreign-born politicians will
sometimes be partial to the country or region where they were born. I do
not think we would have any reason to condemn a voter who made
predictions of that sort when deciding whether to support a foreign-born
candidate.
But these predictions seem too doubtful to support an absolute,
constitutionally inscribed prohibition upon the election of foreign-born
Presidents.
458
Modem systems of communication - rapid and efficient postal service,
radio, television and the Internet - allow voters in even the most remote rural
sections of the country to make educated and well-informed decisions about
presidential candidates. The nature of the Internet, with its weblogs,
chatrooms, and the ability to e-mail large numbers of people unconstrained by
455 Pryor, supra note 42, at 898.
456 2 ELLIOTT, supra note 56, at 257, quoted in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 541
(1969); see also Constitutional Amendment to Allow Foreign-Born Citizens to be President:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 10 (2000) (remarks of Barney Frank, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary) ("1 do
not favor putting obstacles on the ability of the people to choose who they wish under those
rules. I think the American public is perfectly capable of making those decisions, and for
both those reasons I think [H.R.J. Res. 88] is a good idea.").
457 Architexture, supra note 445, at 688 ("Some Philadelphia Framers objected to direct
presidential election because they believed that ordinary Americans across a vast continent
would lack sufficient information to choose intelligently among leading presidential
candidates."). As early as 1803, however, national presidential parties and national
platforms began educating voters about candidates. Id.
458 Eisgruber, supra note 128, at 94.
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printing and postage costs, allows "ordinary citizens" to publish and widely
disseminate information and engage in dialogue with one another.
459
Newspaper owners and the wealthy no longer hold a monopoly over the
publication of information.4 60 Voters are now exposed to many more divergent
viewpoints representing different sectors of society. In addition to possessing
increased access to information, today's voters are more literate and have more
formal education, which enables them to make better judgments about
candidates. As the Supreme Court stated in its 1982 decision in Anderson v.
Celebrezze,461 - before the Internet and cable television revolutionized
communications - in the Framers' view, "[e]lection by the people was...
disfavored, in part because of concern over the ignorance of the populace as to
who would be qualified for the job."'' 462 In the Framers' experience:
[I]t took days and often weeks for even the most rudimentary information
about important events to be transmitted from one part of the country to
another in 1787, [while] today even trivial details about national
candidates are instantaneously communicated nationwide in both verbal
and visual form. Second, although literacy was far from universal in
18th-century America, today the vast majority of the electorate not only is
literate but also is informed on a day-to-day basis about events and issues
that affect election choices and about the ever-changing popularity of
individual candidates.
463
The campaigning process is now highly regulated, 464 and the unforeseen
emergence of strong political parties, together with the interconnection of
451 See Richard Morris, Direct Democracy and the Internet, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1033,
1042 (2001).
460 See id. at 1044. Although newspapers and, more recently, radio and television
stations have to a large extent ceased functioning as local operations and are instead
controlled by corporate conglomerates, see, e.g., Ben Scott, The Politics and Policy of
Media Ownership, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 645, 645 (2004) (discussing the Federal
Communication Commission's 2003 revision of broadcast ownership rules to permit cross-
media ownership in the same market, and increased media concentration in local and
national television markets), the Internet affords access to an incredible variety of news
sources around the world.
461 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
462 Id. at 796 n.21 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554, 563-64 (6th Cir.
1981)).
463 Id. at 796-97 (footnotes omitted); see also GEORGE L. HASKINS & HERBERT A.
JOHNSON, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES VOL. 11 16-28 (1981) (discussing the way of life in each region of the United
States in the early 1800s).
464 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431-55 (2000)), amended by Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 9031-42 (2000)). Congress established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in 1975
to oversee federal election campaigns.
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national and local candidates' platforms, also assists in the broad dissemination
of information.465 The resulting lack of privacy in the current digital age
makes it extremely difficult for a presidential candidate to avoid disclosure of
suspicious activities, whether or not explicitly required by election laws.
Personal information, business transactions, and other activities are
computerized and documented to a much greater extent than in the past,
making it much less likely that an individual could clandestinely perform
disloyal acts. Any evidence of a candidate's suspected disloyalty is much
more likely to become widespread public knowledge than in the past.466 There
is nothing unique about non-natural born candidates that would prevent this
mechanism from functioning to scrutinize their loyalty. In fact, it is worth
noting that federal law restricts alien ownership of communications media,
467
as well as electoral campaign contributions by aliens.
468
Finally, the expansion of the electorate allows more citizens a voice in
choosing their elected officials, enhancing the legitimacy of the electoral
process and maximizing the amount of scrutiny to which Presidential
candidates are subjected. A greater percentage of the population is currently
eligible to vote than at any time in the nation's history.469 Constitutional
amendments have progressively expanded to include more and more
previously excluded citizens - African-Americans and other minorities,
women, citizens without property, and younger citizens.470 Consequently, the
465 Wasserman, supra note 388, at 349, 370-73 & n. 16 (describing the early development
of political parties and supporting the role of parties in providing the public with
information); see also Architexture, supra note 445, at 688 (explaining that by the time of
the Twelfth Amendment, the national parties linked presidential candidates to local
candidates, and national platforms allowed voters to understand what candidates stood for).
466 As the Supreme Court noted in Celebrezze, its decisions reflect its "faith in the ability
of individual voters to inform themselves about campaign issues," 460 U.S. at 797,
particularly in the context of the intense publicity of a Presidential election. Id. at 798
(explaining that the above reasoning applies with greater force to a Presidential election
because of its intense publicity).
467 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(l) (2000).
468 2 U.S.C. § 441(e) (2000).
469 More than seventy-five percent of the population is eligible to register to vote.
Wasserman, supra note 388, at 393 (citing Abner J. Mikva, Doubting Our Claims to
Democracy, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 798 (1997)).
470 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude."); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIX, § I ("The right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of sex."); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United
States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of age."). States also voluntarily eliminated
property ownership requirements. See Wasserman, supra note 388, at 393 (citing Mikva,
supra note 469, at 797).
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electorate more comprehensively represents the whole of the American
population. Suffrage is now firmly connected to citizenship status, and
resident aliens - often permitted to vote in colonial times and the early years of
the new republic - are no longer eligible to vote in presidential elections.
471
The remote possibility that a high concentration of disloyal foreigners would
succeed in electing a candidate sympathetic to their interests is virtually non-
existent. In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, a foreign born
candidate would undoubtedly undergo penetrating public scrutiny.472 As the
publicity surrounding a recent remake of an old movie suggests, the real
danger of a "Manchurian Candidate" is more likely to come from allegiance
purchased by hard cash than political loyalty to a country left behind.473 There
is therefore no need to use natural born citizenship as a proxy for loyalty.
D. The Vulnerability Created by the Proviso's Ambiguity
There is little question that the current uncertainty about the meaning of
natural born citizenship in Article II of the Constitution places the United
States in a vulnerable position for several reasons. First, in the electoral
context, the ambiguity of the proviso invites a dispute over the qualifications of
potential Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates. It is serendipitous that
such a dispute has not occurred before now, and unrealistic to believe that it
will never occur. When it does - assuming successful resolution of relevant
questions of justiciability - the matter will almost surely come before the
471 Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and
Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1391, 1393-94 (1993)
(summarizing the history of resident aliens' voting rights in the United States).
472 See Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and
the Construction of Race, Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1,
20 (2002) (linking foreignness to perceived disloyalty to the United States, in peacetime and
even more in times of international conflict). See generally Romero, supra note 422, at 883-
84 & n.41 (interpreting the differentiation between "natural born" and "naturalized" citizens
in the Constitution as indicating that "natural born citizens were more presumptively loyal
than naturalized ones"); Raskin, supra note 471, at 1397 ("Until... the xenophobic
nationalism attending World War I, alien suffrage figured importantly in America's nation-
building process"). For example, recent presidential candidate John Kerry received
criticism for seeming "too Continental," and was advised to downplay his fluency in French
and international connections. Joshua Kurlantzick, The Campaign Trail Pardon?, NEW
YORKER, April 19 & 26, 2004, at 66 (describing Republican criticism of Kerry's
international connections, particularly his comfort with French language and culture, and
Kerry's subsequent efforts to change his image).
411 See generally Louis Menand, Brainwashed: Where the "Manchurian Candidate"
Came From, NEW YORKER, Sept. 15, 2003, at 88, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/critics/atlarge/?030915crat-atlarge (last visited Nov. 7, 2004)
(discussing the anti-Communist paranoia surrounding the original movie); THE
MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE (United Artists 1962) (based on Richard Condon's 1959 novel by
the same name).
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Supreme Court. As in Bush v. Gore,474 however the Court rules - even if it
does not reach the merits - the justices will face allegations of political
partisanship. If a challenge arises only after the election of a candidate, the
resulting dispute could be even more disruptive. If a majority of justices were
to conclude that the proviso rendered a President-elect ineligible to assume
office, the Court would be in an extraordinarily difficult position. A decision
disqualifying the choice of the electorate surely would bring to the fore oft-
raised questions about the antidemocratic nature of judicial decisions with
more force and putative validity than in almost any instance to date, including
the 2000 election.
A similar challenge to the qualifications of an incumbent President would
raise different but equally problematic concerns. Although it is far less likely
that such a dispute would arise, it is unclear how a challenge to a sitting
President's eligibility would be resolved. A national crisis caused by a terrorist
attack, disease pandemic, or natural disaster poses the gravest risks. As long as
the federal succession statute requires a would be acting President to meet the
constitutional eligibility requirements of Article II, ambiguity will continue to
infect even the provisions Congress has made to deal with a double vacancy.
A dispute over the natural born citizenship credentials of an official in the line
of succession could wreak havoc at a time of extraordinary national
vulnerability.
V. PROPOSALS FOR ACCOMPLISHING THE TASK AT HAND
During the more than two hundred years since the drafting of the
Constitution, members of Congress have launched many efforts to clarify,
modify, or eliminate the natural born citizen proviso. The Immigration Act of
1790 was arguably Congress' first attempt to clarify the term natural born
citizen. 475 A resolution introduced in 1868 was among the first of many efforts
to amend the Constitution to eliminate the proviso.476 Over the years, many
legislators have attempted to address the ambiguities and inequities inherent in
the clause. The following discussion briefly reviews these proposals and offers
suggestions for a constitutional amendment designed to address the problems
posed by the natural born citizenship proviso.
A. Congressional Initiatives to Date
1. Proposed Clarifying Statutes
Congress' use of the term "natural born citizen" in the Naturalization Act of
414 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
411 See supra Part I.B.1.
476 H.R.J. Res. 269, 40th Cong. (1868) (proposing a Constitutional Amendment making
any citizen eligible for the presidency who satisfies the age and residency requirements).
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1790477 to include foreign born children of United States citizen parents
arguably supports at least one of two propositions: (1) the Framers intended
Congress to have the authority to define natural born citizenship; or (2) the law
merely declared rights its drafters already deemed to exist.478 In any event, as
discussed above, the term "natural born citizen" inexplicably disappeared from
the 1795 Act and subsequent naturalization statutes. 479
Members of several later Congresses followed the lead of the First Congress
in attempting to clarify natural born citizenship. 480 Senators Nickles, Landrieu,
and Inhofe introduced one of the most recent proposals for a clarifying statute
early in 2004.481 The goal of the proposed Natural Born Citizens Act is to
make both biological children and foreign born children adopted by United
States citizen parents eligible to the Presidency regardless of their place of
birth.482 The bill incorporates the Fourteenth Amendment's definition of
citizenship and adds additional categories of citizens as "natural born."
Section 2(a) of the bill provides:
Congress finds and declares that the term 'natural born Citizen' in Article
II, Section 1, Clause 5 of the Constitution of the United States means -
(1) any person born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof; and
(2) any person born outside the United States -
(A) who derives citizenship at birth from a United States citizen
parent or parents pursuant to an Act of Congress; or
(B) who is adopted by 18 years of age by a United States citizen
411 See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795). The Act's
definition of natural born citizens to include foreign born children of United States citizen
parents was never challenged as an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional authority.
Some commentators have suggested that the temporal proximity of this early Congress to
the drafting of the constitution, as well as the presence of several convention delegates
among its members, may indicate that the Framers were not opposed to legislating on the
meaning of the term "natural born." See Substantive Issues in the First Congress, supra
note 99, at 777 (describing the First Congress as a continuation of the Constitutional
Convention and naming several of the most conspicuous overlapping members); Gordon,
supra note 8, at 8 n.57 (noting that twenty members of the First Congress had been
Constitutional Convention delegates, and that eight members had served on the committee
that drafted the natural born proviso); Pryor, supra note 42, at 894-95 (suggesting that
because the Congress that passed the Act was nearly contemporaneous with the
Constitutional Convention, the Act reflects the Convention's original understanding that
Congress had the power to define natural born citizen); see also discussion supra Part I.B.
478 See supra note 103-106 and accompanying text.
471 See supra Part I.B.
480 See infa Part V.A.2.
411 See Natural Born Citizen Act, S. 2128, 108th Cong. § 2(a) (2004).
482 See id. at § 2(a)(2)(A)-(B).
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parent or parents who are otherwise eligible to transmit citizenship
to a biological child pursuant to an Act of Congress.
483
The proposed Natural Born Citizens Act also defines the "geographic sense" of
the United States to mean "the several States of the United States and the
District of Columbia."
484
The Natural Born Citizens Act would make children born abroad to United
States citizen parents, as well as children born in other countries who are
subsequently adopted by a United States citizen, eligible for the Presidency.
Despite its broad sweep and egalitarian goals, however, the legislation, as
drafted, could create additional ambiguities and potentially irrational
outcomes. For example, if a foreign born couple with a foreign born infant
daughter were to become naturalized United States citizens, their infant would
acquire United States citizenship through derivative naturalization. As a living
biological child, however, she would not qualify as "natural born" pursuant to
the Act. In contrast, if, following their naturalization, the same couple
subsequently adopted a foreign born teenager who had never lived in the
United States, this adopted child would be considered a "natural born" citizen.
At the age of thirty-five, only the adopted child would be eligible for the
Presidency, and no one naturalized after age eighteen could serve as President
or Vice President. While a teenager adopted at age seventeen would be
deemed "natural born," a nineteen year old immigrant would be perpetually
barred from seeking the Presidency. Moreover, the status of both Native
Americans 485 and those born in United States territories would remain unclear
Assuming these issues could be addressed, statutes such as that proposed by
Senators Nickles, Landrieu, and Inhofe would still be subject to constitutional
challenge. Any attempt to encompass persons naturalized after birth within the
meaning of "natural born Citizen," is necessarily suspect. Even if the term
"natural born Citizen" is not limited to native born citizens, the plain language
of the proviso appears to require at least that prospective Presidents acquire
citizenship at birth. Citizenship at birth is acquired through the circumstances
of one's birth - i.e., by virtue of birthplace or parentage. It is difficult to see
how foreign born adoptees, even newborns, could be considered natural born,
because adoption laws generally do not permit prenatal adoptions, thereby
precluding these children from being born United States citizens.
486
483 Id. § (2)(a).
484 Id. § (2)(b).
485 The Supreme Court long ago held that Native Americans are not Fourteenth
Amendment citizens because they are not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States.
Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884); see supra Part I.B.2 & Part II.A.2.b. Nor are they
born outside the United States. Consequently, Native Americans arguably do not fit within
either of the classifications set forth in S. 2128.
486 Only two states - Alabama and Hawaii - permit a birth mother to consent to adoption
prior to the child's birth. Even in these two states, the mother's consent is provisional. It
may be withdrawn, and must be reaffirmed if the adoption is to proceed, following the
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More importantly, the value of any statute purporting to clarify the meaning
of "natural born Citizen" is questionable at best.487 First, it is unclear whether
Congress has constitutional authority to define natural born citizenship for
purposes of Article 11.488 Second, even if Congress does possess the authority
to legislate in this regard, a statute would not prevent a crisis from occurring.
The constitutionality of any statute may be contested, and the very existence of
a legal action would be disruptive, even if the courts ultimately held the case
nonjusticiable. Consequently, even with enactment of legislation such as that
envisioned by the proposed Natural Born Citizens Act, the Supreme Court
could be placed in the position of deciding whether the statute would pass
constitutional muster. Although the Court might be less likely to become
embroiled in a controversy over the meaning of natural born citizenship if
Congress had already spoken to the issue, significant risks would still remain.
Finally, any decision to define "natural born Citizen," rather than eliminate
the distinction entirely, would necessarily discriminate against some United
States citizens with respect to eligibility for the Presidency. Even if a statute
could conceivably stretch to include adopted children, it is almost
inconceivable that it could extend to other persons naturalized after birth
without grave risk of constitutional infirmity. While there is wide room for
legitimate debate over the meaning of the proviso, it is hard to believe that any
judicial forum could in good faith interpret "natural born citizenship" to
include any person retroactively declared "natural born" by Congress without
regard to where she was born or the nationality of her parents.
A clarifying statute will not resolve the fundamental inequity inherent in
perpetually excluding millions of citizens from eligibility to serve as President
of the United States. Nor will it, in the absence of a definitive Supreme Court
ruling upholding its constitutionality, eliminate the risk of dangerous
ambiguity. To the contrary, a "clarifying" statute could add an additional layer
of uncertainty that might exacerbate problems created by a disputed election or
aggravate a crisis situation.
489
child's birth. See ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-13 (2004) (allowing consent to be withdrawn within
five days of the child's birth, or if consistent with the child's best interests, up to fourteen
days after birth); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-61 (2003) (providing that, while an adoption
petition may be entered at any time after the sixth month of pregnancy, no judgment may be
entered until after the child's birth and a reaffirmation of consent has been filed).
487 Gordon, supra note 8, at 27 (arguing that the value of a clarifying statute passed by
Congress seems "dubious" and "would [only] express the opinion of the present
Congress... and would not be binding on the other two branches of our Government").
488 Pryor, supra note 42, at 883 n.9 (citing Freedman, supra note 16, at 364; Gordon,
supra note 8, at 9; Means, supra note 43, at 29) (noting that several others have raised, but
not answered, the issue of whether Congress can define the categories of persons who are
"natural born" citizens); see supra notes 107-124 and accompanying text.
489 A court would first have to determine whether Congress had constitutional authority
to legislate at all on the issue of Presidential qualifications, and, if so, interpret the substance
of the statute. A statute could also be changed much more easily than a constitutional
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2. Resolutions to Initiate a Constitutional Amendment
For well over a century, members of Congress have introduced bills
proposing amendment of the natural bom citizenship proviso. In contrast to
clarifying statutes, a well-drafted amendment could resolve all the ambiguities
and inequities inherent in the proviso. The resolutions proposed to date would
do so in varying degrees. These initiatives generally fall into three categories:
(1) Elimination of the natural born citizenship requirement entirely; (2)
exemption of certain groups of citizens from the natural born citizenship
requirement; and (3) elimination of the natural born citizenship criterion
coupled with the addition of other criteria, such as minimum length of
citizenship.
Congressman Robinson introduced an example of the first category as
House Resolution 269 in 1868 for the purpose of "[p]roposing an amendment
to the Constitution of the United States ... so as to read: No person, except a
citizen of the United States, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither
shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age
of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United
States."
490
Congressman Robinson's proposal represents one of the broadest, most
sweeping approaches possible to reform the natural born citizenship proviso.
It would have made natural born and naturalized citizens equal in all respects,
eliminating the last vestiges of distinction among citizens. It would have left
intact the age and residency requirements of the Presidential qualifications
clause, requirements that would then be applicable to all citizens seeking to
meet the constitutional criteria for the offices of President or Vice President.
These requirements would also apply to current eligibility requirements under
the federal succession statute.491
Later proposals for constitutional amendment of the natural born citizenship
proviso have been less sweeping in scope and tend to fall into either the second
or third categories. The most frequent initiatives to exempt particular groups
from the reach of the proviso have been designed to ensure that children born
abroad to members of the United States armed forces on active duty
amendment, and a later Congress could alter its statutory definition of "natural-born" to
exclude or include potential candidates.
490 H.R.J. Res. 269, 40th Cong. (1868). Congressman Morgan also introduced a similar
proposal a few years later to provide for the eligibility of naturalized citizens to the office of
President. See H.R.J. Res. 52, 42d Cong. (1871) ("Naturalized citizens of the United States
shall be eligible to the offices of President and Vice President. Any provision in the
Constitution inconsistent herewith is hereby declared void and of no effect."); see also S.J.
Res. 161, 92d Cong. (1971) ("Notwithstanding the provision of clause 4 [sic] of section 1 of
article II of the Constitution, a person who is a naturalized citizen of the United States shall
be eligible to hold the office of President if he is otherwise eligible under such clause to
hold such office.").
"s' 3 U.S.C. § 19(e) (2000) (only persons constitutionally eligible to serve as President
are eligible to act as President); see supra Part I.B.4.c.
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assignment - e.g., Senior White House Adviser Karen Hughes 492 - are
considered "natural born Citizens." An example appears in House Joint
Resolution 205 introduced by Congressman Fogarty on February 2, 1959:
SECTION 1. No person, except a person born in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or a person born outside the United
States of parents both of whom are citizens of the United States and one
of whom is in the military service of the United States under orders to
serve outside the United States, shall be eligible to the Office of
President .... 493
A few of these proposals have gone beyond military personnel to include
other government employees. Later in 1959, on September 3, Congressman
Fogarty introduced House Joint Resolution 517.494 The language of this
resolution was substantially identical to House Joint Resolution 205, except for
the deletion of the word "military." 495  The proponents of House Joint
Resolution 517 presumably intended this change to broaden the application of
the amendment to exempt the children of non-diplomats employed by the
United States government who, like military personnel, are assigned to duty
stations outside the United States.
496
The third group of initiatives to amend the Constitution includes proposals
to eliminate the distinction between "natural born" citizens and other
Americans but add length-of-citizenship requirements. In August 1967, when
it was clear that Governor Romney was in the running for the Republican
Presidential nomination, then-Senator Gerald Ford offered House Joint
Resolution 795, providing that "[n]o person except a natural born citizen of the
United States, or a naturalized citizen of the United States for at least fifteen
years, shall be eligible to the office of President. '497 In subsequent years, other
members of Congress introduced similar provisions containing length-of-
citizenship requirements ranging from eleven to thirty-five years.
498
The most recent examples of initiatives for constitutional amendments of
this type are House Joint Resolution 59 introduced by Congressman Snyder, on
behalf of himself and co-sponsors Congressmen Issa and Frank, on June 11,
492 See supra text accompanying note 27.
493 H.R.J. Res. 205, 86th Cong. (1959); see also, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 645, 84th Cong.
(1956); H.R.J. Res. 80, 85th Cong. (1957); H.R.J. Res. 612, 85th Cong. (1958); H.R.J. Res.
214, 86th Cong. (1959).
494 H.R.J. Res. 517, 86th Cong. (1959).
495 id.
496 See id.
497 H.R.J. Res. 795, 90th Cong. (1967).
4 See, e.g., S.J. Res. 72, 98th Cong. (1983) (eleven years); H.R.J. Res. 229, 100th Cong.
(1987) (eleven years); H.R.J. Res. 450, 101st Cong. (1989) (eleven years); H.R.J. Res. 88,
106th Cong. (2000) (twenty years); H.R.J. Res. 47, 107th Cong. (2001) (twenty years);
H.R.J. Res. 59, 108th Cong. (2003) (thirty-five years).
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2003, 499 and Senate Joint Resolution 15, introduced by Senator Hatch on July
10, 2003,500 along with its House counterpart, House Joint Resolution 104,
introduced by Congressman Rohrabacher on September 15, 2004.501 House
Joint Resolution 59 provides: "A person who has been a citizen of the United
States for at least 35 years and who has been a resident within the United
States for at least 14 years shall be eligible to hold the office of President or
Vice President. '50 2 Senate Joint Resolution 15, called the "Equal Opportunity
to Govern" Amendment, and its House counterpart, House Joint Resolution
104 - with only incidental variation - reads: "A person who is a citizen of the
United States, who has been for 20 years a citizen of the United States, and
who is otherwise eligible to the Office of President, is not ineligible to that
Office by reason of not being a native born citizen of the United States.
50 3
These proposals have merit, but they are not necessarily sufficient to
accomplish the task at hand. First, requiring an individual to be a citizen for a
minimum of thirty-five, or even twenty, years is unnecessarily restrictive with
respect to naturalized citizens. Additional years of citizenship no more
effectively screen for loyalty than the natural born proviso itself.5°4 Any such
requirement would discriminate against both persons who naturalized as adults
and against some of those who naturalized before the age of majority. 50 5 The
Framers of the Constitution calculated fourteen years of residency as
sufficient; a longer period would have excluded several of those who shaped
the document itself.50 6 There is no reason why a fourteen-year residency
period, coupled with an identical citizenship requirement, would be insufficient
today.
Second, while each of these examples of the third category of resolutions
49 H.R.J. Res. 59, 108th Cong. (2003).
500 S.J. Res. 15, 108th Cong. (2003).
501 H.R.J. Res. 104, 108th Cong (2004).
502 H.R.J. Res. 59, 108th Cong. (2003).
"I S.J. Res. 15, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 104, 108th Cong. (2004). The Hatch
Bill refers to native, not natural bom, citizens. Otherwise, the text is identical to that of a
proposed amendment introduced in 2001 by Congressmen Frank and Hoekstra. See H.R.J.
Res. 47, 107th Cong. (2001).
104 For example, naturalization statutes recognize maximum periods of time of only five
and ten years after naturalization for considering certain acts as reflecting adversely on
original eligibility for naturalization: (1) Refusing within the ten years following
naturalization to testify regarding subversive activities; or, (2) joining within five years
following naturalization an organization in which membership would have barred
naturalization. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 340, 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (2000); see
GORDON ET AL., supra note 166, § 96.10(7).
505 A thirty-five year length-of-citizenship requirement arguably has a basis in the
Constitution's Presidential age threshold, but would raise that age for anyone naturalized
after birth. Even a twenty-year length-of-citizenship requirement would additionally burden
those who naturalized after the age of fifteen.
506 See supra Part I and note 55.
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eliminates the natural born citizen requirement, Senate Joint Resolution 15
gives rise to the possibility of generating further confusion by employing the
term "native born" rather than "natural born." Consequently, given the
construction of the proposed amendment, if "natural born" and "native born"
are synonymous categories, then naturalized citizens would indeed be eligible.
However, if "natural born" is a category of birthright citizenship broader than
"native born," naturalized citizens might continue to be excluded.
One of the most far-reaching amendments proposed as a means of
eliminating the distinction among citizens is House Joint Resolution 67,
introduced on September 3, 2003 by Congressman Conyers: "A person who
has been a citizen of the United States for at least 20 years shall be eligible to
hold the Office of President. ' 50 7 This proposed amendment makes no mention
of the age and residency requirements. Although the introductory phrase
explains that its laudable purpose is "to permit persons who are not natural-
born citizens of the United States, but who have been citizens of the United
States for at least 20 years, to be eligible to hold the Office of President," 50 8 the
absence of any specific reference to the age and residency requirements could
create confusion about the continued validity of these additional requirements
set forth in Article II.
Despite many efforts to initiate the process of amending the Constitution, as
well as attempts to clarify the meaning of "natural born Citizen" by statute, the
language of the proviso remains exactly as it was in 1787. Today, however,
the inherent inequities of the proviso, as well as the potential political turmoil
and dangers its ambiguity may one day create, are only too apparent.
B. Suggestions for a Constitutional Amendment
Ideally, amendment of the natural born citizenship proviso should be
included in the comprehensive succession planning currently on the agenda of
many Congressional committees, as well as that of the Continuity of
Government Commission.5 0 9 Amendment of the proviso, however, is a
discrete task that can and should be undertaken separately if overall
restructuring of succession plans turns into a long-term effort. The benefits of
undertaking this task include abolition of the remnants of the "natural
aristocracy" and its concomitant overtones of racial and ethnic discrimination,
avoidance of the very real possibility of serious disputes involving future
Presidential elections, and elimination of a source of confusion over eligibility
to serve as Acting President that could impede the nation's ability to respond
quickly and effectively to a devastating terrorist attack, or the ravages of a
global pandemic or other natural disaster.
51 0
Assuming these outcomes are appropriate and realistic, it is possible to
507 H.R.J. Res. 67, 108th Cong. (2003).
508 Id.
509 See supra note 21.
510 See supra Part IV.
2005]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
identify several objectives for a proposed amendment to the natural bom
citizenship proviso. First, an amendment should eliminate any distinction or
quality of citizenship based on circumstances of birth. Second, an appropriate
change in the Presidential qualifications criteria need not disturb the criteria set
by the Framers that have worked reasonably well since 1787 - i.e., the age and
residency requirements set forth in Article II, Section 1, Clause 5. 511
A third objective is less obvious, but a good idea nevertheless. In light of
the realities of twenty-first century life, the Constitution should require a
multinational President-elect to renounce any and all claims to foreign
citizenship prior to taking the oath of office. 512 While there is little reason to
assume that a person who has amassed the credentials necessary to seek the
Presidency is likely to feel allegiance to any other nation-state, providing for
formal renunciation of potential bases for allegiance to another country would
remove any appearance of disloyalty that could tarnish the office.
Accordingly, an appropriate amendment to the Presidential qualifications
clause of Article II might read as follows:
Any citizen of the United States who has attained to the age of thirty five
years and who has been fourteen years a resident within the United States
shall be eligible to the Office of the President, provided that any person
elected to the office of President who is also a citizen of any other country
shall renounce any such citizenship under oath or by affirmation prior to
taking the oath of the office of President.
This proposed language addresses three critical issues. First, it permits any
and all United States citizens to serve as President of the United States, thereby
eliminating any possibility for confusion with respect to a Presidential election
or invocation of the procedures set forth in a federal succession statute.
Second, it leaves intact the age and residency qualifications that have been
relatively uncontroversial for more than two centuries. Finally, it takes into
account the reality that many people now hold claims to dual citizenship or
even multiple nationalities, but mandates that any specter of conflicting
allegiance should be exorcised before a President, Vice President, or Acting
President takes office.
C. Interim Measures
The process of amending the Constitution is often a lengthy one - the
Twenty-seventh Amendment was adopted more than two hundred years after it
5l1 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. To maximize clarity, however, Congress could
make the residency requirement more specific. Although examination of the issues that
could arise with respect to the residency criterion are beyond the scope of this discussion, if
a Constitutional amendment is initiated, Congress should strive to eliminate any ambiguity
pertaining to Presidential succession.
512 See supra Part II.C; see also Maximizing Voter Choice, supra note 10 (statement of
Matthew Spalding).
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was first proposed.513 Recent Congresses have generally provided self-
executing, seven-year sunset provisions in the resolutions proposing
constitutional amendments, 5 14 but even an amendment on the fast track is
likely to take several years to become part of the Constitution. Preparations for
Presidential elections begin long before the actual events, and the threat of a
national crisis is all too immediate. Congress should take interim measures to
decrease the impact of the uncertainty created by the natural born citizenship
proviso over the eligibility of Congressional leaders and cabinet members to
assume the office of Acting President.
Congress can accomplish this objective by amending the current succession
statute to eliminate the language that restricts the office of Acting President to
persons constitutionally qualified to serve as President.51 5 While Congress
might choose to limit eligibility for the office of Acting President to citizens
who are at least thirty-five years old and have been residents of the United
States for a specified period of time, these conditions should be explicitly set
forth in the succession statute. While it makes sense to incorporate the
Constitution's age and residency criteria, 516 it is inappropriate to import
513 See VILE, supra note 239, at 538. Congress proposed the Twenty-seventh amendment
in 1787, but it was not ratified until 1992. Id.
514 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 89, 108th Cong. (2004) (proposing a constitutional amendment
to provide for the appointment of individuals to fulfill vacancies in the House of
Representatives.); S.J. Res. 15, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing a constitutional amendment
to make those who have been citizens for twenty years eligible for the presidency); H.R.J.
Res. 77, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing a Constitutional amendment regarding the
appointment of individuals to fill vacancies in the House of Representatives); H.R.J. Res.
42, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing an amendment to deny United States citizenship to
individuals born in the United States to parents who are neither United States citizens nor
persons who owe permanent allegiance to the United States).
515 3 U.S.C. § 19(e) (2000). James Ho has eloquently stated reasons why the succession
statute should be amended in this fashion. See Unnatural Born Citizens, supra note 14, at
584-85. Congress might do so in the context of addressing the concerns raised by Akhil and
Vikram Amar, and others concerning the constitutionality of including the Speaker of the
House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate in the line of presidential succession. See Is
Succession Law Constitutional?, supra note 21, at 114.
516 If Congress wishes to restrict eligibility to the office of Acting President on the basis
of the quality of an individual's citizenship, it should do so with great care. Although the
Constitution does not require cabinet members to be United States citizens, it is extremely
unlikely that a President would choose, or the Senate confirm, anyone other than a United
States citizen as a member of the Cabinet. Even so, out of an abundance of caution,
Congress would be wise to mandate that an Acting President must be a United States
citizen. Unless and until the meaning of the term "natural born Citizen" is definitively
resolved by the Supreme Court or by a constitutional amendment, however, Congress
should eliminate natural born citizenship as a prerequisite for service as Acting President.
Otherwise, the federal succession statute simply multiplies the odds that the constitutional
ambiguity will cause serious problems if the nation ever finds itself facing the nightmare of
the loss of key leaders.
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ambiguity into the law designed to provide for swift and sure transition of
executive power in what - if it ever comes to pass - would surely be one of the
nation's darkest hours.
CONCLUSION
If the natural born citizenship proviso ever served a legitimate purpose, it
has long since outlived its usefulness. The most serious threats to our country
are no longer conniving European monarchs capable of enthralling illiterate
voters, but bitter political disputes, terrorist attacks, and diseases that quickly
circumnavigate the globe. The uncertainty the proviso creates with respect to
Presidential qualifications elevates the chances of another major electoral
dispute in the near future and increases the vulnerability of the nation in the
event of a crisis. Perhaps most importantly, in twenty-first century America,
the natural born citizenship clause serves to divide us rather than to protect us.
In a nation of immigrants, its inherent inequity flies in the face of the spirit of
equality at the heart of our constitutional system. The distinctions it creates
disserve Americans who work and live abroad while they do important jobs, it
debases those who have freely chosen this land as their home, and it dishonors
the sacrifices of thousands of members of the United States military and civil
services. In short, the proviso ties the hope of a nation not to a mature decision
that our Constitution and our beliefs are worthy of loyalty, but to an accident of
birth. It is time to eliminate it.
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